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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation proposes an exploration of a variety of themes in philosophy of 
science through the lens of a case study in evolutionary biology. It draws from a 
careful analysis and comparison of the hypotheses from Bill Martin and Tom 
Cavalier-Smith. These two scientists produced contrasted and competing 
accounts for one of the main events in the history of life, the origin of eukaryotic 
cells. This case study feeds four main philosophical themes around which this 
dissertation is articulated. (1) Theorizing: What kind of theory are hypotheses 
about unique events in the past? (2) Representation: How do hypotheses about 
the past represent their target? (3) Evidential claims: What kind of evidence is 
employed and how do they constrain these hypotheses? (4) Pluralism: What 
are the benefits and the risks associated with the coexistence of rival 
hypotheses? This work both seeks to rearticulate traditional debates in 
philosophy of science in the light of a lesser-known case of scientific practice 
and to enrich the catalogue of existing case studies in the philosophy of 
historical sciences.  
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CHAPTER 1: EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY BETWEEN SCIENCE AND HISTORY.  
INTRODUCTION 
There are two interlinked perspectives that can be taken on living organisms. 
One may wonder about how these organisms work or, alternatively, about how 
these forms of life came to be. Biology, the study of forms of life, has thus often 
been described as being composed of present-centred and past-centred 
investigations. It is from the latter that biology can be described as a historical 
inquiry. This historical side of biology comes under the name of evolutionary 
biology. This dissertation proposes a study of the practice of evolutionary 
biology as a historical science. 
Evolutionary biology is a multifaceted set of practices, and this work does not 
aim at exploring all of the richness this discipline has to offer. Some 
evolutionary biologists are dedicated to working out the general principles that 
drive the evolution of forms of life. Achieving this amounts to a formalization of 
evolution under a series of concepts, equations and models, and draws 
together theoretically-inclined biologists and philosophers of biology1. Other 
evolutionary biologists have tried to infer the series of events that marked the 
history of life, from its origin to the present. This dissertation is exclusively 
focused on this second type of practice2. This work studies evolutionary biology 
as a historical endeavour to reconstruct the history of life.  
What types of theories are produced? How do these theories represent their 
target? What kind of evidence is mobilized? How does theory choice occur? 
These general questions are going to be addressed in this specific context 
within evolutionary biology in the following chapters. Before doing this, this first 
chapter starts off with some methodological considerations. Concretely, three 
things are on this chapter‟s program: (a) clearing off some of the tensions at the 
                                            
1 Examples include Sober 1984; Okasha 2006, Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006; 
Godfrey-Smith 2009.  
2 These endeavours are not mutually exclusive. There are various examples of 
works that combine both theoretical and historical aspects (e.g. Maynard-Smith 
and Szathmáry 1997; Darwin 1859).  
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intersection between history and science; (b) specifying my aims and 
methodology and (c) breaking down the upcoming chapters.  
Evolutionary biology, as a historical science, lies at the intersection between 
history and science. Qualifying something as historical and scientific generates 
tensions. Analysts and practitioners of history have on several occasions 
claimed the autonomy of their field from science. Conversely, some 
philosophers of science do not consider history to belong to the traditional 
catalogue of sciences and to provide scientific knowledge.  
The first part of this chapter aims at dissipating these residual tensions by 
dispelling two arguments mobilized in favour of a separation between history 
and science. Firstly, I argue that some of the stated reasons for separating 
history from science are based on an outdated and narrow picture of what 
scientific knowledge is. Once released from the idea that science is a strictly 
nomological endeavour and emphasizing instead the methodological disunity of 
the sciences, there are no obstacles to the accommodation of history within the 
scientific picture. Another separatist strategy is to ground the autonomy of 
history on its object of inquiry: humans. The special nature of humans is argued 
to grant history a separate epistemic position, away from the scientific study of a 
“mindless” universe. I argue, on methodological grounds, that a strong 
separation is unwarranted and that the study of the history of humans bears 
continuities with the rest of historical inquiries, whether about animate or 
inanimate matter.   
Undermining the arguments supporting the separation of history from science 
prepares the ground for two things. First, rejecting the separation between 
history and science legitimates a study of history as a scientific inquiry. In terms 
of resources, then, it makes relevant the use of concepts and notions derived 
both from the study of scientific and historical practices. Establishing 
methodological continuities between (human) history and historical sciences 
ensures that no artificial barrier exists between the studies of these practices.  
After releasing existing tensions and enlarging the breadth of potentially 
relevant literature to my analysis, the second part of this chapter explores some 
of the available philosophical methodologies. This allows me to specify the 
types of questions, methods and results I‟d like to draw inspiration from. To do 
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that, I draw parallels between philosophical projects independently presented in 
the context of the study of science and of the study of history. In the context of 
science, I discuss Godfrey-Smith‟s distinction between “philosophy of nature” 
and “philosophy of science”. In the context of history, I think Tucker‟s distinction 
between “philosophy of history” and “philosophy of historiography” goes on 
similar lines to Godfrey-Smith‟s. On one hand, philosophy of nature and 
philosophy of history propose studies of the constituents and properties of, 
respectively, the phenomena studied in scientific and historical inquiries. It 
attempts to extract the deeper meaning of our best scientific and historical 
theories, a philosophical method characterized as naturalism. On the other 
hand, philosophy of science and philosophy of historiography provide analyses 
of the scientific and historical practices and methods. It relies on historical, 
social and methodological studies to understand how scientists and historians 
acquire knowledge about the world. 
I argue against a strong separation between the first and the second types of 
projects. Both types of projects, I think, can be run conjointly. For this, I draw 
inspiration from existing studies of science that study the relation between 
theories, practices and the world at the same time. I characterize this latter 
position further and outline some of its commitments. I argue these projects also 
commit to a form of methodological naturalism, which defends the use of the 
best available scientific and conceptual resources to tackle questions about 
science. This methodological stance provides an ideal that is only partially 
achieved in this present work. I conclude this chapter by presenting and 
motivating the successive chapters of this dissertation, and by a discussion of 
their scope and limits.  
I. HISTORY AWAY FROM SCIENCE? A REBUTTAL 
A. HISTORICAL SCIENCES AND HUMAN HISTORY 
I propose a study of evolutionary biology as a historical science. By doing this, I 
position my work within an emerging subfield in philosophy of science. Currie 
and Turner have recently provided a definition of “historical scientists”:  
Historical scientists, from cosmologists to archaeologists, tackle 
important but difficult tasks: reconstructing the events and entities which 
populate the deep past, understanding their formation and development, 
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and learning how to see our contemporary world in terms of its long 
history. (Currie and Turner 2016, 43)3 
This definition integrates a wide set of activities revolving around the study of 
the deep past. Since it involves both cosmologists and archaeologists, it sets 
minimal boundaries on how deep the events of the past must be to belong to 
the historical sciences. The time-span dealt with by historical sciences only 
excludes the “shallow” past, a past too close yet to be worthy of historical study. 
What remains unclear, from this definition, is the relation between historical 
sciences and history, the latter traditionally understood as the study of the 
human past.  
While Currie and Turner explicitly avoid “playing demarcation games” (Currie 
and Turner 2016, 43), I think that inquiring whether history belongs to historical 
sciences can help to unpack some tensions at the intersection between history 
and science. This relation is not always perceived as problematic. Tucker, in the 
introduction of his Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography, 
affirms that  
The scope of history is all of the past: societies have a history, but so do 
rocks, languages, species, and indeed the universe. Historiography in 
this broader sense attempts then to infer descriptions of the histories of 
everything (Tucker 2009a, 2–3). 
In this view, historical sciences are uncontroversially part of history (and vice 
versa). This statement matches with the wide variety of subjects addressed in 
Tucker‟s companion, which includes chapters on human history, but also on the 
history of non-human living as well as non-living entities. For others, however, 
the idea of continuity between history and historical sciences is perceived as 
problematic and faces some objections. I attempt here to deal with two such 
objections. The first argues that history does not provide scientific knowledge. 
The second one argues that the focus on humans singles out human history 
                                            
3 Tucker has also provided a definition of historical sciences, as “sciences that 
attempt to infer rigorously representations of past events, processes, and their 
causal relations from their information-preserving effects” (Tucker 2014, 365). I 
prefer the wider array of activities included in Currie and Turner‟s definition.  
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(and the rest of the social and human sciences, for that matter) from the rest of 
the sciences.  
B. OBJECTION 1: “HISTORY IS NOT A SCIENCE” 
On a recent defence of scientific pluralism, Dupré characterizes history as part 
of the “traditional non-sciences” (Dupré 2012, 38). While this brief mention was 
surely not a key component of his argumentation, I think that it still provides a 
good illustration of the tendency to keep history and science apart. What 
legitimates this separation?  
Making this separation requires committing (implicitly or not) to a view about 
what science is. Often4, science has been described as following a “nomological 
ideal”. In this view, scientific investigations try to uncover the “laws of nature”: a 
set of regularities couched in mathematical equations that enable to explain and 
predict the behaviour of the various entities composing this world. Historical 
investigations, which aim at explaining the causes driving the occurrence of 
single events, are not scientific in this sense. They are not interested “in the 
search for general laws which might govern these events” (Hempel 1942, 35). 
This interpretation leaves four possibilities to the notion of “historical science”: 
(1) contrary to general beliefs, historical inquiries are scientific because they do 
establish laws of nature; (2) historical sciences are immature forms of science, 
as they fail to establish and apply laws of nature; (3) “historical science” is an 
oxymoron, since they do not aim to establish laws of nature and (4) historical 
sciences are scientific because the nomological ideal does not adequately 
capture what counts as scientific.  
Possibilities (1), (2) and (3) stem from a belief in the nomological ideal of 
science. It hinges the scientific character of history on matters of goal and 
success. If they both do not aim to and fail to establish the laws of history, then 
(3) prevails and history is not a science. If they aim to, but fail, to establish laws, 
then (2) prevails and history is an immature science. If they aim, and manage, 
to establish the laws of history, then (1) prevails and history is a science.  
An example of the defence of (1) in the context of human history dates from the 
19th century and the works of the founder of sociology: Auguste Comte and his 
                                            
4 Though I doubt this is Dupré‟s case. 
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“Law of Three Stages” (Comte 1830). While it is not articulated in mathematical 
terms, it argues that the evolution of human societies follows three stages: 
“theological”, “metaphysical” and “positive”. On Comte‟s view, history is 
scientific (possibility (1)) because it satisfies a positivistic ideal by connecting 
observations about past societies into well-established regularities. In another 
context, the existence of such laws has also been used to claim the 
epistemological superiority of evolutionary biology over (human) history. Here, 
evolutionary biologists Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry spoke of the “great 
advantage” they possessed over historians:  
we have agreed theories both of chemistry and of the mechanism of 
evolutionary change. We can therefore insist that our explanations be 
plausible both chemically, and in terms of natural selection. This places a 
severe constraint on possible theories (Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 
1997, 3). 
What the authors mean by the agreed theory of evolutionary change is a 
commitment to a gene-centric view of evolution. In their view, “the transitions 
must be explained in terms of immediate selective advantage to individual 
replicators” (Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 1997, 8). In addition to this, the 
constraints on organisms imposed by the principles of chemistry, according to 
them, are sufficiently strong to limit greatly what can be claimed about the past. 
Historians, in their view, do not benefit from any such set of constraints to limit 
what they can say about human actions. In other words, Maynard-Smith and 
Szathmáry consider evolutionary biology as scientific since it establishes and 
applies nomological principles (possibility (1)). History, however, isn‟t because it 
fails to do so (possibility (2) or (3)).  
Comte‟s positive law for the evolution of societies has been refuted several 
times since it arguably fits history in a very tight Procrustean bed. Maynard-
Smith and Szathmáry can also be criticized for their strong commitment for and 
confidence in a gene-centric view of evolution that has also been criticized and 
considered as too monolithic. The existence and scope of general principles 
driving historical change, as mentioned in the opening lines of this chapter, are 
the subject of ongoing scientific and philosophical attention. In the case of 
biological evolution, a consensus on these questions does not seem to have 
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been reached and does not always seem to be aimed for. Similarly, the strength 
of the constraints stemming from the principles of chemistry also needs to be 
relativized. On a discussion of existing theories about the origin of life, Malaterre 
observed that the space of possible chemical reactions was only “very loosely” 
constrained (Malaterre 2010, 45-46). This view has more broadly been 
formulated by Gould:  
Invariant laws of nature impact the general forms and functions of 
organisms; they set the channels in which organic design must evolve. 
But the channels are so broad relative to the details that fascinate us! […] 
When we set our focus on the level of detail that regulates most common 
questions about the history of life, contingency dominates and the 
predictability of general form recedes to an irrelevant background (Gould 
1989, 289-290). 
Without necessarily subscribing to how weak Gould argues these constraints to 
be (and the “strong contingency” thesis associated with it), his and Malaterre‟s 
positions illustrate the open nature of this debate. The absence of agreed 
theories of evolution and of sufficiently strict constraints provided by the laws of 
nature seem, then, to invalidate the posture that would single out evolutionary 
inquiries from historical ones on the basis of their closeness to a nomological 
ideal. At best, this difference could be interpreted as a matter of degree: it is 
likely that some disciplines within historical sciences apply tighter, “quasi-
nomological”, constraints on the past phenomena they try to explain.  
Another possibility is to argue for the possibility (4), by claiming that the 
“nomological ideal” presents a dated view of what scientific knowledge is. This 
criticism has a long history. In the late 19th century, Windelband already 
complained about a form of “nomothetic imperialism” originating from 
mathematics and the natural sciences and providing normative guidelines on 
how other sciences should look (Windelband 1980). This complaint also 
underlines the literature defending scientific pluralism and the disunity of 
science (see Dupré 1993; Wylie 2002; Kellert, Longino and Waters 2006; 
Chang 2012) which highlights in several ways the unrealistic expectations and 
nefarious consequences of the reliance on a monistic nomological ideal for the 
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sciences5. If one endorses this view, and I do, it then relaxes our criteria of 
scientificity by releasing the expectation that properly scientific endeavours aim 
at producing and establishing laws of nature6. The scientificity of history, then, 
does not depend on its ambition to produce and successfully apply laws of 
nature. Failure to do both things is not sufficient to refuse to grant scientific 
status to a practice. In other words, history‟s traditional focus on explaining 
unique events without merely invoking general principles is not in principle 
unscientific.  
If there are no arguments against viewing history as a science, are there 
contrary, positive ones? Despite defending the disunity of science, Dupré 
identifies a set of virtues shared, in different degrees, by all scientific inquiries, 
namely  
sensitivity to empirical fact, plausible background assumptions, 
coherence with other things we know, exposure to criticism from the 
widest variety of sources and no doubt others (Dupré 1993, 243).  
It would be surprising to think that these virtues are not possessed by all 
historical investigations. Sources of various origins provide empirical grounds 
and enable criticisms. The background assumptions invoked for the behaviour 
of the various entities and phenomena described must be plausible. Historical 
hypotheses are undoubtedly aiming to have some degree of coherence with 
existing knowledge on the relevant subjects. In addition to these virtues, 
achieving progress can be seen as a sign of flourishing scientific practices. 
While scientific progress has been a notoriously difficult notion to pin down with 
precision, historical investigations can be seen as progressive. This, for 
instance, has been documented by Rudwick concerning the history of the Earth 
(Rudwick 2014), Gould, Sapp and Archibald for our understanding of biological 
                                            
5 The argument runs for other forms of monism in science.  
6 By defending this approach, I am not denying the importance of regularities 
and nomological principles in scientific investigations, including historical ones. I 
just refuse to evaluate the scientificity of an investigation solely on its capacity 
to provide and apply such general principles.  
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evolution (Gould 1989; Sapp 1994; Archibald 2014) and has been 
metaphorically summarized by Bloch in the context of human history:  
[In a bit more than a century,] gigantic patches of humanity emerged from 
the mists. Egypt and Chaldea shook off their shrouds. Dead cities of 
Central Asia revealed their languages that no-one could speak anymore, 
and their religions that were long extinct (Bloch 1949, 22, own 
translation). 
This spectacular ability that history possesses to “bring to epistemic life” 
unobservable features of the world, I think, is similar to the ability of physics to 
discuss unobservable microparticles and faraway planets. No one doubts the 
scientific character of physics. By possessing or responding to all these 
epistemic virtues, I think that history belongs to the sciences. There is, 
therefore, nothing paradoxical in talking about “historical sciences”.  
C. OBJECTION 2: “HUMANS MAKE A DIFFERENCE” 
If there are no good objections to considering history as a science, there are still 
arguments that would grant a special character to the study of the human past. 
These arguments point to a strong distinction between (human) history and the 
rest of historical sciences. The idea is that the subject-matter of history, 
humans, somehow separates this inquiry from the rest7. This section attempts 
to critically assess these arguments. 
“The subject-matter of history is, by nature, Man. Better: Humans” (Bloch 1949, 
4, own translation). This quote from Bloch can be interpreted in two ways. A 
weak interpretation would see in this quote the delineation of what is 
traditionally called “history” as a subfield of the existing historical sciences. This 
delineation can, alternatively, be seen in a stronger way: there is a something 
fundamentally distinct about the study of the human past. What is not about 
humans is not distinctively historical. The weaker interpretation does not conflict 
with a claim of methodological continuity between historical sciences and 
history. The stronger interpretation, however, does. It echoes some of the 
intuitions sometimes stated by analysts. Kosso, for instance, declares that 
                                            
7 It is likely that this discussion similarly applies to the rest of social and human 
sciences.  
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“persons, unlike electrons, are not all alike. People, unlike planets, are 
expressive and creative” (Kosso 2009, 10). As a consequence, “[u]nderstanding 
humans may be a fundamentally different process than understanding the 
mindless objects studied in natural science. [Human history] may be 
fundamentally distinct from science” (Kosso 2009, 24).  
Tucker has, in another context, nicely summarized the tension between the two 
interpretations of Bloch‟s claim. He affirms that  
some philosophical approaches to historiography consider it special for 
having a human subject matter. Forms of description, understanding, and 
explanation in historiography are allegedly different because of this 
special subject matter. From this perspective, history would refer then 
exclusively to the human past […]. Alternative philosophical approaches 
argue that there are some common and unique features to all the 
sciences of the past, sciences that are concerned with the inference of 
unobservable token events from their traces in the present (Tucker 
2009a, 3)8. 
In order to critically assess the stronger separatist interpretation, I now turn to 
the works of Collingwood, who articulated a detailed argument for the 
separation of human history from the rest of the historical (and natural) 
sciences.  
Collingwood, in strong terms, denies the possibility of a genuine historical 
knowledge about non-humans:  
[T]here is and can be no history of nature, whether as perceived or as 
thought by the scientist. No doubt nature contains, undergoes, or even 
consists of, processes; […]. But all this goes no way towards proving that 
the life of nature is an historical life or that our knowledge of it is historical 
knowledge. The only condition on which there could be a history of 
nature is that the events of nature are actions on the part of some 
                                            
8 A similar distinction has been made by Glennan, attributing the first view to a 
form of “anti-naturalism” and the second to a form of “naturalism” (Glennan 
2010, 252). I discuss forms of naturalism later on this chapter.  
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thinking being or beings, and that by studying these actions we could 
discover what were the thoughts which they expressed and think these 
thoughts for ourselves. This is a condition which probably no one will 
claim is fulfilled. Consequently, the processes of nature are not historical 
processes and our knowledge of nature, though it may resemble history 
in certain superficial ways, e.g. by being chronological, is not historical 
knowledge (Collingwood 1994, 302). 
This is an extended quote, but it clearly albeit densely states the main lines of 
Collingwood‟s argument.  
In this paragraph, Collingwood doesn‟t deny that disciplines such as geology or 
evolutionary biology generate scientific knowledge, but that these disciplines 
can generate historical knowledge. Why is human history so special? According 
to Collingwood, it is because it is driven by the actions of thinking beings: 
humans. Then, what difference does thinking make? Thoughts drive (but does 
not fully determine) individual acts (Collingwood 1994, 309). It would be foolish, 
otherwise, to assume that someone “acted with no idea whatever what would 
come of it, but did the first thing that came into his head and merely waited to 
see the consequences” (Collingwood 1994, 310).  
Not merely conceived as a driver to history, thoughts are also argued to 
possess a universal character:  
The peculiarity of thought is that, in addition to occurring here and now in 
this context, it can sustain itself through a change of context and revive in 
a different one (Collingwood 1994, 297). 
This way, acts of thought possess a certain independence from experience or 
others thoughts occurring in a specific context. Collingwood illustrates this by 
talking about mathematics:  
The self-identity of the act of thinking that these two angles are equal is 
not only independent of such matters as that a person performing it is 
hungry and cold, and feels his chair hard beneath him, and is bored with 
his lesson: it is also independent of further thoughts, such as the book 
says they are equal, or that the master believes them to be equal; or 
even thoughts more closely relevant to the subject in hand, as that their 
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sum, plus the angle at the vertex, is 180 degrees (Collingwood 1994, 
298). 
These self-conscious, reflective thoughts, thoughts “performed in the 
consciousness that it is being performed”, which lead us to “do something of 
which we have a conception before we do it” (Collingwood 1994, 308), are the 
“atoms” which historians aim at discovering in their work. In other words, these 
acts of thoughts are the mental objects remaining from the subjective actions of 
past people. This is what is epistemologically accessible to the historian, and 
what he aims to re-enact in his own thoughts. 
Collingwood illustrates this with the way to gain historical knowledge about the 
Theodosian Code:  
Suppose, for example, [the historian] is reading the Theodosian Code, 
and has before him a certain edict of an emperor. Merely reading the 
words and being able to translate them does not amount to knowing their 
historical significance. In order to do that he must envisage the situation 
with which the emperor was trying to deal, and he must envisage it as 
that emperor envisaged it. Then he must see for himself, just as if the 
emperor‟s situation were his own, how such a situation might be dealt 
with; he must see the possible alternatives, and the reasons for choosing 
one rather than another; and thus he must go through the process which 
the emperor went through in deciding on this particular course. Thus he 
is re-enacting in his own mind the experience of the emperor; and only in 
so far as he does this has he any historical knowledge, as distinct from a 
merely philological knowledge, of the meaning of the edict (Collingwood 
1994, 283). 
The epistemic privilege granted by this unique connection between historians 
and their human subject-matter is what maintains history as an “autonomous 
form of thought with its own principles and its own methods” (Collingwood 1994, 
140). To summarize, historical knowledge is the knowledge of human acts of 
thoughts, driving human actions and accessible by mental re-enactment by 
historians.  
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What, then, makes a historical re-enactment a good one? Historical evidence, 
according to Collingwood, is  
evidence of how such thinking has been done and that the historian 
should be able to interpret it, that is, should be able to re-enact in his own 
mind the thought he is studying, envisaging the problem from which it 
started and reconstructing the steps by which its solution was attempted 
(Collingwood 1994, 312–13). 
This, then, requires a good knowledge of (a) the context in which these 
thoughts occurred as well as (b) a good knowledge of human behaviour and 
psychology. The former relies on knowledge of the numerous material aspects 
of societies (i.e. geography, agriculture, architecture). I argue that this type of 
knowledge does not single out human history from the rest of historical 
sciences.  I argue that knowing about the former is methodologically continuous 
with the rest of the historical sciences. Of course, palaeontologists and 
cosmologists are not attempting to “reenact” in their own mind the experiences 
of extinct mammals and asteroids. However, these different inquiries share a 
commitment to epistemically recreate the “universe” in which the past event of 
interest purportedly occurred.  
Knowing about human behaviour and psychology is, in some respects, 
continuous with knowing about the behaviour and psychology of other, non-
human, historically relevant beings. However, this is also where human history 
and historical sciences might bear some methodological divergences. Contrary 
to Collingwood, I don‟t think that this comes from the ability to decontextualize 
and recontextualize acts of thoughts. Historians, as much as other social 
scientists, study what Hacking calls interactive kinds (Hacking 1999). In this 
view, humans interact with the classifications they describe themselves with. 
These classifications can shape the behaviour of the people thus classified and, 
consequently, eventually requires changing the description of the category via 
what Hacking terms a looping effect. In the above example, the expectations 
and norms associated with the status of Roman emperor undoubtedly shaped 
Theodosius‟ behaviour, and in turn, his reign as an emperor surely shaped the 
expectations and norms associated with this social category.  
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This phenomenon, however, does not occur with categories describing non-
humans. In Hacking‟s terms,  
The classification “quark” is indifferent in the sense that calling a quark a quark 
makes no difference to the quark (Hacking 1999, 105) 
The extent to which the interaction between the knowledge of past humans with 
the kinds they are described with makes human history methodologically 
distinct from historical sciences is a matter of interpretation. It surely constitutes 
a source of methodological difficulty. However, here, like in the rest of historical 
sciences, historians are tributaries of increases of knowledge in the relevant 
scientific domains.  
Emphasizing the presence of methodological continuities between historical 
sciences and human history by no means eliminates the diversity of 
phenomena and methods found in these inquiries: from archaeology to social 
history, from post-colonialism to cosmology. In this view, however, they are 
rather subparts of the same family, a set of related inquiries interested in the 
past and producing different forms of historical knowledge. It is likely, then, that 
some of the analyses of the practice of human history are illuminating for our 
understanding of how knowledge in other historical sciences is produced. The 
reverse is also true. I argue that analysts of human history should not dismiss 
methodological investigations on the production of historical knowledge about 
non-human entities. To summarize this first part, I argued against conceiving 
human history and historical sciences as strongly separated. These inquiries 
are both defended as being scientific, and as possessing methodological 
continuities.  
II. METHODOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES 
If history and historical sciences are methodologically continuous, the scope of 
relevant resources to understand the practices of evolutionary biology is then 
extremely wide. In this second part I attempt to explore methodological 
possibilities, thus help to clarify the sort of projects I‟d like to run in this 
dissertation. I start by pointing to the existence of parallel projects in both the 
study of human history and in the philosophy of science.  
A. METAPHYSICAL VS. PRACTICE-ORIENTED PHILOSOPHICAL PROJECTS 
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Tucker recently attempted to clarify and unify the terminology used in the 
various studies of historical practice. His conceptual arsenal is mainly 
articulated around a distinction between “history” and “historiography”. History is 
defined as the “past events and processes” (Tucker 2009b, xii). It designates 
the phenomena under historical investigation. Historiography is defined as 
“what historians write, about past events, about history” (Tucker 2009b, xii). It 
designates the products of historical investigation9.  
Following this line, Tucker makes a distinction between “philosophy of history” 
and “philosophy of historiography”. Philosophy of history is the “philosophical 
examination, study, and theorizing about the past” (Tucker 2009b, xii). It aims at 
uncovering the deeper dynamics of the past: its various components and the 
principles and processes that guide historical change. Philosophy of 
historiography is defined as the “philosophical examination, study, and 
theorizing about […] what historians write, and its relation to the evidence” 
(Tucker 2009b, xii).  This one is not concerned with the structure of the past, but 
with how the past is studied. To summarize, Tucker‟s distinction between 
philosophy of history and philosophy of historiography is between an 
examination of the deeper meaning of historical knowledge and a study of the 
production of historical knowledge. This distinction closely maps Dray‟s earlier 
distinction between “speculative” and “critical” history10.  
Tucker highlights the parallels between his distinction between “philosophy of 
history” and “philosophy of historiography” respectively with the one between 
“philosophy of nature” and “philosophy of science” in the study of science 
(Tucker 2009a, 3-4). In the latter context, Godfrey-Smith proposed to  
                                            
9 “Historiography” has a variety of possible meanings. In addition to Tucker‟s 
definition, it can also designate the analysis of the writing of history (Salevouris 
and Furay 2015, 256), the analysis of historical practice (beyond writing) 
(Offenstadt 2011, 1) or the activity of writing history (Arnold 2000, 5).  
10 “The speculative seeks to discover in history, the course of events, a pattern 
of meaning which lies beyond the purview of the ordinary historian. The critical 
endeavours to make clear the nature of the historian‟s own inquiry, in order to 
“locate” it, as it were, on the map of knowledge” (Dray 1964, 1). 
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distinguish philosophy of science, in a narrower sense, from philosophy 
of nature. Philosophy of science in this narrower sense is an attempt to 
understand the activity and the products of science itself. When doing 
philosophy of nature, we are trying to understand the universe and our 
place in it (Godfrey-Smith 2014, 4). 
The parallels between Godfrey-Smith and Tucker‟s distinctions are indeed 
clear. Philosophy of nature and philosophy of history share a common interest 
in being focused on scientific products and their metaphysical meaning. They 
are, in Tucker‟s words, “sub-fields of metaphysics that examine the ultimate 
constituent parts of everything” (Tucker 2009a, 4). Philosophy of science and 
philosophy of historiography concern the examination of scientific practice and 
its various constituents. It examines the conditions under which scientific 
knowledge is produced. 
Despite differences in subject-matter, I argue that these two types of 
philosophical projects (henceforth metaphysical and practice-oriented) are 
underpinned by a similar methodological commitment, broadly named 
“naturalism”. I first illustrate how naturalistic commitments are at play in 
philosophy of biology, an instance of a metaphysical project.  
B. NATURALISTIC APPROACHES IN METAPHYSICAL AND PRACTICE-ORIENTED 
PROJECTS 
If the metaphysical project is a study of the deeper meaning of scientific 
products, it is intuitive to guess the nature of the data on which this 
philosophical analysis is based. Godfrey-Smith describes this methodology as 
“working out what the raw science is really telling us, and using it to put together 
an overall picture of the world” (Godfrey-Smith 2014, 4). Applied to the context 
of biology,  
The science of biology becomes an instrument – a lens – through which 
we look at the natural world. Science is then a resource for philosophy 
rather than a subject matter (Godfrey-Smith 2014, 4). 
This position is echoed by Griffiths‟ assessment of the methodology ideally 
employed by philosophers of biology:  
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Ideally, philosophy of biology differs from biology itself not in its 
knowledge base, but only in the questions it asks. The philosopher aims 
to engage with the content of biology at a professional level, although 
typically with greater knowledge of its history than biologists themselves, 
and less hands-on skills (Griffiths 2014). 
This way, philosophy and biology are perceived to be in a mutually beneficial 
relationship. As Sterelny and Griffiths describe,  
philosophy is important to biology because biology‟s exciting conclusions 
do not follow from the facts alone. Conversely, biology is important to 
philosophy because these exciting conclusions really do depend on the 
biological facts (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 5). 
They illustrate their claim with the refutation of the doctrine of biological 
determinism, a philosophical position that has been shown false “because of the 
facts of evolutionary theory and genetics” (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 5-6). A 
proposed methodology for the metaphysical project, then, is to extract, by 
philosophical analysis, the deeper meanings from the facts provided by the 
biological sciences11.  
Griffiths considers these methodological commitments to belong to a form of 
naturalism in which there is “no profound discontinuity in either method or 
content between philosophy and science” (Griffiths 2014). It makes it difficult to 
tell apart theoretical biology from philosophy of biology. In a similar vein, 
Godfrey-Smith recognizes that tackling metaphysical questions “is not 
something that only philosophers can do” (Godfrey-Smith 2014, 4). 
Conceptually-minded biologists are also in the business of providing a deeper 
meaning to biological facts: they are also capable of “distilling the philosophical 
upshot of scientific work” (Godfrey-Smith 2014, 4).  
                                            
11 An earlier endorsement of a similar position has been made by Mayr, who 
describes biological sciences as “the most suitable […] starting point of 
analysis” for deeper questions about the nature of life and the place of humanity 
(Mayr 1969, 202).  
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By extrapolation from this case within biology, metaphysical projects, 
comprising philosophy of history and philosophy of nature, endorse a form of 
naturalism, defined as a commitment to ground philosophical analysis on 
scientific results. In the case of biology, this means grounding philosophical 
discussions about the nature of life on biological facts. In the case of historical 
sciences, it means discussing the nature of historical change on the basis of 
historical facts.  
In practice-oriented philosophical projects, there are (at least) two domains that 
can be uncontroversially attributed to a naturalistic methodology. The first of 
them is “evolutionary epistemology” (EE). Evolutionary epistemology can refer 
to two distinct projects. The first one (“the evolution of epistemological 
mechanisms”, EEM) is “the label for the program which attempts to provide an 
evolutionary account of the development of cognitive structures” (Bradie and 
Harms 2016). The production of scientific knowledge relies on individual and 
collective cognitive capacities that are products of evolution. How and why did 
these capacities come to evolve in humans? The second project (“the 
evolutionary epistemology of theories”, EET) “attempts to account for the 
evolution of ideas, scientific theories, epistemic norms and culture in general by 
using models and metaphors drawn from evolutionary biology” (Bradie and 
Harms 2016). In this view, it is possible to account for the processes behind the 
genesis and development of scientific theories by using the conceptual 
apparatus provided by evolutionary theory12. Both EE programs, then, are 
openly naturalistic as, at least, it employs the concepts stemming from 
evolutionary biology to understand scientific practices.  
Another example of a practice-oriented naturalistic project can be found in the 
study of scientific reasoning as defended by Bechtel. In this case,  
the naturalized approach to understanding the mind and brain involves 
seeing them as part of the natural world (rather than as miraculous or 
supernatural anomalies) and recognizing the biological, evolutionary, and 
                                            
12 For classical works in EET, see Popper 1972; Campbell 1974; Hull 1988. An 
instance of a more recent attempt is Rouse 2016. For a critical discussion, see 
Callebaut 1993, 286-337.  
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environmental pressures which have helped to shape them (Bechtel et 
al. 2001, 7). 
This naturalized approach is continuous with EEM, as it also studies reasoning 
in an evolutionary lens, albeit this project is less strictly committed to describing 
these processes in strictly evolutionary terms. The overarching methodological 
commitment emphasized by Bechtel is that it is particularly important to be 
“shaped” by science when facing these questions (Bechtel in Callebaut 1993, 
352-353). By this, he means that philosophical questions and concepts must 
come second. They should not guide the analysis of scientific knowledge by 
framing the questions and problems the relevant scientific knowledge will help 
us to solve. Instead, in Bechtel‟s view, philosophical questions and problems 
must emerge and be shaped by the analysis of existing scientific debates and 
knowledge. For instance, anybody interested in questions about cognition 
should start by analysing what scientific studies of this process have to say.  
These examples highlight how methodological commitments to naturalism can 
fuel a variety of philosophy of science projects. At the very least, naturalism 
represents an application of metaphors and concepts derived from scientific 
disciplines to feed practice-oriented analyses (as in the case of EET). At the 
other extreme, attempts at philosophical analysis of the outcomes of scientific 
practice must, as Bechtel‟s stronger view argues, primarily draw inspiration 
from, and be shaped by, scientific practices and problems. In this case, 
philosophy is entirely shaped by and subordinate to science. All these 
philosophical projects share a belief, albeit in various degrees, on a scientific 
basis to philosophical discussions and in the impossibility of a philosophical 
inquiry on science that is autonomous from scientific knowledge and practices.  
This section argued that the metaphysical and practice-oriented projects are 
amenable to a naturalistic methodology. I have, however, not yet displayed 
instances of projects that explicitly bridged these two types of philosophical 
practice. The next section presents projects that are overtly both metaphysical 
and practice-oriented. They can be found in recent studies of scientific practice. 
I argue that these projects are also committed to a form of methodological 
naturalism.   
C. INTEGRATED STUDIES OF SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 
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These integrated projects, albeit not exclusively, can be found in works of 
members of the “Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice” (SPSP 
hereafter). This society‟s manifesto contains an explicit statement of its aims 
and methods.  
If we are interested in exploring the assumptions and methods underlying 
the sciences, it is essential not only to explore the theories and results 
produced by scientists, but the processes by which they came to these 
conclusions. And what we learn from history of science is that scientific 
practices should be evaluated in their historical contexts reaching up to 
the present moment. Without excavating underneath the tidy surface of 
published papers or finalized theories, it is extremely difficult to identify 
these processes. SPSP is dedicated to fostering the pursuit of a 
philosophy of science that considers theory, practice and the world 
simultaneously, and never in isolation from each other (Ankeny et al. 
2011, 304, own emphasis).  
The first part of this quote primarily concerns practice-oriented projects. It 
emphasizes the methodological need to go beyond the analysis of scientific 
products to understand the processes shaping scientific practice. This need to 
“excavate underneath” what appears in scientific outcomes is a call, in 
philosophy of science, to integrate historical, sociological and anthropological 
studies of scientific practices. It corresponds to what Soler et al. characterized 
as a shift “from decontextualized, intellectual, explicit, individual and „purely 
cognitive‟” understanding of scientific practice to a “contextualized, material, 
tacit, collective, and psycho-social” understanding of scientific practice (Soler et 
al. 2014, 20).  
This kind of naturalistic practice-oriented projects is dedicated to using the best 
available scientific resources to deal with a given philosophical problem. By 
scientific, I do not only mean resources from the natural sciences as sometimes 
understood (and as approaches such as EEM primarily use), but also include 
historical, sociological or anthropological resources. As in naturalistic 
philosophy of biology, these resources provide the knowledge base on which 
philosophical analysis can develop.  
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One successful example of such a naturalistic study of scientific practice is 
Leonelli‟s study of the Gene Ontology database, which, she argues, requires 
“the integrated use of history, philosophy, and social studies of biology” to 
provide a “complex, multifaceted, and possibly more truthful analysis of what 
bioinformatics tools are and mean for contemporary biology” (Leonelli 2010, 
121). Leonelli‟s method is, in her own terms, a form of “empirical philosophy of 
science”13. This type of approach, I think, is methodologically continuous with 
the naturalistic approaches outlined above, to the difference that it seems 
committed to using a broader knowledge base by drawing from a wider array of 
disciplines.  
The last sentence of the quote from the SPSP manifesto contains a more 
radical philosophical statement. By arguing that “theory, practice and the world” 
must be studied simultaneously, they deny grounds to “merely metaphysical” 
and “merely practice-oriented” philosophical projects. On this quote, it is 
unwarranted to engage in metaphysical discussions that abstract from 
methodological considerations of a given practice. In this view, conceptual 
commitments and scientific results are embedded within a given scientific 
practice, and cannot be given proper meaning if the context in which these 
concepts are at play and these results are produced is backgrounded. In other 
words, scientific practice and scientific products are too entangled to be studied 
in isolation. 
Existing work in philosophy of historical sciences provides cases of such an 
entangled methodology. All across her collection of essays on archaeology, 
                                            
13 The goal of this way of proceeding “is to bring philosophical concerns and 
scholarship to bear on the daily practice of scientific research and everything 
that such practice entails, including processes of inquiry, material constraints, 
institutional settings, and social dynamics among participants. […] The methods 
used in this work range from argumentation grounded in relevant philosophical, 
historical, anthropological, and sociological literature to analyses of publications 
in natural science journals; consultation of archives documenting the functioning 
and development of biological databases; and multisided ethnographic 
explorations, on- and offline, of the lives and worlds that these databases create 
and inhabit” (Leonelli 2016, 6-7).  
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Wylie ties conceptual and methodological issues with the direct results they 
may have in practice (Wylie 2002). For instance, she discusses the influence of 
assumptions about gender roles on archaeological knowledge (Chapter 14, 
185-199) or the ethical and epistemic risks associated with the interaction of 
archaeological practice with non-scientific commercial practices (Chapter 17, 
229-246). In her latest book, in collaboration with Robert Chapman (Chapman 
and Wylie 2016), they cover issues on the constitution, use and re-use of 
evidence in archaeology. They also deal with the theoretical underpinnings 
behind the constitution of archaeological knowledge claims and how new 
evidence (from the world) is continually capable of reshuffling existing 
interpretations. In all of these cases, the studies of practice, theories and the 
world are intertwined. 
The articles of a recent special issue in Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science present a similar entanglement. For instance, Bromham looks at ways 
of testing hypothesis about macroevolution in evolutionary biology (Bromham 
2016), O‟Malley at the consequences of the increased methodological 
sophistication in evolutionary biology (O‟Malley 2016) and Currie at the use of 
the “ethnographic analogy” for reconstructing the past of human societies 
(Currie 2016). In all three cases, the focus is not only on the methods of 
investigation but on the consequences that these methods have on the 
epistemic grip that historical scientists possess about the past and the concepts 
and theories that can be generated from them. In other terms, these instances 
do not present a parallel demarcation between philosophy of history and 
philosophy of historiography in the study of historical sciences. In this view, 
understanding scientific products and understanding how they are produced are 
two interrelated sides of the same inquiry.  
In this dissertation I study evolutionary biology as a historical science by looking 
at its practices, its theories and their relation to the phenomena under study. It 
is an attempt to unpack the consequences of conceptual and methodological 
commitments for the way empirical evidence is handled and the type of 
scientific theories that are formulated. The methodology employed in this 
dissertation is an attempt to emulate the type of projects discussed above that 
are both metaphysical and practice-oriented. This commits me to a form of 
naturalism that addresses philosophical problems using the best possible 
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resources at hand, and to let scientific practice (and not only its outcomes) 
shape as much as possible the philosophical questions and answers that I 
provide. At the same time, this work is a new contribution to the philosophy of 
historical sciences.  
CONCLUSION 
This introductory chapter aimed at doing three things. The first was to dissipate 
tensions at the intersection between history and science. Doing this, it clarifies 
the relation between historical sciences and history. I argued that the latter, 
sometimes defended as distinct because taking humans as its subject-matter, 
bears several methodological continuities with the former. Both these sets of 
investigation can, therefore, benefit from analyses of the concepts and practices 
of the other. Claiming methodological continuity between the study of the history 
of humans and study of the history of non-humans and non-living entities comes 
back to the genealogical relationship between these two practices. Our 
knowledge about the history of non-human entities, as Rudwick argued, 
originally stemmed from the extension of the methods to study the human past 
to the non-human past, including, for instance, the quest for “natural antiquities” 
in the 17th century (Rudwick 2014).  
The second aim of this chapter is to devise an ideal philosophical methodology 
driving this dissertation. With philosophy of nature and philosophy of science in 
the context of science, and philosophy of history and philosophy of 
historiography in the context of history, analysts distinguished between two 
types of philosophical projects. The first is a metaphysical project (“nature” and 
“history) that aims at unravelling the deeper meaning of the outcome of 
scientific practice. The second is a practice-oriented project (“science” and 
“historiography”) that attempts to understand the methods and processes of 
scientific knowledge production. I argued that both of these projects could be 
carried out with a commitment to a form of methodological naturalism. I retained 
this commitment to methodological naturalism, by endorsing a wide conception 
of what counts as a scientific resource (including historical and social sciences). 
However, I follow a third type of philosophical project, which attempts to 
consider metaphysical and practice-oriented questions at the same time.  
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That said; let‟s now briefly summarize how I plan to carry on this inquiry. This 
dissertation contains 6 additional chapters. The plan is to integrate more and 
more elements of scientific practice in the philosophical picture as the 
dissertation progresses. The project‟s initial driver is to understand how 
diametrically opposed accounts of the evolution of early forms of life on the 
planet, such as Tom Cavalier-Smith‟s and Bill Martin‟s, have been coexisting, 
and what were the benefits and the risks associated with such a situation.  
Chapter 2 provides a description of Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s hypotheses 
about the origin of eukaryotic cells. This chapter works as a basis for the case 
studies of the following chapters. Chapter 3 aims at describing the form of 
hypotheses in evolutionary biology. “Narrative explanations” and “ephemeral 
mechanisms” have been proposed as candidate epistemic tools. I adapt the 
concept of “lineage explanation”, drawn from Calcott (Calcott 2009), to 
accommodate mechanisms and narratives as subtypes. This move allows me to 
characterize Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s hypotheses as mixed lineage 
explanations, composed of both narrative and mechanistic elements. Chapter 4 
is a study on the topic of representation: how do these evolutionary narratives 
represent the past? I propose reconciling Toon‟s direct and Frigg and Nguyen‟s 
indirect accounts of scientific representation by characterizing lineage 
explanations as superficially directly representing unique events. These 
explanations represent by displaying fictional truths about their targets and 
being capable of being used to generate further, implicit ones. After 
characterizing what counts as a representation of the past, I turn to more strictly 
methodological questions. Chapter 5 critically assesses the existing literature on 
the methodology of historical sciences. It provides a series of concepts and 
demands that can be put to use to understand specific cases in historical 
sciences. Chapter 6 draws inspiration from such concepts and demands to 
defend and apply a framework for evidential claims to the case of Archezoa, an 
initially supported and eventually rejected classification proposed by Cavalier-
Smith. Chapter 7 looks back to the initial question by exploring the benefits and 
risks of the coexistence of contradicting hypotheses in historical sciences. It 
does so by focusing on questions of underdetermination and pluralism.  
There are two things I want to address before closing this first chapter. The first 
is a matter of the scope of application of my analysis. As I mentioned in the 
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opening words, the type of practice I am looking at does not represent the 
entirety of what‟s going on in evolutionary biology. There should, however, be 
convergences with any other practices that aim at reconstructing unique events 
from indirect traces. What I say, then, should be relevant to several other 
practices within historical sciences. It might also, as was noticed by Currie, bear 
commonalities with any other scientific practices that are in “epistemically 
precarious situations” (Currie 2018).  
Finally, this dissertation is not based on empirical work I‟ve carried out myself 
on practitioners of evolutionary biology. If the tape of my PhD were to be 
“replayed”, this is definitely something I would change and something that I will 
look to include in my future research projects. Instead of this, my work‟s primary 
source is an extensive study of Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s published work and 
a careful study of their methodological, conceptual and evidential choices. I 
tried, as much as possible, to have informal exchanges with scientists involved 
with this practice, including Cavalier-Smith and Martin themselves, and to 
expose some of my insights to their first-hand experiences. I hope that this 
blending of resources allows me to make an account that is not too far removed 
from actual scientific practice and, at the very least, that the claims I make can 
help to shape empirically tractable questions, for researchers either working on 
this case study or on other similar ones.    
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CHAPTER 2: CAVALIER-SMITH AND MARTIN ON THE ORIGIN OF EUKARYOTES 
INTRODUCTION 
The works of Tom Cavalier-Smith and Bill Martin provide this dissertation‟s 
central scientific resource. Both scientists are interested in reconstructing the 
“deep past” of life on Earth. Their work is historical: they infer about the key 
events marking the evolution of unicellular forms of life on Earth, from the origin 
of life to the diversification of unicellular eukaryotes. The two scientists I am 
focusing on have differing hypotheses on the events filling up this time span and 
divergent assumptions driving such reconstructions. The task of this dissertation 
is to disentangle as much as possible the various components of this process of 
scientific knowledge production. 
This case study is not entirely philosophical terra incognita. O‟Malley has 
already provided an extended and thorough survey of the disagreement on the 
origin and early evolution of eukaryotes (O‟Malley 2010). In her analysis, 
Cavalier-Smith and Martin are pictured as the main proponents of two different 
types of evolutionary explanations (respectively, “autogenous” and 
“exogenous”). Her substantive reconstruction of the disagreement is explicitly 
helpful in three of the following chapters. It helps with the task, undertaken in 
this chapter, of recapitulating each scientist‟s proposed explanations. Her 
account of the rejection of the Archezoa hypothesis (O‟Malley 2010, 216) is a 
valuable help to build my own study of this case, though my philosophical angle 
is different from hers. Her article also provides a summary of the theoretical, 
evidential and methodological lines of disagreement between these scientists. 
On Chapter 7, my discussion of scientific pluralism is fuelled by a narrower 
study of only one component of this disagreement (namely, the necessity of 
phagocytosis for eukaryogenesis). The rest of the chapters use this case study 
to fuel philosophical discussions on issues that O‟Malley only sometimes 
implicitly addressed (i.e., the type of explanation employed, how these theories 
represent their target).  
Before proceeding to further philosophical analyses, this chapter introduces the 
theories defended by Cavalier-Smith and Martin, focusing in particular on their 
conflicting accounts of the origin of eukaryotes. It is targeted to the reader 
unfamiliar with the intricacies of evolutionary biology and avoids having to re-
explain Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s work from scratch in each subsequent 
35 
 
chapter. In addition to this, words marked with an asterisk are defined in a 
glossary available at the end of the dissertation.  
Please note that this chapter does not aim to provide an assessment of the 
quality of these two competing hypotheses, but instead is purely focused on 
theoretical content. At no later point does in this dissertation I attempt to 
adjudicate between Cavalier-Smith and Martin. Later chapters, however, dwell 
further on the evidence and assumptions mobilized in favour of both sides and 
other details of their practices.  
Martin has worked on the issue for more than 20 years and Cavalier-Smith for 
more than 40 years. Unsurprisingly, then, a lot of alterations have been made to 
their hypotheses (this is particularly true of Cavalier-Smith). In this chapter, I try 
to stick as much as possible to the most “up-to-date” version of their claims. The 
contents provided here are therefore likely to be outdated (or severely 
incomplete) in the space of months or years. This usual caveat of studies of 
science in the making, I think, should not overly affect the credibility of my 
analysis of this case. This is because I believe that while theoretical contents 
might (and will) change, the practices underlying this knowledge production 
should remain more or less the same. The quality of the philosophical claims I 
make in the following chapters is, I argue, partly independent of the stability of 
the hypotheses I present in this chapter.  
As said above, this chapter mainly focuses on the origin of eukaryotes. It also 
briefly discusses elements of hypotheses from Cavalier-Smith and Martin about 
other past events when deemed relevant. Please note that at no point does it 
aims to be an exhaustive summary of these scientists‟ work.  
I. WILLIAM MARTIN 
A. IN PREVIOUS EPISODES 
There are, I think, a few key things to know about Martin‟s views on events 
preceding the origin of eukaryotes. They help to illuminate aspects of his 
account of eukaryogenesis and differences with Cavalier-Smith‟s claims.  
It is relevant to know that he views the origin of life as the origin of both archaea 
and bacteria, both stemming from proto-living self-replicating colonies formed in 
hydrothermal vents (Martin and Russell 2003; Koonin and Martin 2005). In this 
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view, Earth was therefore already populated, ca. 3Bya, by the two main types of 
prokaryotes. Both of these pioneering lineages had a vast array of ecological 
niches to populate. This resulted, in these organisms, in the quick emergence of 
a vast metabolic diversity, leading Martin to affirm that “most of the biochemical 
pathways that drive modern prokaryotic carbon, sulphur and nitrogen cycles 
were in place by as early as 3.5 Gya [billion years ago], by 2.7 Gya at the latest” 
(Martin et al. 2003, 194).  
Among these metabolic options, oxygen production by photosynthesis is argued 
to have emerged “by at least 2.7 Gya” (Martin et al. 2003, 194). Oxygen 
production by cyanobacteria, however, mostly affected the atmosphere and 
superficial oceanic layers. The deeper strata of the oceans, in this view, 
remained anoxic “until ca. 600 Mya [million years ago]” (Mentel and Martin 
2008, 2724). The environmental backdrop to the origin of eukaryotes, which 
purportedly occurred ca. 1.5 Gya in the depth of the oceans, is therefore 
resolutely anoxic.  
Before discussing the origin of eukaryotes, another important piece of 
information concerns Martin‟s views on what drives prokaryotic evolution. On 
his view, these changes are driven by processes of lateral (or horizontal) gene 
transfer (LGT/HGT). They are conceptually opposed to traditional means of 
genetic inheritance, especially in multicellular organisms, which are going in a 
vertical direction from parent to offspring. These horizontal processes include 
“transformation”, the uptake and incorporation of exogenous genetic material 
found in the surrounding environment; “transduction”, a transfer of genetic 
material from a bacterium to another mediated by bacteriophages* and 
“conjugation”, direct transfer of small circular pieces of DNA, called plasmids, 
from a donor cell to an acceptor through direct cell-to-cell contact. These 
processes allow for transfers of genetic material across species boundaries. As 
a result of these processes, prokaryote evolution is marked by numerous 
genetic reshuffling episodes and cross-species genetic exchanges.  
B. THE ORIGIN OF EUKARYOTES 
The origin of eukaryotic cells occurred 1.5 Gya in the depth of an anoxic and 
sulphidic ocean. This event generated the last common ancestors of all cells 
with a nucleus, and all multicellular forms of life, including us. This dramatic 
episode of evolution is accounted for by the “Hydrogen hypothesis”, a scenario 
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formulated in 1998 by William Martin, in collaboration with Miklós Müller (Martin 
and Müller 1998). To talk of the origin of eukaryotes is to talk of the emergence 
of a series of eukaryotic traits: the nucleus, mitochondria*, the cytoskeleton*, 
phagocytosis*, the endomembrane system* and large genomes charged with 
introns* to name a few. Debates around these issues often boil down to matters 
of timing, to the order of appearance (and more importantly, the reasons behind 
this order) of the aforementioned structures. In Martin‟s case, mitochondria are 
argued to come first and to underpin the origin of all of the other eukaryotic 
structures.   
As the name suggests, hydrogen is the key to the emergence of eukaryotes, “[i]t 
is the bond that forges eukaryotes out of prokaryotes” (Martin and Müller 1998, 
40). Hydrogen is what drove a set of methanogenic archaea to interact with 
free-living, metabolically versatile alphaproteobacteria. Methanogens “live by 
reacting hydrogen gas with carbon dioxide, and evanescing methane gas as a 
waste product” (Lane 2005, 52)14 and are thus confined to anaerobic 
environments. There is, then, an advantage for methanogens that can live in the 
vicinity of facultatively anaerobic alphaproteobacteria which produce hydrogen 
as a waste product of their anaerobic metabolism. 
This close proximity induces a change of shape of the methanogens. They 
surround hydrogen-producing alphaproteobacteria, in order to “reap the 
greatest benefit from them” (Martin and Müller 1998, 39). This tight embrace 
progressively turned into physical encapsulation. These alphaproteobacteria are 
now engulfed organisms found within the walls of methanogens-turned-hosts. 
The following steps in this narrative are successive problem-solving episodes to 
transform this initially ill-functioning collaboration into a fully-functioning 
host/endosymbiont association. As repeatedly stated by Martin to defend this 
scenario, its steps do not require major evolutionary inventions, but “merely 
genetically rearranging pre-existing components” (Martin and Müller 1998, 39). 
These genetic transfers require the intervention of various episodes of LGT. 
                                            
14 Note that Lane, who collaborated extensively with Martin, wrote books 
destined to lay audiences that formulate some of these ideas. I used these 
sources as an inspiration for Martin‟s account in this chapter.  
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Once inside the methanogen host, the engulfed alphaproteobacteria do not 
have access anymore to the requisite nutrients for survival found in the 
surrounding environment. Some of the intracellular alphaproteobacteria might 
even not have survived from it. The situation is equally problematic for 
methanogens, as this interrupts their vital hydrogen consumption. As 
alphaproteobacteria starve and die into their hosts‟ cytoplasms*, 
alphaproteobacterial genes are released in the environment. Some of these 
genes are then incorporated in the methanogen‟s chromosome by 
transformation. Luckily, among these genes are the ones coding for proteins 
that enable the host to ingest organic compounds from the environment. To 
solve this situation, then, all that is needed is for these genes to be expressed 
by the methanogens, so that “the host would in principle be able to feed its 
symbiont with organics and thus feed itself with H2 and CO2” (Martin and Müller 
1998, 39). 
However, another issue arises, in the form of a “tug-of-war” for imported goods. 
This conflict arises because of the polarized natures of the host and engulfed 
organism‟s metabolisms. “The trouble was that methanogens normally use 
glucose to build up complex organic molecules, whereas the 
alphaproteobacteria break it down for energy” (Lane 2005, 60). The solution 
was to find a way to fundamentally invert the metabolism of the methanogen, by 
turning this autotrophic* organism, mainly a “producer” of organic molecules, 
into a heterotrophic* one, a “consumer” of these same molecules. After 
acquiring the endosymbiont‟s carbohydrate metabolism via LGT, it is necessary 
for the host, to avoid possessing mutually negating (“futile”) metabolisms, to 
abandon its original autotrophic metabolism. The host can now import and 
ferment glucose, and the symbiont could use some of these breakdown 
products to generate ATP*. 
The resulting host/engulfed organism association leads, in the words of Martin 
and Müller, to a “curious situation. 
The selective pressure that associated the partners from the start and 
that drove the integration of eubacterial genes into archaeal 
chromosomes was the host's strict dependence upon hydrogen produced 
by the symbiont. But by transferring the symbiont's importers and 
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glycolysis to the [cytoplasm] in order to satisfy that dependence, the host 
suddenly can meet both its carbon and energy needs from organic 
substrates. The functions of both methanogenesis and autotrophy* have 
been replaced, and there is no obvious selective pressure to retain 
either. The host has irreversibly become heterotrophic, and hydrogen is 
once again a waste product, but now of a compartmentalized metabolism
 
(Martin and Müller 1998, 40). 
The various conflicts solved and transfers of metabolic pathways indeed led to a 
complete reshuffling of the host‟s initial functioning and the motive behind their 
initial association has, at this stage, become irrelevant to the sustainability of 
the interaction. The last step on the way to a fully functioning association is to 
“plug” an ATP transfer protein in the endosymbiont‟s membrane so that the 
methanogen can import some of the ATP produced by the endosymbiont and 
compartmentalize the production of energy for the whole cell within the 
endosymbiont. 
As a result, Martin and Müller conclude that 
That cell has time, energy and ample genetic starting material (two highly 
divergent and partially merged prokaryotic genomes) to evolve 
cytological and genetic traits that are specific to the eukaryotic lineage 
(Martin and Müller 1998, 41). 
The endosymbionts subsequently lose superfluous genetic material and 
become specialized in the performance of a narrow set of functions. It becomes 
specialized, in particular, in energy production. These endosymbionts are the 
common ancestors of all of the forms of mitochondria: the “classic”, aerobic, 
one known as mitochondria; the anaerobic form known as hydrogenosomes*; 
and the “reduced” version known as mitosomes*15. To make this possible, the 
newly made endosymbiont must not have lost its metabolic versatility in the 
process, especially its elements of aerobic metabolism, despite the fact that the 
emergence of eukaryotes occurred at a time of widespread anoxia and thus of 
disuse of this particular function. The sustained existence of facultatively 
                                            
15 Mitosomes were discovered after the publication of the hydrogen hypothesis 
(Tovar et al. 1999). 
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anaerobic, versatile, metabolisms is considered by Martin to be a rather 
common state of affairs in marine environments.   
In parallel to metabolism, another, more silent, revolution occurred and requires 
explanation. The host at the origin of eukaryotes is archaeal, and therefore 
initially possesses typically archaeal lipids*. However,  a eukaryotic lipid bilayer 
is made of typically eubacterial lipids. Somewhere in the process, eubacterial 
lipids must have replaced archaeal lipids on the plasma membrane. To do this, 
the lipid synthesis pathways that were operating in the endosymbiont must have 
been successfully transferred to the host. 
The explanation favoured by Martin, elaborated in detail with his colleagues 
Gould and Garg (Gould et al. 2016), manages to cover both this membrane 
changeover and the emergence of the endomembrane system. The key to this 
scenario is that prokaryotes are known to secrete outer-membrane vesicles 
(OMVs), small lipidic vesicles involved in multiple roles such as inter-cellular 
communication and trafficking of molecules. Once inside the host, the 
endosymbiont‟s OMVs had two choices.  
They can fuse, either with themselves to generate larger vesicular 
compartments, or with the plasma membrane to export their contents to 
the cell exterior. The former generates a basic [endoplasmic reticulum* 
(ER)] topology. The latter constitutes, we propose, the ancestral outward 
state of eukaryotic membrane flux, and furthermore converts the 
chemical composition of the host's plasma membrane from isoprene 
ethers to bacterial fatty acid esters (Gould et al. 2016, 3). 
Therefore, it is this “continuous flow of bacterial lipid OMVs to the archaeal 
plasma membrane” that “would have naturally transformed the lipid composition 
of the archaeal plasma membrane from ether-linked isoprenes to ester-linked 
fatty acids […]” (Gould et al. 2016, 5). The endomembrane system would have 
emerged by the fusion and specialization of such OMVs. 
The secretion of OMVs is also what provided the primary material for the origin 
of the nucleus, even though the nucleus emerged out of quite distinct selection 
pressures (Gould et al. 2016, 2, Box 1). Within the acquired 
alphaproteobacterial genome were found mobile genetic elements, named 
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“group II introns”, intercalating between other genetic elements and capable of 
autocatalytic* activity. These mobile elements hitchhiked with other 
alphaproteobacterial genes and invaded the archaeal host genome. From 
group-II introns evolved spliceosomes (Martin and Koonin 2006, 43), protein 
complexes involved in maturing mRNA* by removing (“splicing”) introns from it. 
As compared with translation*, splicing is prohibitively slow, this runs the risk of 
genes being translated into proteins before splicing has been finished, 
something characterized as 
an extremely unhealthy situation because few functional proteins will 
ensue, and the prospects of any descendants emerging from this 
situation are bleak (Martin and Koonin 2006, 43). 
The solution favoured by Martin and Koonin involves the emergence of an 
evolutionary innovation to 
physically separate splicing from translation, allowing the former (slow) 
process to occur to completion first, before the latter (fast) process sets 
in. Physical separation in cells usually entails membranes, so [this 
solution] would involve the invention of a membrane separating splicing 
from translation, with pores sufficiently large and selective enough to 
export matured ribosomal subunits, mRNA and tRNA* (Martin and 
Koonin 2006, 43). 
Being contiguous and functionally tied to the ER, the nuclear envelope is 
argued to have emerged from the ER, as the ER itself emerged from OMVs 
(Gould et al. 2016, 7). 
The appearance of mitochondria results in the compartmentalization of energy 
production and provides configurations allowing the emergence of the 
endomembrane system and nucleus. This is, according to Martin, a sufficient 
starting point for the emergence of the more complex eukaryotic features. 
What is it that makes it possible for eukaryotes to have evolved more complex 
forms of life? According to Lane and Martin, 
[v]irtually every 'eukaryotic' trait is also found in prokaryotes, including 
nucleus-like structures, recombination, linear chromosomes, internal 
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membranes, multiple replicons, giant size, extreme polyploidy, dynamic 
cytoskeleton, predation, parasitism, introns and exons, intercellular 
signalling (quorum sensing), endocytosis-like processes and even 
endosymbionts. Bacteria made a start up virtually every avenue of 
eukaryotic complexity, but then stopped short. Why? (Lane and Martin 
2010, 929) 
The bottom line of this inability is, in their opinion, that prokaryotes cannot afford 
the bigger genomes required to evolve complex traits. Large amounts of DNA, 
in themselves, are chemically inert and do not cost a lot to sustain, but the 
production of proteins mobilizes about 75% of the cell‟s energy budget. To have 
more complex traits, therefore, requires the expression of more genes, and 
expressing more genes requires more energy. 
Energy synthesis, in prokaryotes, occurs at the plasma membrane. To 
synthesize more energy, therefore, would require increasing the surface 
dedicated to energy synthesis on this very membrane. The problem with this is 
that scaling-up also increases the volume of the cell, therefore the volume using 
the energy produced by membranes. Because the volume increases faster than 
the surface if bacteria increase their size, the energetic efficiency would actually 
decline as the size increases. In a competitive environment in which slight 
differences in efficiency determines who survives, bacteria face pressure to 
keep their size and their energetic expenses as low as possible, making it 
impossible for them to afford a massive gene expansion. 
The acquisition of mitochondria is the key to the release of this selection 
pressure and allowed the emergence of eukaryotic complexity. Instead of 
having energy production located at the outside of the membrane, eukaryotes 
possess, with mitochondria, a compartmentalized way to synthesize energy. 
They are now liberated from the diktat of the surface-to-volume ratio, 
internalization releases the eukaryotic cell from the geometric constraints 
that oppress bacteria. Eukaryotes are on average 10 000 to 100 000 
times the volume of bacteria, but as they become larger, their respiratory 
efficiency doesn't slope off in the same way. To increase energetic 
efficiency, all that eukaryotic cells need to do is to increase the surface 
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area of mitochondrial membranes within the cell; and this can be done 
simply by having a few more mitochondria (Lane 2005, 125-126). 
As a consequence, eukaryotes are much more energetically efficient. They 
have been calculated to afford a “roughly 200,000-fold rise in genome size” 
(Lane and Martin 2010, 929)16. This is all that is required for eukaryotes to 
“evolve, explore and express massive numbers of new proteins in combinations 
and at levels energetically unattainable for its prokaryotic contemporaries” 
(Lane and Martin 2010, 933). The emergence of eukaryotes is on its way, and 
this is where I stop. 
II. THOMAS CAVALIER-SMITH 
A. IN PREVIOUS EPISODES 
A crucial difference between Cavalier-Smith and Martin lies in their views about 
the origin of life. According to Cavalier-Smith, the origin of life bears witness to 
the emergence of bacteria but not archaea. Archaea is argued, instead, to have 
appeared roughly simultaneously with eukaryotes, as another outcome (as seen 
below) of the same event.  
Martin‟s hypothesis is primarily (but not exclusively) centred on questions of 
metabolism, biochemistry, and the relation of cells to their (changing) 
environments. By contrast, Cavalier-Smith pieces together hypotheses that 
(again, not exclusively) articulate a large array of knowledge in cellular biology. 
Particularly salient is his emphasis on the changes in membranes, as they are 
conceived as the primary drivers of major evolutionary events in prokaryote and 
early eukaryote evolution. As a result, Cavalier-Smith‟s account of bacterial 
evolution centres on the origins of single and double-membranes in bacteria.  
B. THE NEOMURAN REVOLUTION AND THE ORIGIN OF EUKARYOTES 
The origin of eukaryotes, in terms of timing, brings an end to the “boring billion”, 
a relatively uneventful period of bacterial evolution. This relative boredom was 
however not without explanation: the next exciting evolutionary events were 
simply very hard to realize (Cavalier-Smith 2014, 41; 2006, 998). The set of 
events at the origin of the archaeal and eukaryotic lineages are called the 
                                            
16 As the “roughly” suggests, this is not meant by these authors to be a precise 
estimation.  
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“neomuran revolution”. As the name suggests (“neomura means “new walls” in 
Latin), it involves a radical change in membrane composition. This was about 1-
1.5 billion years ago (Cavalier-Smith 2014, 66).  
The bacterial cell wall is formed of a “covalently cross-linked bag” of 
peptidoglycan* murein, “completely surrounding the cytoplasmic membrane” 
(Cavalier-Smith 2014, 43). The neomuran revolution started with the accidental 
loss, by an actinobacterium, of its peptidoglycan cell wall “to become naked L-
forms” (Cavalier-Smith 2014, 51). This destabilized these cells‟ general 
functioning. From this situation emerged a new type of membrane coat (the 
“new wall”) based on N-linked glycoproteins*. The new N-linked glycoproteins 
are not cross-linked, but merely linked to residues of asparagine amino acids 
(N) attached to oligosaccharides*. This provides a more flexible configuration 
that both lineages at the origin of eukaryotes and archaea exploited differently. 
These lineages, independently, surrounded this new basic structure with 
different types of lipid membranes, at the origin of two radically novel, 
contrasting lifestyles.  
Archaea, on one hand, evolved a new type of lipids (isoprenoid ethers) to 
colonize extremely hot environments and effectively becomes the first set of 
hyperthermophiles*. Becoming specialists to a given environment, archaea, in 
their evolution, “lost so many lipids and proteins that they could never have 
evolved directly into eukaryotes” any more (Cavalier-Smith 2014, 42-43, figure 
1). Later in their evolution, they reverted to more mesophilic* lifestyles by 
acquiring genes by LGT from bacteria. Apart from their change of environment 
and membrane, the emergence of archaea did not come with the emergence of 
a new “cell structure, growth, division and genetics”, remaining on the whole 
“fundamentally bacterial or prokaryotic” (Cavalier-Smith 2014, 54). This justifies 
why Cavalier-Smith considers them as a relatively young form of bacteria rather 
than a wholly separate domain of life17.  
                                            
17 Notice that archaea‟s relative young age is inferentially independent from 
their phenotypic proximity to bacteria. Even if they were shown to originate 
farther in time, this would still not legitimate, in Cavalier-Smith‟s view, a 
consideration of this group of organisms as a separate domain. This runs 
against views that contest the legitimacy of the notion of “prokaryotes” on the 
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Eukaryotes, on the other hand, “arose by exploiting the new flexible 
glycoprotein surface” of the cell to evolve phagotrophy, a metabolism based on 
the consumption of external foodstuff acquired via phagocytosis (Cavalier-Smith 
2014, 48–49, figure 3). The evolution of phagotrophy depends on the 
development of a fully-fledged cytoskeleton, providing both the requisite 
structural integrity and flexibility. This new capacity to internalize food from the 
outside allowed the emergence of a system of functional compartments within 
the cell, the endomembrane system. The capacity to ingest other organisms is 
also what made it possible for this proto-eukaryote to ingest and fail to digest an 
aerobic alphaproteobacterium, which was progressively enslaved into the 
ancestor of mitochondria.  
The primary payoff of the evolution of mitochondria is in the improvement it 
provides in the “aerobic utilization of intracellular digestion products” (Cavalier-
Smith 2014, 51). This increased efficiency is not the result of the sole presence 
mitochondria. It rather stems from a new, multicomponent, and eukaryotic-
specific division of energetic labour. The endoplasmic reticulum* (ER), 
mitochondria and peroxisomes* together constitute an “energy belt” argued to 
have originated more or less simultaneously. Peroxisomes generate breakdown 
products of the lipid metabolism that are sent to mitochondria which generate 
ATP from these products, and this ATP is in turn exploited by the ER to 
synthesize novel proteins and cellular components.  
Another consequence of the formation of the cytoskeleton and the 
endomembrane system is the evolution of the nucleus. The cytoskeleton is, 
roughly speaking, composed of a network of actin* filaments and microtubules*. 
This structural network mediates all of the cellular movements, from vesicle 
transport to changes of shape, and does this through continuous assembly and 
disassembly as well as from the action of various cellular “motors” such as 
myosin, dynein and kinesin. While this greatly diversifies the possible cellular 
movements, this also exposes cellular structures to potential damage from the 
movements of these same motors. This risk particularly applies to the fragile 
                                                                                                                                
basis of the evolutionary and phenotypic distinctness of bacteria and archaea 
(Pace 2006). 
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genetic material and is at the origin of the nucleus that initially evolved to protect 
DNA “from shearing damage” (Cavalier-Smith 2014, 44).  
These various innovations – the rise of a cytoskeleton, the different elements of 
the endomembrane system and the ability to phagocytise – are at the origin of 
an inversion in the selective pressures affecting genome size. These different 
components allowed for an increase in cell size, which “imposed upward 
coevolutionary pressures on genome size” and increased nuclear volume with it 
(Cavalier-Smith 2014, 15). This order of events runs contrary to Martin‟s 
hypothesis. Here, changes in membrane structure allowed for the origin of 
phagocytosis, which allowed the ingestion of mitochondria and the emergence 
of the endomembrane system, ultimately increasing cellular volume, which 
released the selection pressures that kept genomes small, allowing for the 
evolution of the rest of the eukaryotic features. This is where I stop for Cavalier-
Smith‟s hypothesis.  
CONCLUDING WORDS 
After this presentation of Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s hypotheses for the origin 
of eukaryotes, I now have the scientific basis on which cases studies from next 
chapters are based. Chapter 3 starts this investigation by asking an apparently 
basic question: what kind of theories are these hypotheses?  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORIES ABOUT UNIQUE EVENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, I provided a summary of the hypotheses presented by 
Martin and Cavalier-Smith about the origin of eukaryotic cells. This chapter 
presents the first philosophical investigation inspired by this case. I propose an 
exploration of the type of hypotheses presented by Cavalier-Smith and Martin. 
To what category do they belong?  
The hypotheses presented by Cavalier-Smith and Martin are attempts to explain 
unique events in the past. There are several ways to understand ”unique” here. 
There is a “trivial” understanding of uniqueness which considers things to be 
unique when there is nothing exactly like them, in the sense of sharing exactly 
the same components, properties and spatiotemporal location. This ontological 
understanding grants that everything that happens is unique. For instance, my 
present typing on the keyboard at 9:23 am on the 23rd of November 2017 in my 
flat in the 18th arrondissement of Paris will never be exactly replicated. At the 
epistemological level, however, the uniqueness of this action is much less 
obvious. This event can be described as belonging to many different types of 
activities: typing on a keyboard, writing a PhD dissertation, inhabiting Paris… 
Even though everything occurring is unique in a very literal sense, there are 
many ways, at the descriptive level18, with which this uniqueness can be 
decreased.  
This brings me to another understanding of uniqueness. Unique events are 
ones described as tokens that cannot be subsumed under a type. This 
epistemic understanding is the one I endorse in this chapter. Unique events are 
both perceived as having happened “once and only once” (Tucker 1998, 63) 
and investigated as unique, not as a type of events. Here, I am not focused on 
whether this granted explanatory uniqueness is legitimate or temporary. It might 
be the case that events such as the origin of eukaryotic cells are better studied 
as a type of event rather than as a token. In this latter case, future 
                                            
18 This discussion of uniqueness focuses on an epistemological understanding 
of uniqueness. I avoid, for lack of time and knowing, delving further into 
metaphysical understandings of uniqueness.  
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investigations will be able to develop a broader category of events in which the 
origin of eukaryotes belongs19. In all cases, this chapter deals with events that 
are currently explained as unique.  
The explanation of unique events has sometimes been considered as a special 
scientific task. Windelband famously separated between ”nomological” and 
“idiographic” sciences, the former being concerned with “what is invariably the 
case” and the latter with “what was once the case” (Windelband 1980, 175). On 
a strong reading of the demarcation, there would be, on the one hand, 
explanations from the nomothetic sciences in the form of laws of nature. What, 
on the other hand, are the sorts of explanations generated by idiographic 
sciences? This chapter searches for answers to this question20.  
The first part of this chapter reviews existing positions on the subject and 
identifies current candidates for explanations of unique events. The best-known 
candidate is the notion of narrative explanation, a form of explanation tightly 
associated with historical investigations. An alternative to narrative 
explanations, ephemeral mechanisms, has been proposed by Glennan 
(Glennan 2010) as an outgrowth of the philosophical studies about mechanistic 
explanations. After discussing both candidates, I identify the points of 
convergences and of tensions between them. Despite both standing out as 
alternative strategies to law-based explanations, I argue that the main tensions 
between narrative and mechanistic explanations revolve around how much 
room is left for contingency and on how to identify explanatorily relevant 
components. Currie proposed a strategy for reconciling both types of 
explanations by making them relevant to a complementary range of events 
                                            
19 This is already partly the case with the origin of eukaryotes and other 
landmark events in the evolution of life on Earth, which are studied as “major 
evolutionary transitions”. Several studies (i.e., Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 
1997) provide a characterization of the common traits of all these transitions. 
The authors of these studies, to my knowledge, are not trying to replace the 
study of these events in their individuality.  
20 Note that the following arguments do not hinge on the degree of validity of 
Windelband‟s distinction.   
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(Currie 2014). In this view, ephemeral mechanisms are simple narratives, 
unique events explained by an appeal to a general model. Complex narratives, 
equivalent to narrative explanations, are appealed to when no such model can 
be produced21.  
If both explanatory strategies can be applied complementarily in different cases, 
can they also be made complementary within a given explanation? In other 
words, can specific aspects of narratives and mechanisms be fruitfully 
incorporated into one type of explanation22? As a way to positively answer this 
latter question, I propose Calcott‟s concept of lineage explanation (Calcott 
2009) as a potential candidate for this task. I first argue that ephemeral 
mechanisms and narrative explanations can successfully be described as 
subtypes of lineage explanations. I then propose a conciliatory strategy in 
which, in principle, elements of narrative explanations and of ephemeral 
mechanisms can be put to work within a lineage explanation.  
The third part assesses if lineage explanations can be useful to describe 
Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s hypotheses. This application bears two 
argumentative roles. I already mentioned the importance of showing the 
fruitfulness of lineage explanations to the explanation of unique events. The 
second is to assess whether, contrary to the initial opposition of these two 
epistemic tools, lineage explanations, in this case, combine mechanistic and 
narrative elements. I argue that lineage explanations provided by Martin and 
Cavalier-Smith are, for the most part, closer to narratives than mechanisms. 
Interestingly, they prove to be mixed in another way: they combine both tidily 
ordered sequences of events with more messy explanations, invoking events 
sometimes running parallel to each other, sometimes devised to branch at 
loosely determined moments of the explanation. The conclusion gathers this 
                                            
21 Note that Currie does not completely argue for mutual exclusivity. In his view, 
complex narratives are not used only in cases when it is not possible to 
generate simple narratives. 
22 In this view, ephemeral mechanisms and narrative explanations would not be 
full explanations, but considered as explanations of specific sub-parts of the 
event in question.  
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chapter‟s main insights and reflects more broadly on possible roles for 
mechanistic explanations in historical sciences.   
I. NARRATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND EPHEMERAL MECHANISMS  
The first part of this chapter starts off with a brief characterization of the main 
features of the two candidate epistemological tools for the explanation of unique 
events, starting with narrative explanations.  
A. NARRATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
Narratives are traditionally associated with the activity of telling stories. A 
narrative is often seen as an entertaining product of our imagination, or as an 
organized display of a collection of facts as someone in the course of a 
conversation recalls them. To distinguish this everyday and literary usage of 
narratives from its usage in scientific theories, the latter is described as 
narrative explanations. The formal requirements for narrative explanations are 
usually quite minimal. To provide a narrative explanation is to provide a 
“logically consistent representation of at least two asynchronous events” (Prince 
2008, 19, cited in Beatty 2016, 33; see also Danto 1962, 146). Narrative 
explanations are also characterized by Currie and Sterelny as “an explanation 
which follows the causal trajectory of [something‟s] origin and subsequent 
history” (Currie and Sterelny 2017, 1). Three uncontroversial features emerge 
out of these early remarks. (1) Narrative explanations have a subject (more on 
the nature of the subject in an instant). (2) They track the development of this 
subject in a series of events that develop over time. (3) The series of events 
provided by narrative explanations are internally consistent.  
According to Mink, narratives do not merely pull together a series of events and 
actions. Their primary role is to present a way in which these events fit, or are 
“configured”, together (Mink 1970). On a similar line, Morgan insists that 
It is the ability and facility to order materials and weave them together to 
form explanations – regardless of whether the warp is a time thread, or a 
space thread, or a theoretical and conceptual thread – that characterises 
narratives (Morgan 2017, 87).  
The subject of the narrative is what provides the ordering. It provides the thread 
that enables picking up, in the diversity of available things, the features relevant 
to the explanation. This has been conceptualized by Hull in terms of the notion 
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of central subject. Central subjects are threads around which narrative 
explanations are built. An organizing principle, “the role of the central subject is 
to form the main strand around which the historical narrative is woven” (Hull 
1975, 255). As Morgan and Hull emphasize, the nature of central subjects can 
be varied: Napoleon is an example, the extinction of the dinosaurs another, and 
the French revolution can also be a central subject.  
What matters to central subjects, however, is that they display sufficient 
continuity in the span captured by narrative explanations. This condition, 
according to Hull, ensures the cohesiveness of these explanations. Continuity, 
here, is not to be confused with identity. Hull insists that “no degree of similarity 
between earlier and later stages in [the development of the central subject] is 
required, as long as the development is spatiotemporally continuous” (Hull 
1975, 256). Central subjects, then, either “persist unchanged or develop 
continuously through time” (Hull 1975, 255). For instance, biological species are 
conceived as lineages of individuals sharing a common descent from a last 
common ancestor, populations of changing sizes, with its members both 
sharing a series of traits in common and gradually accumulating variations by 
evolution. They are, in paleobiology, central subjects of narrative explanations 
addressing the changes of morphology of their members, as well as their 
extinction. Narrative explanations, in this view, track the events and factors 
behind the stability or changes of such central subjects.  
In attempts to legitimate narrative explanations as epistemological tools, a 
particular feature concerning the nature of events, best captured by narrative 
explanations, is often invoked. Narrative explanations are argued to be 
particularly suited to track contingent events. In Sterelny‟s definition of 
contingency, “a change in a system is contingent if it could not be predicted 
from information about the prior state of that system” (Sterelny 2016, 522). The 
most famous defence of the pervasiveness of contingency in the study of the 
past is attributed to Gould‟s “replaying life‟s tape” argument, formulated in the 
context of palaeontology. Assuming you could “press the rewind button and, 
making sure you thoroughly erase everything that actually happened, go back 
to any time and place in the past” and then press play again, Gould affirms that 
“any replay of the tape would lead evolution down a pathway radically different 
from the road actually taken” (Gould 1989, 51). In other words, the history of life 
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is contingent since its course could not be determined from a given point in the 
past. Scrutinizing Gould‟s argument, Beatty distinguished between two possible 
meanings for contingency in this context. The occurrence of an event is 
contingent per se if “it was not necessary, not bound to occur; it was possible, 
but there were other possibilities; it was a matter of chance”. However, an event 
is contingent upon another when “it depended on that other event occurring; 
that other event was necessary for its occurrence” (Beatty 2016, 36).  
Events that are contingent per se (henceforth contingent tout court) are 
considered by Beatty as turning points. They are events in the past that were 
“not bound to happen, but did” (Beatty and Carrera 2011, 495). They constitute 
junctions at which several courses of events were open and possible, and 
where only one of them was chosen. What is the relation between contingency 
and narrative explanations? Beatty argues that contingent events “are what 
make narratives worth telling. Indeed, turning points make narrative essential” 
(Beatty 2016, 37). On this reasoning, a series of causally related events where 
no alternative path was available is not worthy of a narrative explanation. 
Narrative explanations instead track series of events where “we need to be told 
what will happen next because we wouldn‟t know otherwise” (Beatty 2017, 35).  
Narrative explanations, to summarize, are woven around a central subject, a 
thread that underlies the unity and continuity of the events described. This type 
of explanation is particularly suited to cases where the events described are 
contingent, when they could not have been anticipated from the information 
provided about the initial state. Here, I assume a weaker, epistemological, 
understanding of contingency, close to Sterelny‟s formulation above, rather than 
a strong version grounded on a defence of an ontologically indeterministic 
world. Focusing on contingency proves useful to compare narrative 
explanations with ephemeral mechanisms. The next section articulates further 
the latter concept.   
B. EPHEMERAL MECHANISMS 
This section begins with a characterization of the main tenets of philosophical 
investigations into mechanistic explanations. Of course, proponents of this 
approach are diverse and they disagree on several non-trivial aspects (see 
Nicholson 2012 for a review). This characterization is therefore far from 
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exhaustive but is simply meant to introduce the conceptual framework behind 
ephemeral mechanisms.  
Mechanistic explanations23 account for the behaviour of systems. Systems are 
spatially and temporally delineated. Mechanistic explanations describe systems 
as composed of organized and interacting parts that together bring about 
behaviours of interest. Mechanistic explanations, thus, aim at an epistemic 
decomposition of the system of interest into its salient components and at 
identifying the relevant interactions between these components. A mechanistic 
explanation also unravels how a specific organization, spatial and temporal, of 
these entities and activities enables the occurrence of the behaviour of interest. 
Mechanistic explanations follow a sequential, continuous start-to-end causal 
sequence. Traditionally, this epistemological tool has been developed to explain 
types of behaviours. Once the components, interactions and organization of a 
system are successfully described, Machamer, Darden and Craver argue that 
“mechanisms are regular in that they work always or for the most part in the 
same way under the same conditions” (Machamer et al. 2000, 3). At first sight, 
mechanistic explanations are not the best-suited epistemological tool to deal 
with unique events.  
Glennan, however, recently defended the relevance of mechanistic 
explanations for historical hypotheses, by bringing forward the concept of 
ephemeral mechanism (Glennan 2010). The notion of ephemeral mechanism 
retains the majority of the components of traditional mechanistic explanations. 
Ephemeral mechanisms still define their explanandum as a system that 
produces the behaviour of interest in virtue of being composed of a series of 
interacting parts. In Glennan‟s terminology, the behaviour of these parts follows 
change-relating generalizations. A change-relating generalization “describes a 
relationship between two or more variables in which an intervention that 
changes one variable will bring about a change in another variable” (Glennan 
                                            
23 In this chapter I take Nicholson‟s point that mechanistic explanations are best 
conceived epistemologically as “heuristic models which target specific causal 
relations and thereby facilitate the explanation of the particular phenomena 
scientists investigate” (Nicholson 2012, 154), and not ontologically.  
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2002, 345). Change-relating generalizations ground the regularity of 
mechanistic explanations.  
Ephemeral mechanisms are invoked to explain unique events. This uniqueness, 
according to Glennan, is grounded on the rarity of the initial configuration of the 
parts. Putting it together, ephemeral mechanisms are “a collection of interacting 
parts where:  
1. The interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, 
change-relating generalizations.  
2. The configurations of the parts may be the product of chance or 
exogenous factors.  
3. The configuration of parts is short-lived and non-stable, and is not an 
instance of a multiply-realized type (Glennan 2010, 260). 
The initial conditions described for ephemeral mechanisms, then, cannot easily 
be replicated and therefore the event they bring about is to be considered 
unique. Glennan highlights that this set-up can be improbable, unstable, and 
also involving components that are themselves not instance of types. An 
example that covers these three elements is the one provided by Glennan: the 
death of French philosopher Roland Barthes. In Glennan‟s description, “Barthes 
had been invited to a luncheon with then [French] president François Mitterrand, 
and was struck by a laundry truck while crossing a Paris street on his way 
home” (Glennan 2010, 260). It is rather improbable that pedestrians cross 
streets unaware of a truck coming in. This configuration is short-lived: would 
Barthes be crossing a few seconds earlier or later this initial configuration would 
indeed have been lost. And the description involves Roland Barthes, an 
individual that is here not described as an instance of a kind. For these reasons, 
the initial configuration of the mechanism that explains Barthes‟ untimely 
encounter with a laundry truck was ephemeral, and this underlies this event‟s 
uniqueness.  
However, Glennan argues that once the ephemeral configuration is described, 
the behaviour of the parts is subject to a set of change-relating generalizations. 
In Barthes‟ case, “we can describe the interaction between Barthes and the 
laundry truck as an instance of change-relating generalization involving persons 
and laundry trucks, or persons and large vehicles” (Glennan 2010, 261). 
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Ephemeral mechanisms, then, explain unique events by simultaneously 
identifying the unlikely initial circumstances at the origin of events of interest 
and by understanding the series of interactions between these components, 
driven by change-relating generalizations, which brought the outcome of 
interest. According to Glennan, the difference between traditional mechanisms 
and ephemeral mechanisms lies in the contingency of the initial configuration, 
not in the behaviour of the parts of the system, since “[t]he same sorts of 
generalizations which characterize the interactions between parts of ordinary 
mechanisms also characterize interactions between the parts of ephemeral 
mechanisms” (Glennan 2010, 261).   
Even though I think ephemeral mechanisms and narrative explanations have 
interesting common features, it is not possible to characterize one as a subset 
of the other. The next section details the respective convergences and 
dissimilarities between the two.   
C. CONVERGENCES AND TENSIONS 
A shared feature of narrative explanations and traditional mechanisms, thus a 
fortiori of ephemeral mechanism, is that they stem from attempts to provide 
alternatives forms of scientific explanations. In particular, both were partly 
developed in reaction to the deductive-nomological model of explanation that 
relies exclusively on the use of laws of nature.  
It is possible to trace the defence of narrative explanations as a legitimate form 
of scientific theories to a reaction against Hempel‟s argument downplaying the 
scientificity of history. Hempel defended a unified picture of the scientific 
method, in which scientific explanations follow a deductive structure. On this 
model, a sufficient knowledge of the initial conditions and of the application of 
the relevant laws of nature make it possible to deductively infer the occurrence 
of the phenomenon under study and hence to explain it. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, history does not possess a readily usable collection of laws which 
can be invoked to explain the events under study. Therefore, it would only be 
when history is equipped with such laws that this discipline would truly deserve 
a scientific status. Before reaching this state (if it is ever reached), explanations 
in history are, at best, what Hempel calls “explanation sketches” (Hempel 1942, 
42). In reaction to this position, narrative explanations have been defended, 
notably by philosophers of history, as a legitimate form of explanation, even 
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though one that departs from the traditional understanding of what counts as a 
scientific explanation (see, for instance, Dray 1957).  
Mechanistic explanations have similarly been proposed as an alternative to law-
based explanations. Despite their emphasis on regularity and the recourse to 
change-relating generalizations, proponents of mechanistic explanations aim at 
capturing practices in which such regularities do not have the deductive and 
necessary character possessed by those explanations invoking laws of nature. 
As Glennan summarizes, the generalizations invoked in these explanations are 
“mechanistically fragile”:  
Just as the behaviour of the mechanism as a whole is regular but not 
exceptionless, so is the behaviour of the mechanism‟s parts (Glennan 
2010, 257). 
Narrative and mechanistic explanations, therefore, have been developed as 
alternatives to a deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation. The 
latter model is criticized as inappropriate to the domain of inquiry by proponents 
of narrative explanations, and as placing too rigid demands by proponents of 
mechanistic explanations. In addition to similarities in their origins, they share a 
common priority in identifying the factors and components that play a role in the 
occurrence of a phenomenon of interest. The type of factors and components 
they emphasize, however, are dissimilar.  
Parts and interactions vs. central subject 
Mechanistic explanations, including Glennan‟s ephemeral mechanisms, are 
epistemologically reductionist. They require specifying “the parts of a 
mechanism and the operations the parts perform” (Bechtel 2011, 538). This 
reductionism implies that the explanandum, the system whose behaviour is to 
be explained, is at a higher level than the explanans, the components and 
activities of the system under study. Explanatory relevance, here, is to be 
sought within the workings of the system under study. Narrative explanations, 
however, do not restrict the search for explanatorily relevant components within 
the system under study. As Currie argues, in narrative explanations “explanans 
are not „components‟ but rather causal factors which influenced the particular 
pathway” the central subject took (Currie 2014, 1180). Causal factors can be of 
any sorts, be it meteors from outer space driving the extinction of lineages of 
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dinosaurs or genetic mutations causing drastic changes in the fitness of a 
subset of insect species.  
Moreover, mechanistic explanations do not make reference to the explanandum 
in the explanation. They instead attempt to unpack its inner workings. Narrative 
explanations, instead, do not create a formal separation between the 
explanandum and the explanans. The development of the central subject, here, 
is the central thread around which the narrative is woven, and is constantly 
referred to. As Currie summarizes, “the history of a central subject is explained 
in reference to its interaction with various causal factors” (Currie 2014, 1180). 
Changes can come both from within and from outside of the narrative‟s central 
subject. Narrative explanations, thus, do not entail the mechanistic commitment 
to epistemological reductionism.  
More tentatively, I think that the focus on components, activities and 
organization by mechanistic explanations implies that the nature and properties 
of the components of the system are, at the scale of the explanation, stable. 
Mechanistic explanations account for changes at the system level by 
unravelling the interactions of relatively stable components. Because narrative 
explanations revolve around the developments and events affecting central 
subjects, it does not seem to assume the same degree of stability in the nature 
of the explanans. As Hull insists, the central subject does not need to be stable 
throughout the narrative but needs to persist through changes. What matters is 
that there exists a form of continuity across the various forms the central subject 
can take across the narrative.  
Contingency 
Narrative and mechanistic explanations both appeal to some degree of 
contingency to account for the explanatory uniqueness of the event. As 
explained above, in ephemeral mechanisms contingency is essentially allowed 
in the description of the initial conditions. Glennan insists on the contingency of 
the configuration of parts: they can be the product of chance or exogenous 
factors and are short-lived and non-stable. In ephemeral mechanisms, once 
these contingent initial conditions are gathered, the outcome – the unique event 
to be explained – has some degree of necessity (Glennan 2010, 260). Unique 
events, using Beatty‟s terminology introduced above, are not contingent per se. 
They are expected to occur if one possesses sufficient relevant information 
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about prior states of the system. Instead, they are contingent upon these initial 
conditions for their realization. The “chance conspiracies of circumstances”24 
upon which unique events are contingent are the ones that are contingent per 
se. In Glennan‟s example of the death of Roland Barthes, it could not have 
been anticipated that Barthes and the laundry truck are simultaneously located 
on a dangerously close patch of road. However, once they find themselves in 
this situation, the death of Barthes was not a contingent outcome. Ephemeral 
mechanisms, therefore, propose a restrictive use of contingency, locating it only 
in the occurrence of the initial conditions.  
Contingency, on the other hand, is claimed by defenders of narrative 
explanations to be their essential feature and the main source of legitimacy for 
their use. As presented above, narrative explanations are argued to be mostly 
concerned with turning points. To recall, history matters, according to Beatty 
and Carrera, when “a particular future depends on a particular past that was not 
bound to happen, but did” (Beatty and Carrera 2011, 495). Narrative 
explanations, in this view, are needed to account for the various stages that 
were needed to occur for the realization of a unique event. In Beatty‟s 
terminology, the outcome of narrative explanations is contingent upon the 
realization of a series of steps that were contingent per se. This view does not, 
at first sight, make ephemeral mechanisms and narrative explanations 
extremely different with regards to contingency. They both attempt to explain an 
event that was contingent upon circumstances that were contingent per se. The 
difference lies in how widespread this contingency can be. As Currie rightly 
explains, ephemeral mechanisms leave room for contingency only in the 
mechanism‟s formation, not in its behaviour (Currie 2014, 1179). Narrative 
explanations, instead, are required to account for a series of contingencies 
affecting the central subject. In this case, contingency is pervasive all across the 
unfolding of the narrative.  
Explanatory load 
These differences in emphasis between mechanistic and narrative explanations 
have an impact on the type of things that carry the explanatory load. Ephemeral 
mechanisms constitute explanations because they manage to link a contingent 
                                            
24 This seems close to the Aristotelian view on “co-incidence”.  
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initial situation with a necessary outcome. This link is established by the use of 
change-relating generalizations. These change-relating generalizations track 
the set of causal interactions between the various components of the system. 
To explain with an ephemeral mechanism is to describe the situation with the 
right components and appeal to the relevant set of change-relating 
generalizations (Currie 2014, 1179). In narrative explanations, explanatory 
relevance is argued to be centred on the various contingent steps identified 
throughout the causal sequence. Beatty argues that narratives explain the 
occurrence of unique events “in the context of surrounding branches” by 
highlighting “counterfactual difference-making events” (Beatty 2017, 32). Here, 
the explanatory load is placed on these branching points which were not bound 
to occur but did and that together made the occurrence of the explanandum 
possible. In this view, it is because these branching points could have been 
different, that their occurrence was not entailed by the initial conditions, that 
they constitute relevant explanatory factors for the occurrence of unique events 
of interest.  
To summarize this section, I have assessed the convergences and key 
differences between narrative explanations and ephemeral mechanisms. 
Narrative explanations and ephemeral mechanisms both provide alternatives to 
the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation. They both insist on 
the need to identify key components and factors playing a causal role in the 
occurrence of the explanandum. They also both highlight the importance of 
some degree of contingency. However, ephemeral mechanisms have 
restrictions that narrative explanations do not share. Ephemeral mechanisms 
focus on strategies of decomposition that explains the occurrence of the 
phenomenon of interest with components found at a lower level. They also 
restrict contingency to what brings together the initial conditions to the 
ephemeral mechanism. Narrative explanations, instead, search for causal 
contributors of different nature from within and without the central subject. It 
also allows and emphasizes contingency at every step of the narrative, not 
merely in the set-up. Consequently, both strategies place the explanatory load 
on different things. Ephemeral mechanisms ground their explanations on the 
change-relating generalizations invoked to link between contingent initial 
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conditions to a necessary outcome. Narrative explanations emphasize the 
contingency of each of the steps needed to reach the desired outcome.  
From this survey of their points of convergence and divergence, another 
question follows: “are these explanatory strategies competing or 
complementary?” The following section considers the second option and 
presents an attempt to reconcile narrative explanations and ephemeral 
mechanisms by presenting them as relevant for different kinds of situations. 
This possibility relies on Currie‟s distinction between “simple” and “complex” 
narratives.  
D. CURRIE’S SIMPLE AND COMPLEX NARRATIVES 
This section details Currie‟s attempt to reconcile ephemeral mechanisms with 
narrative explanations. Ephemeral mechanisms are, in Currie‟s view, the 
equivalent of simple narratives. In simple narratives25, “an event is explained by 
a general model, and minimal causal factors are referenced” (Currie 2014, 
1167). Currie illustrates his claim with the explanation of a geological episode of 
planet-wide Ice Age that purportedly occurred around 650 million years ago. 
This geologically unique event is explained by invoking the “Snowball Earth” 
model. According to this theory, the planet-wide episode of glaciation was 
triggered by the clustering of landmasses around the tropics. These contingent 
initial conditions led to atmospheric changes that globally lowered the 
temperatures, notably at the poles, and triggered a feedback loop that 
strengthened the cold wave, which eventually led to a planet-wide ice envelope 
on the oceans. If such initial conditions were replicated, the Snowball Earth 
model states that a similar planet-wide glaciation would occur. This model fits 
with the notion of ephemeral mechanisms. The behaviour of a system (here, 
planet Earth) is explained by identifying lower level parts in a (geologically 
speaking) short-lived configuration and the change-relating generalizations 
driving the behaviour of these parts. As in ephemeral mechanisms, the 
emphasis is placed on decomposition, the identification of contingent initial 
conditions, and the use of the relevant change-relating generalizations that 
leads to the production of the desired outcome.  
                                            
25 Please note that there is no negative connotation associated with the 
qualification of ephemeral mechanisms as “simple”. 
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In this chapter‟s meaning26, narrative explanations are equivalent, in Currie‟s 
view, to complex narratives. In these cases, “there is no appeal to a general 
model in explanation, but rather a unique, detailed causal sequence is 
employed” (Currie 2014, 1167). Currie discusses the case of sauropod 
gigantism, an attempt at explaining the size of the biggest land animals that 
have ever existed. To do this, scientists combined sauropod‟s inferred primitive 
characteristics (i.e., oviparity, the lack of mastication, small-head-and-long-neck 
morphology) and new adaptations (i.e., increased basal metabolic rate, 
pneumatised skeleton). All of these factors are pieced together in a “unique, 
detailed causal sequence” (Currie 2014, 1167) that uses explanans at many 
levels of grain to account for the origin and viability of sauropods. The 
explanation of sauropod gigantism takes the form of a narrative explanation as 
it “proceeds by drawing together a plethora of diffuse, contingent explanans and 
telling a well-supported, coherent story about the sauropod lineage” (Currie 
2014, 1169). The emphasis here is placed on the identification of a variety of 
contingent factors, acting at different scales, which enabled the occurrence of a 
unique outcome: the extreme size of a species of dinosaurs.  
The complementarity between simple and complex narratives, according to 
Currie, is grounded on the fact that the recourse to one or the other is not 
dependent on merely subjective considerations. In other words, the best 
explanatory strategy is indicated by the “world” (Currie 2014, 1164). In some 
cases, the event of interest yields itself to be explained by recourse to a 
mechanistic explanation, invoking a general model to link between initial 
conditions and the outcome. In other cases, such a strategy fails and a 
particular, contingent course of events must be invoked to explain the outcome. 
Both tools are complementary in the sense that there would generally be no 
cases in which both tools would be simultaneously suited to explain an event of 
interest. This requires making a choice about the preferred mode of 
explanation.  
Moreover, Currie ties simple and complex narratives with the notion of progress 
in historical sciences. It is possible that in the course of an investigation, 
                                            
26 By contrast, Glennan seems to equate narrative explanations with ephemeral 
mechanisms.  
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according to Currie, a complex narrative replaces a simple one, constituting a 
form of explanatory progress. Reverting from complex narratives to simple 
ones, however, seems quite unlikely and counterproductive. Any simplification 
of the causal sequence runs the risk to be arbitrary and to miss out on essential 
causal factors27. He discusses the details of the explanation of sauropod 
gigantism to illustrate his claim:  
An account which did not include oviparity would fail to explain how 
sauropods managed such gigantic sizes, as how they managed to have 
resilient populations is left as a mystery. One which doesn‟t mention 
pneumatisation is also dissatisfying, as how Sauropods oxygenated their 
blood is left mysterious (Currie 2014, 1171-1172). 
The complementarity between narrative explanations and ephemeral 
mechanisms is therefore grounded on what investigations of unique events 
indicate over time. Different investigations privilege one type of explanation. 
And in some cases, complex narratives (narrative explanations) might end up 
replacing simple ones (ephemeral mechanisms).  
The first part of this chapter outlined the two candidate epistemological tools for 
the explanation of unique events, narrative explanations and ephemeral 
mechanisms. After identifying the convergences and divergences between both 
explanatory strategies, I presented Currie‟s distinction between simple and 
complex narratives. Currie‟s distinction is used in a conciliatory strategy that 
claims narrative and mechanisms to be useful for the explanation of a different 
range of unique events. Can these two explanatory tools, on top of that, be 
complementary within a given explanation? In other words, can explanations of 
unique events integrate elements of both ephemeral mechanisms and narrative 
explanations? The next part defends lineage explanations as a potential 
candidate for this task.  
II. LINEAGE EXPLANATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
                                            
27 This relies on a strong interpretation of Currie‟s argument. How far he thinks 
his case can be extrapolated is not explicitly stated.   
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Lineage explanations are, similar to ephemeral mechanisms, a recent 
outgrowth of the philosophical study of mechanistic explanations. They also 
share with ephemeral mechanisms the intended application to the domain of 
historical sciences, more specifically in evolutionary developmental biology 
(evo-devo). Lineage explanations are, according to Calcott, epistemological 
tools suited to explain phenotypic changes, here changes in patterns of 
development over evolutionary time. It attempts to deal with “the details of how 
[a] particular mechanism of interest worked, and how it changed over time” 
(Calcott 2009, 52). These explanations typically display causal trajectories 
between two states of the same entity. If applied to the professional career of a 
human being, a lineage explanation retraces the series of steps from early 
education to retirement, describing the state of the person at each of the stages 
and describing the changes required to proceed from one step to another 
(promotion, degree, etc.). 
These explanations can be represented in the form of a cartoon strip:  
Each stage shows how some mechanism worked, and the differences 
between each adjacent stage demonstrate how one working mechanism, 
through minor modifications, could be changed into another working 
mechanism (Calcott 2009, 52).  
To provide a simple illustration, Calcott describes a game in which one must go 
from one word to another. There are two rules to this game. First, one can only 
change one letter at a time, illustrating how changes must be gradual. Second, 
each of the stages must form an actual word, illustrating the need for “viable” 
transitions. For instance, it is possible to provide a lineage explanation that 
tracks the changes from “scale” to “plume” (Fig. 1).  
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Figure 1 Representation of a lineage explanation (from Calcott 2009, 55). Reproduced 
with permission from Oxford University Press. 
As the figure shows, lineage explanations run in two dimensions, following two 
types of requirements. The first requirement, which runs horizontally in Fig. 1, is 
termed the continuity dimension. The continuity dimension constrains lineage 
explanations by imposing limits on how much the subject of a lineage 
explanation is allowed to change. In the case presented, to respect the 
continuity dimension is to respect the rule that the words can only be modified 
by incremental change, one letter at a time. The second requirement is the 
productive dimension. The productive dimension constrains lineage 
explanations by checking that each step in the explanation is considered viable 
according to some principles. Here, each of the slightly modified sequences of 
letters must still be able to form a valid English word. These are the two generic 
types of constraints that lineage explanations must simultaneously respect.  
Applied in the context of evo-devo, lineage explanations track changes in the 
phenotypic space. What were the various stages, for instance, in the evolution 
of eyes and feathers? In his discussion of these cases (Calcott 2009, 57-61), 
Calcott respects the continuity dimension by proposing only a series of gradual 
changes, respectively in the eye and the hair follicle structures. The lineage 
explanations he discusses also respect the productive dimension by proposing 
at each step structures that are considered viable. In other words, at each of the 
stages, the described organisms are (on paper) capable of living and surviving. 
Combining continuity and productivity, these two lineage explanations 
respectively account for the gradual improvement of visual acuity and the 
development of fully-fledged feathers.  
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Lineage explanations are a compilation of an interrelated set of two types of 
lower level explanations (Calcott 2009, 62). Respecting the productive 
dimension requires providing an explanation of how each of the developmental 
steps is a viable one. These explanations, according to Calcott, are 
mechanistic. They rely on the explanation of the viability of the entity postulated 
at each of the steps by unravelling the organization and interaction of its parts 
so that they fit together into a functional whole. In this view, a lineage 
explanation is composed of at least as many mechanistic explanations as there 
are steps postulated by it. The validity of each of these “vertical” mechanistic 
explanations are both independent of the others and of the series of 
explanations provided to account for the “horizontal”, continuity, dimension.  
Calcott is much less restrictive on the type of explanations that can be invoked 
to explain what caused the changes between each of the steps of the lineage 
explanation. In the cases he is describing,  
[t]he same lineage explanation for some biological change could be 
given, whether the process driving that change was natural selection, 
artificial selection or genetic engineering (Calcott 2009, 75).  
In my interpretation, Calcott here leaves open the possibility of filling in the 
causal gaps between each of the stages with the variety of types of 
explanations that evolutionary biology possesses: selectionist and non-
selectionist, population versus individual-based… The types of explanations 
filling the continuity dimension, in his opinion, are not as easily determined as 
for the productive dimension.   
In the example illustrated in Fig. 1, the same type of change connects the 
various steps, namely a single letter change. As will be visible in my application 
of the concept to the explanation of the origin of eukaryotes, explaining 
continuity by the same type of change is, I think, not required in lineage 
explanations, especially when the trajectory studied is complex. To summarize, 
lineage explanations are composed of two sub-types of explanations of (a) the 
viability of each step and (b) the transitions between each step, respectively 
accounting for (a) the productive and (b) the continuity dimensions. If the 
viability of each step is argued by Calcott to be explained mechanistically, the 
transitions are however not explanatorily constrained in this way.  
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B. NARRATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND EPHEMERAL MECHANISMS AS TYPES OF LINEAGE 
EXPLANATIONS 
As the somewhat long title of this section suggests, and before presenting the 
possibility of combining both of them within a lineage explanation, I argue that 
narrative explanations and ephemeral mechanisms can be successfully 
described as sub-types of lineage explanations. Doing so requires making slight 
amendments to the initial characterization of lineage explanations. These 
changes, I think, extend the scope of applicability of Calcott‟s concept. At the 
same time, it enables me to use a conceptual framework to compare both 
narrative explanations and ephemeral mechanisms and to eventually devise 
another conciliatory strategy between the two.  
Ephemeral mechanisms as lineage explanations 
As a reminder, ephemeral mechanisms employ a traditional strategy used in 
mechanistic explanations. The explanandum is a behaviour produced by a 
system. Explaining this behaviour is a matter of an adequate decomposition of 
the system into its relevant parts, describing how they are organized and 
identifying the interactions that occur between them. The difference between 
traditional and ephemeral mechanisms lies in how contingent and frequent the 
initial configurations of the system of interest occur. Ephemeral mechanisms, 
concerned with explaining unique events, deal with purportedly rare or unique 
initial configurations. The initial step of lineage explanations corresponds to the 
description of the initial configuration of ephemeral mechanisms. Ephemeral 
mechanisms explain the connection between unique initial configurations and 
the outcome of interest by appealing to change-relating generalizations. In 
lineage explanations, change-relating generalizations fill the gap between each 
of the steps. They ensure the continuity of the system of interest by explaining 
the series of changes that affect it. As in mechanistic explanations, the outcome 
of the unique event in need of explanation stands at the end of the lineage 
explanation.  
Having found equivalents for the initial and end stages, as well as for how the 
continuity requirement is fulfilled, there remains the need to account for the 
production requirement in ephemeral-mechanisms-as-lineage-explanations. 
Because the vertical explanation of each step‟s viability is done in mechanistic 
terms in Calcott‟s formulation, I argue that the adaptation of ephemeral 
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mechanisms to this part of the framework is unproblematic. This question, 
however, highlights a difference of focus between lineage explanations and 
ephemeral mechanisms. In the context of evo-devo, from which the concept 
originates, each of the steps of lineage explanations corresponds to the 
phenotypes of different species. These phenotypes are stable and viable, 
corresponding or akin to the ones of extant species. The transitions between 
steps described by Calcott is considered as what is needed, at a population 
level and over a range of generations, for species bearing a phenotype to 
change into another. In ephemeral mechanisms, instead, each of the steps is 
meant to be a reconstruction of the changes an individual subject went through. 
In this view, the steps described are transitional snapshots of what resulted 
from a series of interactions between the parts of the system before another 
series of interactions occur again. It is, however, still of primary importance that 
none of the intermediate steps postulated in ephemeral mechanisms is non-
viable. None of the assessments of the viability of the steps, in ephemeral 
mechanisms, are usually done by providing self-standing mechanistic 
explanations of their viability. It is instead assumed that a viable (albeit rare) 
initial configuration undergoing the relevant change-relating generalizations is 
going to be viable. Vertical explanations are therefore usually kept implicit in 
ephemeral mechanisms. A representation of ephemeral mechanisms as lineage 
explanations is provided in Fig. 2.  
 
 
Figure 2 A representation of an ephemeral mechanism as a lineage explanation. 
Fragmented rectangles represent the system of interest, decomposable into entities 
represented as squares. Modifications in the components are represented by changes 
in colours. Black arrows represent change-relating generalizations. At each extreme 
are represented rare initial conditions (left) and the outcome to be explained (right). 
This representation assumes that the initial configuration of 8 white squares is a rare 
one. 
Narrative explanations as lineage explanations 
Because of the “mechanistic origins” of lineage explanations, the analogy 
between the latter and narrative explanations seems less obvious. With a few 
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adjustments to the concept of lineage explanations, I argue that this remains an 
analogy worth drawing. The accommodation of the central subject of narrative 
explanations in lineage explanations seems quite natural. Lineage explanations 
are threaded around the changes in a subject over time. Contrary to systems in 
ephemeral mechanisms, the subjects of lineage explanations share with central 
subjects a form of relaxed space-time continuity. They possess some form of 
cohesiveness without (contrary to ephemeral mechanisms) necessarily tracking 
one and the same system over the course of the explanation. This is why 
narrative and lineage explanations can track the development of a wider variety 
of historical individuals. Lineage explanations can follow the phenotypes of 
evolutionarily related species; narrative explanations can track biological 
lineages (species) or intellectual lineages in the development of ideas. In this 
relaxed vision of continuity, central subjects of narrative explanations and 
subjects of lineage explanations are analogous28.  
It is worth reminding that Calcott did not put restrictions on the type of 
explanation to be employed to fulfil the continuity dimension of lineage 
explanations. In the case of narrative explanations, two things are emphasized 
about the cause of these horizontal changes. Chiefly, changes in the central 
subject of narrative explanations are mediated by causal factors that bring 
about contingent intermediates. These causal factors affecting the central 
subjects can be contingent (but need not be), but the result of their action is 
itself not bound to occur. In this view, narrative explanations contrast sharply 
with explanations in terms of ephemeral mechanisms. In the latter, the 
intervention of change-relating generalizations brings an element of necessity to 
the intermediate steps proposed. Such a necessity is not present in narrative 
explanations.  
                                            
28 Here, I characterize narrative explanations and ephemeral mechanisms as 
subtypes of lineage explanations. I am aware that it is possible to reverse that 
claim, and argue that lineage explanations (and, possibly, ephemeral 
mechanisms) are a subtype of narrative explanations. This would mean that my 
characterization of narrative explanations is a narrow one, one that captures 
only one of the possible forms of narrative explanations.  
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In order to fit narrative explanations, however, slight amendments need to be 
made to the concept of lineage explanations with respects to the production 
requirement. Lineage explanations, Calcott argues, mechanistically explain the 
viability of each of the intermediate steps. Similar to ephemeral mechanisms, 
intermediate steps in narrative explanations possess a certain degree of 
transience. While they must be plausible states of affairs, there is no in principle 
need to restrict the explanation of their viability to mechanistic ones. This is in 
part a consequence of the differing nature of central subjects and systems, 
respectively in narrative explanations and ephemeral mechanisms. If systems in 
ephemeral mechanisms are decomposable, I think that it is much more difficult 
to decompose central subjects in this way, hence to explain its viability in 
mechanistic terms. In this sense, narrative explanations have looser production 
requirements than lineage explanations have.   
In short, it is not wholly implausible to characterize narrative explanations as a 
form of lineage explanations, provided that some slight alterations are made to 
the original production requirements. In terms of focus, narrative explanations 
are more directly concerned with horizontal explanations of changes in the 
subject than Calcott‟s account was. Calcott‟s notion seems primarily suited to 
provide representations of the trajectory of the subject that underwent changes, 
rather than representing the causes of the changes that underpins this 
trajectory. The two requirements that Calcott identifies, however, strongly echo 
Hull‟s two types of linkages identified in narrative explanations. These linkages 
are “the cause-effect relation connecting the events associated with the 
historical entity”, corresponding to the continuity requirement, and “the part-
whole relation integrating the central subject into a single historical entity” (Hull 
1975, 260), equivalent to the production requirement. A representation of 
narrative explanations as lineage explanations is provided in Fig. 3.  
 
Figure 3 Representation of narrative explanations as lineage explanations. Rectangles 
represent the central subject of the explanation. Changes (or lack thereof), marked by 
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changes in colours, here concern the central subject as a whole. Black arrows 
represent the intervention of causal factors. 
Mixed explanations 
Conceiving ephemeral mechanisms and narrative explanations as subtypes of 
lineage explanations opens up, in addition to Currie‟s, another strategy to 
conciliate these two. A mixed lineage explanation presents a sequence of steps 
and transitions that contain both mechanistic and narrative elements. 
Ephemeral mechanisms and narrative explanations, in these cases, would not 
cover the whole trajectory of the unique event. Certain episodes within the 
explanandum, instead, would be distinctly explained by an appeal to a narrative 
or to a mechanism. Ephemeral mechanisms, for instance, could be particularly 
useful to explain parts of the trajectory that do not exhibit the degree of 
contingency emphasized by narrative explanations, and where the changes in 
the central subject can be explained by invoking change-relating generalizations 
between some of its parts. Other parts of lineage explanations could uncover a 
series of contingent outcomes, stemming from the action of a variety of factors, 
from within and without the central subject. Narrative explanations seem better-
suited to deal with these kinds of episodes.  
A representation of such a mixed lineage explanation can be seen in Fig. 4. 
Please bear in mind that this conciliatory strategy is presented here as an in 
principle solution. It might well be possible that it does not fit with any real-life 
case of explanations of unique events (and as shown below, it does not fit so 
neatly with the hypotheses of Cavalier-Smith and Martin). It merely stems from 
an attempt to provide an alternative conciliatory strategy between ephemeral 
mechanisms and narrative explanations. Contrary to Currie‟s distinction 
between simple and complex narratives, mixed lineage explanations avoid 
seeing narrative explanations and ephemeral mechanisms as mutually 
exclusive forms of explanations that cannot coexist as part of a bigger 
explanation29. This section, by using a slightly amended version of lineage 
explanations, provides such an alternative.  
                                            
29 Even though it is not explicitly stated, please note that nothing however 
seems to contradict this possibility in Currie‟s paper.  
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The following paragraph assesses the relevance of the ideas presented so far 
to an analysis of the hypotheses of Cavalier-Smith and Martin. My analysis 
identified ephemeral mechanisms and narrative explanations, the two candidate 
epistemological tools to deal with unique events, as subtypes of lineage 
explanations. Therefore, there are four possibilities with regards to the type of 
theory presented by Cavalier-Smith and Martin. They can be (a) narrative 
explanations, (b) ephemeral mechanisms, (c) mixed lineage explanations or (d) 
something different. In what form do Cavalier-Smith and Martin tell us a story 
about the origin of eukaryotes?  
 
Figure 4 Representation of mixed lineage explanations. Mechanistic-like parts are 
represented by changes in a set of components (squares) within the subject of interest. 
Narrative-like parts are represented by changes in the colour of the whole subject. 
III. CASE STUDY 
A. MARTIN’S HYPOTHESIS AS A LINEAGE EXPLANATION 
Martin‟s hypothesis for the origin of eukaryotes has kept the majority of its main 
steps unchanged since its initial formulation, in collaboration with Müller (Martin 
and Müller 1998). This section proposes a characterization of Martin‟s 
hypothesis as a lineage explanation, retracing in a series of steps the 
explanation of this unique event.  
This hypothesis is composed of an initial step, an outcome and a central 
subject. It starts with two populations of cells interacting in the depth of anoxic 
oceans and ends with the emergence of a fully-fledged eukaryote bearing the 
ancestors to all mitochondria-related organelles. The central subject is the 
following evolutionary transition: the origin of eukaryotic cells from prokaryotic 
ones. All of the steps explain how the outcome came to be. Therefore, the 
targeted conclusion is what establishes what counts as relevant in the 
explanation. The continuity of the central subject through changes is ensured by 
a genealogical link of descent.  
Step 1: The encounter 
72 
 
The explanation starts with two types of cells: archaea30 and 
alphaproteobacteria. In an anoxic environment where there is competition for 
resources, organisms would benefit from being in close proximity to food 
supplies. The encounter between hydrogen-consuming archaea and hydrogen-
producing alphaproteobacteria is thus driven both by the internal specificities of 
their respective metabolisms and the external pressures of a competitive 
environment. This step in Martin‟s hypothesis can be captured by a mechanistic 
explanation. Let‟s consider the deep oceans of the Palaeozoic as a system and 
our two organisms of interest as its parts. A change-relating generalization 
driving these parts could run like this:  
In a system in which there are limited available resources, organisms 
tend to cluster around available food supplies.  
The first step of Martin‟s explanation can thus be explained as an ephemeral 
mechanism. In the initial conditions described below (widespread anoxia in 
deep oceans and competition for resources), applying the above change-
relating generalizations explains the outcome: the physical proximity of 
hydrogen-consuming archaea and hydrogen-producing alphaproteobacteria.  
Step 2: The entry 
As the physical proximity increases, both organisms eventually lose their 
physical distinctness, and an alphaproteobacterium is engulfed by an archaeon. 
This part of the scenario describes an instance of a prokaryote harbouring 
another prokaryote within it. Despite Martin‟s repeated attempts to decrease the 
exceptionality of such arrangement (for instance, in Martin et al. 2017, 23-26), 
this situation is still not consensually considered to be widespread. In addition to 
this, in the few cases describing a prokaryote-prokaryote engulfment, little is 
known about how this situation came to be. This situation is therefore 
contingent upon an interaction that, to the best of our knowledge, is contingent 
and needs to be specified: a prokaryote finds itself within another prokaryote as 
a result of an unknown process of encapsulation. No mechanistic explanation of 
                                            
30 The nature of the host is here explicitly vaguer than the nature of the 
symbiont. This is because there is less scientific consensus on the precise 
nature of the former than on the latter.  
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how physical proximity turns into encapsulation has been provided in 
prokaryotes. This step in the lineage explanation, I think, is aptly conceived as a 
narrative explanation. Note, however, that this judgement can be temporary. If 
future investigations provide change-relating generalizations relevant to this 
event, this step would instead be explained by an ephemeral mechanism.  
Step 3a: The rearrangements 
This step compiles a series of steps which share common features. In Martin‟s 
hypothesis, it corresponds to the series of “problem-solving” steps that helped 
to turn an oddly-functional host/symbiont association into a fully-functional cell 
with the precursor of mitochondria-related organelles in it. All of the steps 
described are contingent per se. For many of the lineages descending from the 
initial engulfment of the host by the symbiont, many of the required steps to 
stabilize the interaction did not occur the way they were described in Martin‟s 
hypothesis. This resulted in the death of the vast majority of these 
descendants31. Martin‟s hypothesis only foregrounds the very few that survived.  
Martin describes a series of genetic transfers that were required both for the 
survival of the cell and for some of the features of the purported first eukaryotic 
cell to emerge. The right series of genes must have been transferred or 
imported at the right time. After each of these required gene transfers, Martin 
describes the temporarily stabilized situation that resulted from some of these 
genetic reshufflings. This step is, therefore, a lineage explanation of a narrative 
subtype. The changes in the central subject are contingent and not captured by 
change-relating generalizations. This explanation is constrained by continuity 
constraints, the slight changes in the composition of the entity of interest must 
be tracked, and by production constraints, an account of the survivability and 
the challenges faced by the newly-emerging transitional organisms is done at 
each stage. 
Step 3b: Membrane changeover 
In parallel to the genetic rearrangements runs another crucial step in Martin‟s 
hypothesis. It is stated to explain the changes undergone by the plasma 
                                            
31 Martin is not explicit about how many lineages he thinks have managed to 
follow the steps he describes. Knowing that he considers this event as unique 
and therefore extremely unlikely, a probable answer is “very few”.  
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membrane lipids. During the whole interaction, it changes from being archaea-
like to bacteria-like. This membrane changeover is explained by invoking a 
purportedly typical behaviour from the engulfed alphaproteobacteria: the 
secretion of lipid vesicles. The secreted vesicles are also at the origin of several 
cellular compartments and cellular trafficking processes. As in step 3a, the 
series of events is dependent on normal behaviour from the central subjects, be 
it horizontal gene transfer or vesicle secretion. What prevents these steps from 
being explainable by appeal to ephemeral mechanisms, however, is that the 
outcomes that are to be explained are too specific to be made a necessary 
result of such regular behaviours. A narrative explanation is needed here to 
specify the contingent outcomes that resulted from these processes.  
Step 4: Eukaryotic expansion 
Once the ill-functioning prokaryotic association has been turned into a fully-
fledged eukaryotic cell, the origin of the rest of the eukaryotic features, 
according to Martin, has been made possible. Even though the details of the 
steps on the way to the rest of the eukaryotic innovations have not been 
provided in the previous chapter, I argue that these lineage explanations will 
require at least some narrative elements. It is unclear how the described 
increase in the affordability of bigger genomes can be translated into 
mechanistic explanations. It seems that, as in step 3a and 3b, some degree of 
contingency is needed to account for how these processes (which, contrary to 
step 2, are not unusual cellular behaviours) are shaped into outcomes as 
precise as new eukaryotic structures.  
To summarize, Martin‟s hypothesis can be described as a mixed lineage 
explanation with a majority of narrative elements. Interestingly, some of its steps 
are running in parallel to each other. They are not following a neatly ordered 
temporal sequence.  
B. CAVALIER-SMITH’S HYPOTHESIS 
Can a similar assessment be made with Cavalier-Smith‟s hypothesis? This 
lineage explanation is woven around different threads than Martin‟s. It starts not 
with two but one type of organism, an actinobacterium, and finishes not with 
one but two types of organisms: the first eukaryotes and the first archaea. It 
results in a subtly different central subject. Here, it is the transition from bacteria 
to the first eukaryotes and archaea, not merely the former. The lineage 
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explanation tracks the changes in this lineage of bacteria at the origin of both 
eukaryotes and archaea. In the below description, I focus mostly on the origin of 
eukaryotes.  
Step 1: Lost and found 
Cavalier-Smith starts with the loss of the cell wall by an actinobacterium. This 
usually untimely loss is, in this case, followed by the evolution, in descendants 
of this cell, of two new types of membrane structures at the origin of both 
eukaryotes and archaea. The whole sequence is named the “neomuran 
revolution”. This initial step does not correspond to a series of events that are 
known to regularly occur in nature. It is similar, in some respects, to step 2 from 
Martin‟s hypothesis. The emergence of two new types of membrane 
arrangements from an uncommon event is a radically contingent event, which 
could not be captured by invoking an ephemeral mechanism. No change-
relating generalizations can be invoked to make the link between the recovered 
wall-less bacteria, an initially rare but mechanistically explainable configuration, 
and the cells with the new types of membrane. This step is, at this stage, 
definitely of a narrative type.   
Step 2: Intracellular coevolution and secondary acquisitions 
Cavalier-Smith actually uses representations of lineage explanations to 
describe the later steps in the evolution of eukaryotes (see, in particular, 
Cavalier-Smith 2014, 46-47, fig. 2). The series of cellular changes described 
after the neomuran revolution are depicted as events of “intracellular 
coevolution”. It proceeds, echoing the focus on decomposition by mechanistic 
explanations, by articulating the organization of existing and newly evolved 
cellular components and the type of functions this enables. The transition 
between each of these stages is however not mechanistic. Instead, the order of 
emergence of some of the cellular structures is only loosely constrained. 
Mitochondria, for instance, emerge somewhere within this series of change as a 
secondary consequence of the acquisition of phagocytosis*. It is only stated that 
it comes simultaneously (evolutionary speaking) with endoplasmic reticulum* 
and peroxisomes*, and that this trio of cellular structures has boosted the 
energetic efficiency of the cell. The same goes for the nucleus, which became a 
necessary protective measure for the genetic material after the emergence of 
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the cytoskeleton*, but of which its moment of appearance isn‟t known with 
precision.  
The origin of mitochondria, in Cavalier-Smith‟s hypothesis, is contingent upon a 
series of higher level intracellular changes, which reshuffled the organization, 
and physiological possibilities of the lineage at the origin of eukaryotes. These 
wider intracellular changes were themselves contingent upon the recovery from 
the loss of cell wall by a lineage of bacteria, which is at the origin of eukaryotes 
and archaea.  
Most of the intracellular changes at the origin of eukaryotes in Cavalier-Smith‟s 
lineage explanation are aptly described and represented as narrative-like 
lineage explanations. They gather together a series of steps that keep track of 
the changing components of the central subject. Contrary to ephemeral 
mechanisms, the transition between these steps cannot be explained by 
recourse to change-relating generalizations. At the side of this series of cellular 
changes, Cavalier-Smith postulates the origin of some cellular structures, such 
as mitochondria, as secondary outcomes of the main evolutionary changes. The 
origin of mitochondria, therefore, is explained with a loose narrative: a sequence 
of events that develops somewhere on the side of a bigger, more constrained, 
narrative.  
C. ANALYSIS 
It is clear that Cavalier-Smith and Martin provide lineage explanations for the 
origin of eukaryotes that are, at best, slightly mixed. Only Martin‟s initial step of 
bringing two types of bacteria physically closer has been successfully explained 
as an ephemeral mechanism. His second step might also become mechanistic 
if change-relating generalizations explaining the integration were uncovered. 
The rest of the explanations possess numerous narrative-like features by 
postulating a series of contingent steps: steps that were not bound to occur as a 
result of the initial conditions. However, and it is very visible in Cavalier-Smith‟s 
hypothesis, both scientists sometimes drift away from providing a linear 
sequence of events. Instead of having a tidy series of contingent events, 
Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s hypotheses sometimes describes events running 
parallel or secondary events that did not occur at a determinate point and in a 
determinate order in the lineage explanations provided. Their hypotheses are 
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thus mixed lineage explanations in a second sense: they combine tidily ordered 
elements with more loosely constrained, messy bits.  
CONCLUSION 
The present chapter inquired into the nature of the explanations of unique 
events. For this task, two epistemological tools have been put forward: narrative 
explanations and ephemeral mechanisms. I summarized the main features of 
these epistemological tools and described Currie‟s distinction between simple 
and complex narratives as a conciliatory strategy that makes narratives and 
mechanisms efficient for a complementary range of events. The second part of 
the chapter puts forward and argues for the notion of lineage explanation as a 
fruitful epistemological notion for explaining unique events. Calcott‟s notion can 
be tailored to accommodate both ephemeral mechanisms and narrative 
explanations as subtypes of lineage explanations. This suggested another 
conciliatory strategy between the two epistemological tools, by presenting the 
notion of mixed lineage explanations. Mixed lineage explanations, in principle, 
are able to contain elements of both ephemeral mechanisms and narrative 
explanations at different stages of the explanation.  
I brought these conceptual considerations to my case study, which analysed 
Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s hypotheses for the origin of eukaryotes as lineage 
explanations. The widespread contingency pervading both Cavalier-Smith and 
Martin‟s hypotheses makes them more readily analysable as narrative 
explanations than as ephemeral mechanisms. However, the case study 
highlighted another way in which lineage explanations can be mixed. Both 
Martin and Cavalier-Smith‟s hypotheses defy a strictly linear understanding of 
lineage explanations by incorporating a parallel series of events and loosely 
timed and ordered elements alongside more tidy and sequential arrangements 
of events.  
The presence of such messiness in explanations of unique events is a 
potentially interesting locus of inquiry. Does it show the insufficient development 
of currently available explanations? In this case, one would expect progress in 
explaining unique events to be a matter of “tidying up” hypotheses by providing 
more strictly ordered lineage explanations. This runs contrary to Currie‟s 
emphasis on the complexification of narratives as a sign of progress (Currie 
2014). Is it, instead, a sign of maturity of these hypotheses? Loosely ordered 
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lineage explanations would be needed, in this view, to accurately reflect the 
complex array of factors that operate simultaneously for the realization of an 
outcome. These factors might affect the central subject in different places and 
their effect might develop over different time-scales. For these reasons, their 
actions cannot be neatly packaged in a linear and tidy lineage explanation that 
integrates them in a linear sequence of steps. In the case of loosely ordered 
events, it might be the case that the near-simultaneous occurrence of such 
events (like, in Cavalier-Smith‟s hypothesis, the acquisition of mitochondria, 
endoplasmic reticulum, and peroxisomes) makes it epistemologically unrealistic 
to access the details of which one came first.  
This emphasis on the non-linearity and complexity of the explanans echoes 
other existing analyses. Bechtel, for instance, recently criticized “basic 
mechanistic explanations” (such as the ones presented by Glennan) as being 
incapable of dealing with non-linear series of events (Bechtel 2011). He 
presented an updated notion of mechanistic explanation, which attempts to 
integrate “nonsequential organization” in order, for instance, to provide 
satisfying mechanistic explanations of oscillatory behaviours. Whether or not 
this updated conception of mechanistic explanations can, in turn, be expanded 
to the explanations of unique events is an interesting question. However, this 
chapter showed that Bechtel‟s critique of mechanistic explanations for their 
overemphasis on linearity can equally be applied to narrative explanations. To 
explain unique events, it seems that one must sometimes give up, in some 
respect, an overemphasis on providing linear explanations.  
The position developed in this chapter also echoes Fehr‟s defence of a form of 
explanatory pluralism for the evolution of sex (Fehr 2006). Fehr presented three 
types of models to explain the existence of sex in a population, namely the “Red 
Queen hypothesis”, “Muller‟s Ratchet”, and the “DNA Repair explanation”. 
These three explanations work at different degrees of abstraction, both spatially 
and temporally. Therefore, Fehr argues that the “[e]xplanation of the evolution 
of sexual reproduction requires multiple accounts, which cannot be integrated 
with one another without loss of content or explanatory information” (Fehr 2006, 
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168). This suggests another reason grounding the impossibility of integrating 
the explanation of some unique events in a neatly ordered sequence32.  
What would a mechanistic explanation of the evolution of eukaryotes look like? 
Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s explanations follow a similar pattern. An initial 
unlikely major disruption is, equally improbably, stabilized. A series of events 
then bring about (among other things) the origin of eukaryotic cells. The initial 
major disruption, in both cases, stems from abnormal or dysfunctional 
behaviours from cells. Both Cavalier-Smith and Martin use this explanatory 
resource as adequate to their explanandum. In this view, a change of this 
magnitude and rarity requires events that are deemed improbable enough. They 
would have otherwise happened several times, something that the degree of 
contingency of each scientist‟s explanation does not seem to allow. This type of 
improbable initial event can be compared to the combination of the meteorite 
impact and the extended volcanic activity that triggered the Cretaceous-Tertiary 
extinction. 
It is hard to see how the initial disruptions postulated in Cavalier-Smith and 
Martin‟s explanations could be mechanistically explained. However, they seem 
to be great candidates for bringing about the contingent initial conditions of an 
ephemeral mechanism. In this case, a mechanistic explanation would be 
capable of deriving the end state, the origin of eukaryotes, by the application of 
a series of change-relating interactions to the newly-made symbiotic interaction. 
Here, in Cavalier-Smith‟s case, a purported mechanistic explanation would work 
out the probability for the newly formed cellular organization to ingest (and then 
fail to digest) foreign elements. In Martin‟s explanation, it would amount to 
systematize the probability to transfer genetic elements of various size and 
nature (i.e., specific genes, whole metabolic pathways) and from this, to devise 
the probability of the initial organisms to successfully undertake the 
transformations presented in Martin‟s scenario over several generations.  
                                            
32 Currie and Sterelny (2017) also discuss the difficulty of providing integrated 
narratives for the explanation of unique events, highlighting the latter as a 
significant epistemic achievement. I come back to this part of their account in 
Chapter 5.  
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The current state of the explanations is far from this potential mechanistic state. 
It is currently insufficient, in Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s explanations, to merely 
identify contingent initial conditions and change-relating generalizations to 
explain the outcome. This line of thinking runs parallel with Skipper and 
Millstein‟s argument (2005) against the possibility of conceiving natural 
selection as a mechanism. Their criticisms mainly concerned the impossibility of 
explaining how the conjoined action of parts and interactions could provide the 
desired outcome as a result of natural selection.  
All in all, whether or not the explanations of the origin of eukaryotes will grow 
messier or more mechanistic is an open question. This case study does not 
enable me to say anything definite with regards to the usefulness of mechanistic 
explanations for unique evolutionary events. Independently of how 
“mechanistic” explanations of unique evolutionary events turn out to be, this 
type of explanation can play alternative roles in this type of research. One such 
role that mechanistic explanation can play is an evidential role. In the next 
chapter, I present the production of implicit “fictional truths” derived from lineage 
explanations as a way to provide empirically tractable claims which validity are 
directly assessed. Some of these claims can be mechanistic. 
Before discussing that, the next chapter starts with a study of the relation 
between these lineage explanations as theories and the past they are supposed 
to represent. 
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CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESES REPRESENTING PAST EVENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3, I defended hypotheses about unique events to take the form of 
lineage explanations. A lineage explanation retraces the development of its 
subject by retracing its trajectory via a series of steps. They are composed of 
two types of lower level explanations. One subset explains the transitory state 
of the subject at each of the identified stages, complying with what Calcott 
(2009) describes as the “production requirement”. The other subset explains the 
transitions between each of the stages, something that Calcott calls the 
“continuity requirement”. After having characterized the nature of these lineage 
explanations, and argued narrative explanations and ephemeral mechanisms to 
be subtypes of this category, this chapter now explores the relation between the 
provided explanation and the target event it aims at explaining. In other words, 
this chapter deals with questions of scientific representation.  
How are Cavalier-Smith‟s and Martin‟s lineage explanations of the origin of 
eukaryotes representations of their target event? The reader might be 
wondering what motivates the opening of such an investigation in the first place. 
How would it fit in the broader argument of this dissertation?  
I am ultimately interested in the production of knowledge in historical sciences. 
The next chapter dwells further on how evidence is generated in historical 
sciences. By exploring questions of representation, this chapter explores how 
lineages explanations are turned into claims to be assessed using these various 
evidential strategies.  
Several criteria to distinguish scientific representations from other, non-
scientific, representations have been proposed. One of them is to make the 
status of scientific representation hinge on direct, here understood as user-
independent, relations between a scientific representation and its specific 
target. The nature of these relations is described with different degrees of 
precision. Nonetheless, in this approach, the focus rests on how scientific 
representations possess some form of similarity to their targets (Suppes 1962; 
van Fraassen 1980; Lloyd 1988; Giere 1988; da Costa and French 2003). 
Because of its restricted emphasis on the representation/target relation, these 
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accounts have been qualified as “dyadic” (Knuuttila 2009) and have been the 
object of vehement criticisms (Suárez 2003). .  
Alternatives to dyadic accounts integrate a third element in the representational 
picture, namely the user(s) of scientific representations. In this view, 
“[p]ragmatic approaches make representation less a feature of models and their 
target systems than an accomplishment of its users […]” (Knuuttila 2011, 265). 
A weak version of such user-centric accounts make scientific representation 
hinge on an act of “stipulative fiat” and does not provide explicit norms to 
assess the quality of the chosen representation (Callender and Cohen 2006). A 
stronger version, which is adopted in this chapter, is presented in Suárez‟s 
inferential account (2004). Here, in Knuuttila‟s words, scientific representations 
represent their target in virtue of their ability to “enable the informed and 
competent user to draw valid inferences regarding the target” (2011, 266).  
Subscribing to the inferential account of scientific representation is a way to 
retain normative guidelines to evaluate the status and quality of scientific 
representations while giving up on excessively strict constraints (hence its 
characterization as a “deflationary” account). In my case study, it leaves room 
for the possibility of characterizing false scientific representations as good 
scientific representations. One example of this being the “Archezoa” hypothesis, 
discussed in Chapter 6. This hypothesis, albeit ultimately proven wrong, was 
used as the stepping stone for the formulation of several useful inferences and 
lines of investigation. This line of thinking is followed by several authors who 
urge to decouple the questions of whether something is a scientific 
representation and what makes this representation an accurate one (Frigg and 
Nguyen 2016a; Toon 2012, 23). This position also resonates with authors who 
emphasized the importance of using “false models” in scientific knowledge 
production (Levins 1966; Wimsatt 1987). In this chapter, my interest lies in how 
the lineage explanations provided by Cavalier-Smith and Martin, as 
representations of unique past events, are turned into empirically tractable 
claims. 
The philosophical literature about scientific representation generally deals with 
how scientific models represent target systems. Scientific models are not 
always representing a particular real-world target. They generate what Morgan 
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describes as a “world in the model” (Morgan 2012) which can be an 
autonomous object of investigations. On a related point, this autonomy grants 
the applicability of models to a wide range of epistemic situations. To illustrate 
this, consider the “Lotka-Volterra” model. This model was initially devised to 
capture the dynamics of predator/prey populations with a set of differential 
equations. Exploring the mathematical properties of the model is an object of 
investigations in itself. The Lotka-Volterra model can also be applied to a variety 
of systems, most notably to biological populations, but it has also been applied 
to describe economic oscillations (see Knuuttila and Loettgers 2016 for an in-
depth analysis).  
The construction of scientific models involves deliberate abstractions, 
distortions and idealizations which underpin the applicability and transportability 
of models. As summarized by Weisberg, scientific models “are abstract 
structures or physical structures that can potentially represent real-world 
phenomena” (Weisberg 2007, 216). Therefore, they are often said to represent 
their targets indirectly, enabling its users to gain “understanding of a complex 
real-world system via an understanding of a simpler hypothetical system that 
resembles it in relevant respects” (Godfrey-Smith 2006, 726).  
The lineage explanations proposed by Cavalier-Smith and Martin are not 
scientific models. The “world in the explanation” they contain is not epistemically 
autonomous from the target system they represent, since these hypotheses 
constitute the sole epistemic access to their event of interest. Such theories are 
not built to be transported to other contexts outside of their scope of origin. They 
are specifically tailored to the explanation of the origin of eukaryotes. 
Additionally, these explanations do not deliberately contain idealizations and 
distortions. Instead, they constitute attempts to provide direct representations of 
their unique event of interest. In this view, they are close to what Weisberg and 
Godfrey-Smith describe as abstract direct representations (henceforth, ADR). In 
this view, Cavalier-Smith and Martin “seek to directly represent the workings of 
the real-world system [they] are trying to understand” (Godfrey-Smith 2006, 
730).  
This vision is noticeably similar to the dyadic account sketched above, but 
differs in two key respects. Firstly, the main focus of this approach remains on 
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how scientists learn from the use of such epistemological tools, and this is 
partially independent from the extent to which a given ADR accurately 
represents its target. Secondly, dyadic accounts of scientific representation are 
mainly conceived with mathematical models in mind, and are thus made to 
account for mathematical similarities between the model and the target. Here, 
my case study involves linguistic descriptions of events, not mathematized 
models of it.  
To summarize, this chapter deals with how lineage explanations about the 
origin of eukaryotes, conceived as abstract direct representations, represent 
their target. It builds on Toon‟s make-believe approach, who proposes a direct 
view of how models represent. The purported directness of his account, despite 
its focus on scientific models, is what drew me to build my argument from it. 
Part 1 introduces the main concepts of Toon‟s view and applies it to my case 
study. Part 2 presents Frigg and Nguyen‟s DEKI account, devised as an indirect 
view of scientific representation and presented as an improvement on some of 
the shortcomings of Toon‟s account. I argue in part 3 that the claimed difference 
between both views is exaggerated and provide a way to consider Toon‟s view 
as a particular configuration (a case of DEK(I)) in Frigg and Nguyen‟s 
framework. In part 4, I argue that Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s lineage 
explanations constitute an even more specific special case (a case of D(E)K(I)) 
in this same framework. This chapter provides a way to reconcile Toon with 
Frigg and Nguyen‟s views and to retain some of the insights Toon‟s account 
provides (notably, his insistence on directness).  
I. TOON‟S “MAKE-BELIEVE” VIEW 
This inquiry starts with a characterization of the “make-believe” view, proposed 
by Toon (Toon 2012). This view is developed in the context of the use of 
models in science and proposes an analogy between the latter and the 
imaginative games of children. Extending this analogy, Toon develops a 
terminology derived from the context of these games.  
A. PROPS 
A game of make-believe starts with a group of children that decide to use their 
imagination to pretend an object to be something else. In games of make-
believe, branches of wood can become magic wands, plastic constructions of 
space-ships can become real ones, and old wardrobes can become entry doors 
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to parallel worlds. The objects which are imagined to be something else are 
termed props. Props are used by the players to imagine things. They are 
constitutive elements of the game.  
Extrapolated to scientific contexts, Toon argues that models are akin to props. 
They are considered, by an act of pretence, to be representations of something 
else. This leads Toon to provide the following definition:  
M is a model-representation if and only if M functions as a prop in a 
game of make-believe (Toon 2012, 62). 
An example of model-representation for Toon is the ball-and-stick physical 
model of molecules, used in chemistry. These physical models are used as 
props in a game of make-believe in the sense that scientists pretend, in 
manipulating them, that they are manipulating genuine molecules and chemical 
bonds (Toon 2012, 122).  
This pretence-based view of scientific models outlines what Toon considers to 
be a direct view of scientific representation. Toon suggests that the relation of 
representation is one between the prop and the target of the representation. 
The former corresponding, in the example discussed above, to balls and sticks, 
and the latter to atoms and chemical bonds. There is not, in this view, any 
intermediate abstract entity between the model and the target. Representation, 
then, occurs when “a model M […] prescribes imaginings about (a target) T 
within a game of make-believe” (Toon 2012, 62).  
B. PRINCIPLES OF GENERATION 
The presence of props is however insufficient to prescribe imaginings about a 
target. A set of rules is needed to direct and constrain the imagination. These 
rules are, in the make-believe approach, called principles of generation (Toon 
2012, 34–35). They are defined as “convention[s] that the children establish by 
[…] agreement” in the game they play. In a game of make-believe, then, the 
imaginings produced by players through the usage of props depend on and are 
constrained by the application of principles of generation. This concept is fairly 
straightforwardly transferred to a scientific context. In this case, principles of 
generation are the set of theoretical principles that both enable and constrain 
scientists‟ imagination in their use of models. In the case of ball-and-stick 
models of molecules, principles of generation dictate that balls are atoms and 
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sticks are covalent bonds, that red balls stand for oxygen atoms, or that each 
carbon atom can make a maximum of four covalent bonds. As Toon states, 
some of these principles are shared implicitly (or are assumed to be) across a 
scientific community (Toon 2012, 36). Principles of generation, also, do not 
need to be fully deterministic: there is often some leeway in what can be 
imagined while using models. In all cases, they enable the users of scientific 
models to turn props into representations of targets.  
C. FICTIONAL TRUTHS 
Games of make-believe involve the interaction of players with props endowed 
with imaginary meanings provided by principles of generation. The resulting 
utterances that are made by children in such games, such as “I put a spell on 
you with my magic stick!”, are what Toon calls fictional truths. It is fictionally true 
to make such utterances because (a) it conforms to the presence of props 
conjoined with the application of principles of generation and (b) it is only in 
virtue of these principles of generation that such utterance can be considered 
true. In a scientific context, fictional truths are similarly uttered when using 
models. In manipulating ball-and-stick models of molecules, it becomes 
fictionally true to assert that someone holds a carbon dioxide molecule if she 
holds a black ball linked on each side by two sticks to two red balls.  
D. THE BENEFITS OF EXPLORATION 
Toon‟s make-believe view is stated to be an account of how it is possible to 
learn with scientific models. By using props to prescribe imaginings about a 
target, Toon suggests that the process of learning occurs through the 
exploration of the fictional truths thus generated. In his view,  
we are quite aware of the state of our props, and of many of the fictional 
truths these props generate. What we don‟t know are many other fictional 
truths that these primary fictional truths imply. Learning about our models 
is a matter of discovering these implied fictional truths (Toon 2012, 47). 
Consistent with his emphasis on directness, to learn about the fictional truths 
generated by the use of models, in short learning about the model, is akin to 
learn about the target these models are supposed to represent. To summarize, 
Toon defends a view where models, as props, and principles of generation are 
combined to prescribe imaginings, or fictional truths, about a given target. The 
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directness of the view suggests that the fictional world thus generated via the 
model is pretended to be equivalent to the actual world of the target of the 
representation. For instance, holding a black ball linked on each side by two 
sticks to two red balls is therefore like holding a carbon dioxide molecule. The 
make-believe view is represented in Fig. 5.  
 
Figure 5 Representation of Toon's make-believe direct view of representation. 
This emphasis on directness is at the heart of Frigg and Nguyen‟s criticism of 
Toon‟s account. Their ”DEKI” approach to scientific representation attempts to 
go on similar lines to those of Toon but, according to them, it avoids some of the 
identified pitfalls of the make-believe approach.  
II. FRIGG AND NGUYEN‟S DEKI ACCOUNT 
Frigg and Nguyen, also discussing this issue in the context of the use of models 
in science, propose to break down scientific representation into four 
components, at the origin of the DEKI acronym. These are denotation, 
exemplification, keying-up and imputation. According to Frigg and Nguyen, 
representation is a relation between a vehicle M and a target system T33. While 
there is supposedly no further mediator in Toon‟s account (hence a direct view), 
the relation between M and T is here mediated by R, the latter being a 
representation of T generated with M. This together constitutes an indirect 
account of scientific representation. The DEKI account proposes to disentangle 
the processes at play between these three entities.  
A. DENOTATION  
                                            
33 They would have respectively used X and Z here, but for the sake of clarity I 
continue with the letters used in Toon‟s account. 
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Denotation, quite straightforwardly, is the relation of attribution that links the 
vehicle M and its target T. It is the relation, for instance, that links the balls and 
sticks of the molecular model with molecules and covalent bonds. A black ball 
connected to two red balls, in this case, denotes carbon dioxide.  
B. EXEMPLIFICATION 
In many cases, not all of the features instantiated by M are relevant to its role as 
a representation of T. Out of the properties of M, the relevant ones to this 
relation are said to be exemplified by M. This notion used by Frigg and Nguyen 
is inspired by Elgin‟s discussion of how caricatures represent. For instance, 
consider a caricature denoting Winston Churchill representing him as a bulldog 
(Elgin 2009, 79). Out of the features of the drawings, some of them (such as 
hair colour and paw shape) are irrelevant to the representation relation while 
some of them (menacing eyes, ample cheeks, defensive posture) are. The 
caricature therefore exemplifies certain features that purportedly represent 
some physical and personality traits owned by its target. In ball-and-stick 
molecular models, the colours, shapes, and relative arrangements of the 
components (not, say, the texture or smell of the balls and sticks) are the 
features exemplified by the vehicle that are relevant to the representation of the 
target.  
C. KEYING-UP 
It is not sufficient for M to exemplify some features to make it denote T. The 
exemplified properties need to be interpreted in order for them to signify 
something about the target. This process of interpretation is mediated by what 
Frigg and Nguyen describe as a “key” 
which explicitly associates the exemplified properties with properties to 
be imputed onto the target (Frigg and Nguyen 2016b, 228). 
The key does a similar job as “principles of generation” in the make-believe 
account. It is what states, in ball-and-stick models, that red balls correspond to 
oxygen atoms and that sticks count as covalent bonds. In Frigg and Nguyen‟s 
terminology, keying-up turns properties exemplified by the vehicle M in 
properties “I-exemplified” – properties that are exemplified by the vehicle after 
the application of the key. The ensemble of I-properties obtained in the use of a 
model is what constitutes R, the “world in the model”.  
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D. IMPUTATION 
Properties that are I-exemplified are then imputed to the target by an act of 
stipulation, similar to Callender and Cohen‟s position described above (Frigg 
and Nguyen 2016b, 228). The need for imputation is justified by the fact that, 
according to Frigg and Nguyen, not all the I-exemplified properties need to be 
imputed to the target. This is especially relevant to cases of idealized models 
where some of the assumptions (i.e. frictionless planes, infinite populations) are 
not carried over to the target. Imputation therefore connects the world in the 
model R with the target T.   
E. SUMMARY 
The various activities constituting representation described in the DEKI account 
are represented in Fig. 6. Frigg and Nguyen defend an indirect account in which 
models M do not represent a target T by directly prescribing imaginings about 
the latter (as Toon argues). Instead, the imaginings prescribed by the model M 
constitute a world in the model R through the processes of exemplification and 
keying-up. Some elements of R are then imputed to the target T denoted by M. I 
think that Frigg and Nguyen‟s account emphasizes the presence of two 
selection processes. First, between M and R as only some features of M are 
relevant and keyed-up into the world constituted by R. Second, between R and 
T as only some features of R are imputed to T.  
 
Figure 6 Representation of the Frigg and Nguyen’s DEKI indirect account of 
representation 
III. DIFFERENCES AND RECONCILIATION 
A. THE MAKE-BELIEVE APPROACH AS A CASE OF DEK(I) 
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What, exactly, are the differences between the DEKI and the make-believe 
views? By defending an account which makes representation an indirect 
relation between M and T, mediated by R, Frigg and Nguyen consider that they 
compensate for some of the shortcomings of Toon‟s direct view of 
representation. By arguing for an unmediated link between the vehicle and the 
target, Frigg and Nguyen consider that Toon bypasses denotation, 
exemplification, and keys to focus merely on imputation (Frigg and Nguyen 
2016b, 233). I agree that Toon‟s account blackboxes a lot of what‟s going 
between the use of a model M and the fictional truths generated from it. In 
particular, it lacks an explicit emphasis on selective processes, described as 
exemplification and imputation in DEKI, which filter the irrelevant features of M. I 
don‟t think, however, that Toon‟s view takes as extreme a shortcut as Frigg and 
Nguyen imply. I argue instead that Toon‟s account is a particular case in the 
DEKI framework, one in which imputation is rendered invisible (hence a DEK(I) 
variant) and hence can be perceived as “direct”.  
In the make-believe approach, models M denote a target T. These are the 
atoms and molecules denoted by ball-and-stick models. In Toon‟s words, what 
is denoted is the entity, concrete or abstract, about which imaginings are 
prescribed and fictional truths generated. As for exemplification and keying-up, 
in both cases principles of generation play a key role. As Frigg and Nguyen 
notice (Frigg and Nguyen 2016b, 233), Toon argues that  
principles of generation often link properties of models to properties of 
the system they represent in rather direct way. If the model has a certain 
property then we are to imagine that the system does too (Toon 2012, 
68-69). 
In this view, principles of generation indicate which of the features are meant to 
be turned into imaginings about the target. It therefore indicates how to single 
out the exemplified properties of a model. Principles of generation also 
constitute the key with which to turn the exemplified properties into what Frigg 
and Nguyen described as I-properties, and what Toon calls fictional truths. I 
think it is an uncharitable assessment of Toon‟s view to state that it neglects 
denotation, exemplification and keying-up. Doing so would leave unexplained 
the transformations that occur, in the make-believe view, between something 
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like a ball-and-stick model and the imaginings about atoms and covalent bonds 
that this model licenses.  
The paragraph above, instead, displays how Toon‟s make-believe view contains 
the recipe for the creation of a world in the model R, similar to the one present 
in Frigg and Nguyen‟s indirect view. The existence of this intermediate R is 
precisely what underscores their defence of indirectness in scientific 
representations. If my interpretation of Toon is correct, how to conciliate the 
generation of R and his outspoken defence of directness? The answer lies, I 
argue, in the fact that Toon presents scientists using models as pretending R 
and T to be one and the same thing. At first sight (and in Toon‟s formulation), it 
gives the impression that there is no additional abstract entity between the 
model and the target. In my interpretation, however, an abstract entity R is 
indeed created but it is simply not epistemically singled out from T. In some 
respects, it turns the DEKI framework into DEK(I). The make-believe view here 
describes cases in which imputation is made transparent because the I-
properties (or fictional truths) generated by the association of the model M and 
the principles of generation are all imputed to the target T. In this interpretation, 
Toon proposes a superficially direct but implicitly indirect view. Toon‟s make-
believe view presents a special case of the DEKI framework, represented in Fig. 
7.  
 
Figure 7 Representation of Toon's make-believe view as a case of DEK(I) 
After having integrated Toon‟s account as a special case of Frigg and Nguyen‟s 
framework, I now argue that lineage explanations about unique past events, 
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such as Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s, are not only aptly described as one of 
Toon‟s special case of a DEK(I) representation but correspond to a case in 
which exemplification is also made transparent.  
B.. LINEAGE EXPLANATIONS AS A CASE OF D(E)K(I) 
I first argue that Toon‟s account of make-believe is directly applicable to 
representations of unique past events such as Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s 
lineage explanations. These scientists‟ hypotheses, here a set of sentences, are 
epistemic entry points to worlds in which the events described in the 
hypotheses occur. In the make-believe terminology, these hypotheses 
undoubtedly play the role of props which denote their target, here the origin of 
eukaryotes. These props, because of their content, prescribe imaginings about 
a target system. It compels us to believe, in Martin‟s case, in the engulfment of 
an alphaproteobacterium by a hydrogen-consuming archaeon and, in Cavalier-
Smith‟s case, in the origin of the flexibility of eukaryotic membranes from the 
recovery of a loss of the bacterial cell wall. The two propositions enunciated in 
the last sentence are to be taken literally in the context of each scientist‟s 
hypotheses. They are akin to what Toon calls fictional truths.  
The worlds thus epistemically generated by these lineage explanations are not 
strictly limited to what is described in each hypothesis. Part of the attempts at 
consolidating or undermining the validity of each hypothesis revolves around 
elements that were not explicitly contained in the hypothesis‟ initial formulation. 
Examples include the criticisms from de Duve based on the lack of explanation 
of implicit aspects of Martin‟s hypothesis. According to him, if Martin‟s 
hypothesis proposes an explanation of the origin of mitochondria, this lineage 
explanation is unable, however, to “explain the development of other complex 
features of eukaryotic cells, or how that development could have been triggered 
by the assumed interaction between two prokaryotes”. Further, it lacks any 
“credible mechanism” to account for the replacement of the host cell‟s own 
membrane (De Duve 2007, 401). The two gaps, or absence of convincing 
fictional truths, identified at the time by de Duve have later become, 
interestingly, the object of attention from Martin and his co-workers. In later 
papers, they both addressed the link between the acquisition of mitochondria 
and the origin of eukaryotic innovations (Lane and Martin 2010) and more 
recently proposed a detailed explanation of the “membrane changeover” 
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critically pointed out by de Duve34 (Gould et al. 2016). A similar strategy is 
present in Cavalier-Smith‟s lineage explanation, which has also been criticized, 
for instance, on its implicit physiological impossibility (Martin et al. 2017).  
In Cavalier-Smith‟s and Martin‟s cases, then, the contents of their lineage 
explanations go beyond what is explicitly described in each scientist‟s 
hypotheses. Instead, the exploration of implicit elements is here deemed 
important. This is reminiscent of Toon‟s emphasis on the exploratory dimension 
in the use of models, and the importance to seek for the implicit fictional truths 
that their use generates.  
In coherence with the introduction of this chapter, I am here agnostic about how 
accurate to their target are the fictional truths generated from such lineage 
explanations. What matters, however, is that fictional truths generated from 
lineage explanations are, in the cases of Cavalier-Smith and Martin, taken 
literally, as if they were true. It matters epistemically, since the generation of 
fictional truths constitute, as the previous paragraphs illustrate, claims to be 
assessed (the next chapters address how such claims are assessed).  
To gain access to the implicit elements of the world contained in Cavalier-
Smith‟s and Martin‟s hypotheses, it is important to supplement the latter two 
with the relevant background principles. Similarly, as with Toon, the generation 
of fictional truths from the use of props is enabled and constrained by the 
equivalent of principles of generation. Here, these principles are all the relevant 
background information about the physiology and structures of the 
microorganisms postulated in these hypotheses. A lot of these principles of 
generations are kept implicit, and it is quite likely that different scientists can 
apply different, sometimes contradictory, principles of generation to the 
hypotheses presented. Such heterogeneity possibly stems in the generation of 
contradictory fictional truths from the same hypothesis. This issue is given 
greater attention in Chapter 7.  
                                            
34 I do not mean here to establish a direct causal link between de Duve‟s 
criticisms and Martin‟s further work, but rather underline the importance of the 
exploration of implicit fictional truths for the sake of reinforcing or undermining 
these hypotheses.  
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The message, here, is that Toon‟s make-believe approach to models is 
particularly compatible with how Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s hypotheses, here 
being ADRs, represent their targets. They do so by acting as props in a game of 
make-believe. When coupled with principles of generation, it is possible to use 
these props to prescribe imaginings about the target of interest. Lineage 
explanations about unique past events, with the two types of explanations they 
possess, are already quite explicit and describe a substantial portion of the 
fictional truths to be imagined about their target. However, as Toon rightly 
emphasizes, the use of these lineage explanations with principles of generation 
also make it possible to uncover implicit fictional truths which can play an 
important role in the consolidation and undermining of such explanations.  
As I hope the above paragraphs made clear, a major reason for the 
compatibility between Toon‟s make-believe approach and Cavalier-Smith‟s and 
Martin‟s lineage explanations is based on the apparent directness of how the 
latter two represent their target. Keeping with my interpretation of Toon‟s 
approach, there is, in this case, no epistemic distinction made between the 
world in the hypothesis and the “actual” world of the target. The world in the 
hypothesis generated by the lineage explanations is taken to be a literal 
representation of the target. It is in this sense that I argue lineage explanations 
of unique past events, such as Cavalier-Smith‟s and Martin‟s, to be fictional 
truths. Such hypotheses provide access to a fictional world that is to be taken 
as a literal representation of a target of interest, here a unique event in the past.  
The way these lineage explanations represent their target is therefore an 
instance of a case of DEK(I), in Nguyen and Frigg‟s terminology. Imputation is 
indeed made invisible by the literal interpretation of the fictional truths generated 
with these hypotheses. I argue, moreover, that they constitute a case of 
D(E)K(I). It is easy in these cases to identify denotation. It corresponds to the 
specification of the target event, the origin of eukaryotic cells in Cavalier-Smith 
and Martin‟s case. The action of principles of generation, described in the 
keying-up phase, is also made clear in the generation of implicit fictional truths 
(or “I-properties”) described above. However, I argue that the process identified 
by Frigg and Nguyen as exemplification is invisible. By this, I mean that there is 
no selection process which sorts out the relevant aspects in lineage 
explanations about unique past events from the irrelevant ones. All of the 
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elements of Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s lineage explanations are fictional 
truths. Further exploration, with the help of the principles of generation, helps 
generating further, implicit, fictional truths. This absence of exemplification is 
represented in Fig. 8. This view echoes Weisberg‟s view on ADRs, which I 
argue Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s explanations to be examples of. I agree with 
him that 
[b]ecause the theorist is analysing a representation that is directly related 
to a real phenomenon, anything she discovers in her analysis of the 
representation is a discovery about the phenomenon itself, assuming that 
it was represented properly. There is no extra stage where the theorist 
must coordinate the model to a real phenomenon (Weisberg 2007, 226-
227, emphasis added).  
 
Figure 8 Representation of Cavalier-Smith and Martin’s Lineage explanations as a 
case of D(E)K(I). 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter was motivated by puzzlement over questions of representation: in 
what respect could lineage explanations of unique past events, such as the 
ones of Cavalier-Smith and Martin, be considered as representations of their 
target? This initial puzzlement has driven me to two main results.  
The first is a reconciliation of two conflicting accounts of scientific 
representation: Toon‟s make-believe approach and Frigg and Nguyen‟s DEKI. 
Authors of the latter presented this account as an improved version of the 
former. This is done by, according to them, avoiding some of the key mistakes 
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from Toon‟s account, notably his defence of direct representation. Proposing a 
different interpretation of Toon‟s account as a superficially direct but implicitly 
indirect account of representation allowed me to fit Toon‟s approach as a 
special case of Frigg and Nguyen‟s DEKI framework. I have described the 
models in Toon‟s approach as cases of DEK(I), cases in which imputation is 
made invisible, thus explaining the apparent directness.  
This conciliation enabled me to benefit from the fruitful framework laid out by 
Frigg and Nguyen while keeping some of the appeals of the apparent directness 
argued by Toon. In a second movement, I‟ve extended their approach to 
representation (which essentially stems from discussions of scientific models) to 
my own case study of lineage explanations of unique past events, which are 
better characterized as abstract direct representations of their target. The 
characterization of these hypotheses as representations strongly resonates with 
the way Toon describes representation to occur in his approach. I argued that 
lineage explanations of unique past events could be adequately described, in 
Frigg and Nguyen‟s framework, as cases of D(E)K(I). These are cases where 
not only imputation is made invisible because of the literal interpretation of the 
fictional truths these hypotheses generate, but also where exemplification is 
made invisible because there is no selection of the relevant features in the 
hypotheses that are turned into fictional truths. In this view, lineage explanations 
essentially represent ”without filters”: they directly constitute fictional truths.  
This picture of representation, combined with the characterization of Cavalier-
Smith and Martin‟s hypotheses as lineage explanations, provides an interesting 
entry point to the topic of the next chapter. After having discussed the type of 
theories these hypotheses were and the way they represent their target, the 
next chapter critically reviews existing positions on the method of historical 
sciences. Lineage explanations, composed of a subset of two types of 
explanations, explicitly articulate a series of fictional truths about the target as 
well as provide, as I have argued above, an epistemic entry point to the world 
contained in the hypothesis. Exploring this world is a second source of fictional 
truths, which this time are implicit, as they were not at first explicitly contained in 
the lineage explanations. This overall set of fictional truths, both generated 
explicitly and implicitly by the assessment of lineage explanations, are the 
claims that are empirically assessed. The “business” of historical sciences can, 
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in this light, be seen as a matter of finding ways to probe the validity of the 
fictional truths contained in lineage explanations. As the next two chapters will 
make clear, there is a multiplicity of ways with which such probing can be 
achieved.  
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CHAPTER 5: A SURVEY INTO HISTORICAL METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 and 4 presented philosophical analyses centred on the theories 
presented by Cavalier-Smith and Martin. What kind of theories are they? To this 
question, I have provided an answer drawing on the notion of lineage 
explanations. Lineage explanations track the trajectory of a subject and can 
accommodate aspects of narrative and mechanistic explanations within them. 
How do these lineage explanations represent their target events? I argued that 
they did so by being constituted of and capable of generating further fictional 
truths. These fictional truths mediate the epistemic access to an imaginary 
world: the world in the hypothesis. What can be said of this world, the fictional 
truths that can be drawn from it, is to be interpreted literally, as attempting to 
provide accurate representations of the events it describes. To assess the 
validity of these lineage explanations is therefore to evaluate the validity of the 
explicit and implicit fictional truths that can be drawn from them. The next 
chapters dive into methodological considerations. I start with a critical review of 
existing positions on the methodology of historical sciences. It is particularly 
concerned with (a) the nature and role of lines of evidence, (b) the way they are 
generated and (c) the bi-directional relation between lines of evidence and the 
theories they support/reject.  
This inquiry does not touch on the specifics of my case study but reaches for a 
higher level of abstraction. At this level, I do not aim to provide a tidily ordered 
account of the methodology of historical sciences, one that would apply across 
disciplines and cases. I doubt of the existence of such a recipe. Instead, I try to 
identify key generic components of these investigations and useful conceptual 
resources that can be mobilized to account for them. The first inquiry places 
demands that help in the evaluation of the latter. The first part of this chapter 
uses quotes from analyses of the methodology of human history to identify 
features shared across historical sciences that need to be accounted for by 
philosophical accounts of its method. The second part is a critical analysis of 
the strengths and limits of Cleland‟s oft-discussed account of the methodology 
of historical sciences, an account notably centred on the notion of smoking 
guns. The third part presents a portion of the conceptual toolbox defended by 
Currie which, I argue, complements Cleland‟s in covering some of the gaps 
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identified in her account. The last, fourth part, applies Wylie‟s discussion of 
“security” to characterize the varying strengths of evidence, completing the 
conceptual methodological picture sketched in Part 2 and 3. I conclude by 
summarizing how the concepts discussed in part 3 and 4 respond to the 
demands of Part 1.  
I. QUOTES AND INSIGHTS 
What are the main features of the methodology of historical sciences? This part 
makes a first attempt at answering this question by drawing insights from four 
different quotes. These quotes are taken from analyses of the methodology of 
human history35. They provide concise and sharp illustrations of key aspects of 
this scientific method which, in line with Chapter 1, I assume to apply across 
historical sciences. These key points provide guidelines upon which the 
conceptual resources discussed in the next parts are critically assessed.  
The first of these quotes comes from Bloch. In an attempt, already quoted in 
Chapter 1, to illustrate how much progress has been achieved in historical 
knowledge, he describes how  
[in a bit more than a century,] gigantic patches of humanity emerged from 
the mists. Egypt and Chaldea shook off their shrouds. Dead cities of 
Central Asia revealed their languages that no-one could speak anymore, 
and their religions that were long extinct (Bloch 1949, 22, own 
translation).    
Bloch‟s assertion is, of course, metaphorical. He does not describe the zombie-
like revival of extinct civilizations. What he means, instead, is that historical 
scientists have the capacity to revive the epistemic existence of civilizations that 
were once collectively forgotten. This point is even more striking when applied 
to the past before the appearance of humans. Before the historical sciences 
started dealing with these topics, there was comparatively very little, close to 
                                            
35 The choice of using cases from human history, not from the history of other 
historical sciences such as geology, is done to further emphasize on the 
methodological continuities (argued in Chapter 1) between human history and 
historical sciences.  
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nothing, that could ever be known about events in the pre-human past (i.e. the 
origin of life). Historical sciences, therefore, are capable of epistemically 
populating the past in ways that are impossible otherwise.  
This quote aims to illustrate the epistemic optimism that seems granted by this 
ability to achieve such progress. Despite the inaccessibility of the object under 
study, Bloch‟s quote underlines how historical sciences are characterized by a 
continuous and spectacular capacity to overcome epistemic limitations posed 
by the nature of their subject of study. In this view, historical sciences are 
capable of devising a variety of ways to obtain epistemic accesses to such 
subjects. By this, I do not mean that all of the puzzles of the past will invariably 
be solved if given enough time. What I mean is that, generally, there are good 
chances that some epistemic progress will be achieved about them.  
The second quote comes from Arnold, which proposes a subtle description of 
the relation between our knowledge of the past and our knowledge of the 
present:  
It has been suggested (by the writer L.P. Hartley) that „the past is a 
foreign country; they do things differently there‟. Douglas Adams, the 
science-fiction author, posits an opposite case: the past is truly a foreign 
country, they do things just like us (Arnold 2000, 6–7).  
Putting side by side Hartley and Adams‟ points of view allows Arnold to exploit 
our conflicting intuitions about the familiarity and the foreignness of the past36. I 
interpret Hartley‟s side as a warning against the risk of transposing the present 
into the past. Understanding the behaviour of the entities observed in the 
present is not sufficient to understand the behaviour of the entities of the past. 
This is because entities existing in the past have characteristics that are not 
known or unobserved in present entities. This “foreign country”, therefore, 
requires a study of its own. Adams‟ point softens without fully contradicting 
Hartley. When asserting that the entities of the past “do things just like us”, I 
interpret Adams as emphasizing the partial similarity of these entities to the 
                                            
36 It has kindly been suggested to me that Arnold here misquotes Adams‟ work. 
Luckily, whether or not it is the case is independent of my interpretation of 
Arnold‟s point and its relevance to my argumentation.  
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entities populating the present. A study of the past, then, is a study of entities 
that are both familiar in many respects and at the same time differ in several 
ways from what can be observed in the present.  
From this quote, it is possible to infer the fundamental importance and 
usefulness of our knowledge of the contemporary to understand the past. In this 
view, historical knowledge benefits from and is shaped by the progress in the 
understanding of contemporary entities. Better understanding the behaviour of 
the latter is, in this view, a gateway to a better understanding of their past 
counterparts. It is clear, for instance, that progress in the knowledge about the 
origin and evolution of bacterial cells would have been impossible before 
biologists gained a deeper understanding of the behaviour of contemporary 
bacteria. The foreignness of the past, however, reminds us that knowledge of 
the contemporary is important but insufficient: it is important for historical 
scientists to capture the multiple “foreign” specificities of the entities populating 
the past.  
The third quote comes back to Bloch who, this time, discusses the epistemic 
value of medieval hagiography:  
From the lives of saints in high middle ages, at least three-quarters of this 
are incapable of telling us anything solid about the pious characters 
about which they pretend to retrace the destiny. But if questioned, on the 
contrary, on the particular ways of living and of thinking of the epochs in 
which they were written, all sorts of things the hagiographer had no 
intention of exhibiting, they turn out to be priceless sources. In our 
unavoidable subordination to the past we have, therefore, at least, freed 
ourselves from the fact that, forever condemned to exclusively know it 
through its traces, we nonetheless manage to know a lot more about it 
than it itself saw fit to let us know (Bloch 1949, 25, own translation). 
This quote substantiates the initial argument about epistemic optimism. I take 
this passage to be of interest on three related points. Firstly, it highlights the 
creativity displayed by historical scientists to extract information about a variety 
of topics in ways that were not intuitively visible. Here, a purported biography of 
the lives of medieval saints is turned into an epistemic window on various 
aspects of medieval culture. The second aspect is the contextual flexibility 
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possessed by traces of the past. The same piece of information can be 
meaningful in a variety of ways, used as evidence in a variety of contexts. 
Lastly, this quote reminds how inescapably theoretically mediated interpretation 
of traces of the past is. In historical sciences as in other scientific domains, lines 
of evidence do not “speak by themselves”. The interpretation of traces of the 
past depends on the bringing together, by historical scientists, of a variety of 
methodological and conceptual backgrounds that underpin these 
interpretations. As a consequence, the assessment of claims about the past can 
focus on several loci. It can focus not only on the nature of the evidence 
mobilized but also on these conceptual and methodological backgrounds that 
are brought in for the generation of these claims.  
The last of these quotes once again comes from Bloch‟s work. It deals with 
ways to verify the accuracy of the exploits narrated by Marbot, a Napoleonic 
general, in his autobiography:  
How to verify the anecdote? By calling to the rescue other testimonies. 
We possess the orders, the notebooks, the reports from the armed 
forces. They testify that, during the famous night, the Austrian corps, 
which Marbot pretends to have found the bivouacs on the left bank, were 
still occupying the opposite bank. From Napoleon‟s correspondence it 
furthermore emerges that, on the 8th May, high waters had not started 
yet. We eventually retrieved a request for promotion established on the 
30th June 1809, by Marbot in person. Among the honours he invokes, he 
does not say a word about his so-called feats from the month before 
(Bloch 1949, 52–53, own translation). 
In the last paragraph, I highlighted the theoretically mediated dimension of 
evidence about the past. The above quote highlights that traces of the past 
indeed do not speak by themselves, but instead that the strength of their 
interpretation also depends on how they fit with other, related, traces. Here, the 
credibility of Marbot‟s testimony as a factual source about its author‟s exploits is 
undermined by a variety of credible traces. With regards to the nature of lines of 
evidence in historical sciences, it means two things. First, the information 
extracted from sources, as well as the latter‟s credibility, are dependent on the 
existing evidential network within which they are embedded. Because of that, 
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these interpretations can possess different degrees of strength, which can 
evolve over time with the discovery of new evidence or changes in concepts, 
methods and theory. Lastly, I also extract from Bloch‟s quote the possibility for 
claims about the past to be conclusively evaluated. In the example mobilized, 
Marbot‟s autobiographical claims are true or false, not comparatively true or 
false. They do not fare worse compared to other hypotheses about what 
happened on the night of the anecdote. These claims are, here, simply shown 
to be false.  
This short survey stemming from the analysis of four quotes allows me to 
extract a series of components belonging to the methodology of historical 
sciences. They are summarized here:  
(a) Epistemic optimism is generally warranted about the progress of our 
knowledge of the past.  
(b) Knowledge about contemporary entities is instrumental to learn about the 
past.  
(c) Historical scientists display creativity in the extraction of information from 
traces.  
(d) The same trace of the past possesses contextual flexibility: it can be 
employed as evidence in a variety of contexts.  
(e) Interpreting traces of the past is inherently theoretically mediated. These 
traces never speak by themselves.  
(f) The existing evidential network matters to the meaning and strength of 
individual lines of evidence.  
(g) The interpretation of a trace of the past has varying degrees of reliability.  
(h) The evaluation of claims about the past is not necessarily conditional or 
relative, it can also be conclusive.  
This series of insights provides evaluative guidelines for the critical assessment 
of existing positions articulated in the philosophy of historical sciences. I focus 
in particular on the claims these accounts make about the nature and role of the 
evidence, the way they are generated, and their relation with the hypotheses 
they are related to. I start by making a critical assessment Cleland‟s “smoking 
gun” view of the historical method. I argue that her account is rightly optimistic 
and forward-looking: it highlights the changes that new trace evidence can bring 
to an existing epistemic situation. However, I think that it is incomplete in the 
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sense that it emphasizes too much on the search for traces, insists on the 
necessity of a comparative assessment of hypotheses and disregards the role 
of theories on the search for evidence.  
II. STRENGTHS AND LIMITS OF THE SMOKING GUN VIEW OF THE HISTORICAL 
METHOD 
A. SMOKING GUNS - DEFINITION 
The view detailed here has been defended in the works of Cleland over the 
years (2001; 2002; 2009; 2011). It describes her vision of the methodology of 
the historical sciences, contrasted with the methodology possessed by 
experimental sciences, in order to establish the epistemic legitimacy of the 
former despite being distinct from the latter. Cleland‟s account revolves around 
the notion of smoking gun, of which she provides the following definition:  
A smoking gun discriminates among rival hypotheses about long-past, 
token events by showing that one or more provides a better explanation 
for the total body of evidence available than the others (Cleland 2011, 
554). 
This notion can be seen as an attempt to explain how knowledge of the past is 
constantly reshaped. According to her, historical scientists constantly search for 
new traces to be added to what has already been collected from the past. This 
is done with the aim of establishing the comparative superiority of a hypothesis 
over others by the finding of a smoking gun, a trace that destabilizes the current 
evidential picture by upsetting the evidential equivalence of competing 
hypotheses. One could, as she does, see this process as ideally converging 
“upon a single hypothesis” (Cleland 2011, 554), or, if it doesn‟t, argue for a 
continuous renewal of competing hypotheses that accounts equally well for the 
ever-changing total body of evidence37. Forber also describes the fundamental 
importance given to the finding of new lines of evidence and their capacity to 
break ties between hypotheses. According to him, 
                                            
37 See Chapter 7 for a criticism of this particular view about how competing 
theories are generated.  
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Evidence is contrastive. For some data to count as evidence they must 
favour one hypothesis over some set of alternatives (Forber 2009, 249). 
The absence of contrastive evidence corresponds to what he describes as 
cases of “contrast failure” (Forber 2009, 249). 
B. ADVANTAGES  
Cleland‟s account is a fundamentally forward-looking one. It successfully 
emphasizes the continuous need, for historical sciences, to keep the evidential 
picture moving, hence to enable the continuous progress of the knowledge of 
the past. Her account thus undoubtedly displays epistemic optimism. She firmly 
believes that  
our ability to extract information about the past from contemporary 
phenomena is rapidly increasing, so much so that I suspect the 21st 
century may become the age of historical science (Cleland 2011, 579)!  
Wylie also defends a forward-looking and optimistic line, in the context of 
archaeology:  
[archaeological data] do (sometimes) have a capacity to challenge and 
constrain what we claim about the past: they routinely turn out differently 
than expected; they generate puzzles, pose challenges, force revisions, 
and canalize reconstructive and explanatory thinking, sometimes raising 
doubts about even the most well-entrenched presuppositions (Wylie 
2002, 191). 
In Wylie‟s view, new lines of evidence (or, in some of the cases she describes, 
the re-interpretation of old one) have the capacity to keep things epistemically 
moving and to upset and improve on potentially all of the components of our 
interpretations of the past.  
In his own assessment of the epistemic legitimacy of the historical sciences, 
Turner highlights a series of factors that warrants a form of pessimism. He first 
emphasizes the pervasiveness and importance of information-destroying 
processes in historical sciences (Turner 2007, 3)38. This concept describes the 
                                            
38 The notion of “information-destroying processes” is drawn from Sober 1991.  
106 
 
processes at play that led to the progressive permanent erasure of remains 
from the past. For instance, fossils are progressively disappearing through the 
combined actions of erosion and of various destructive human processes (i.e., 
construction, mining). In this view, this ever-decreasing quantity of traces 
proportionally decreases what can be potentially known about the past.  
The epistemic optimism discussed in part 1 encourages me to side with Cleland 
and Wylie. While it is true that information-destroying processes are 
continuously erasing traces from the past, historical scientists have also 
continuously improved their ability to extract and to interpret these traces. 
These methodological improvements are combined with the creativity of 
historical scientists as well as their capacity to exploit the contextual flexibility 
displayed by these lines of evidence. In addition to this, improvements in 
knowledge of the contemporary also benefit knowledge of the past. I think that 
the combination of these positive factors, as a whole, generally overcomes the 
epistemic hurdles continuously formed through the action of information-
destroying processes. It does not mean that historical scientists always manage 
to overcome these detrimental effects. There are probably areas of the past that 
are epistemically forever out of reach. However, I think, like Cleland, Wylie and 
Bloch that it is legitimate to be optimistic with regards to the progress of our 
knowledge of the past39.  
On another positive note, Cleland‟s characterization of the effects of smoking 
guns entails a view in which the evidence‟s epistemic significance is relative to 
the already available traces of the past. The effect of new lines of evidence is 
indeed to selectively support a hypothesis above others in combination with 
what has already been found out, not by itself. This agrees with one of the 
insights described in part 1.  
C. LIMITS  
While the emphasis on the search for smoking guns and the underlying 
optimism are, I think, strong points of Cleland‟s account, it is less clear to see 
                                            
39 This cautious optimism with regards to how information about the past can be 
lost, preserved or generated is also captured by Currie‟s “ripple model” of trace-
based evidence in historical sciences (Currie 2018, 111-136). 
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why the evaluation of hypotheses must be comparative, hence to see why the 
research of new lines of evidence must necessarily be placed in a competitive 
context. In part 1, the case of the evaluation of the credibility of Marbot‟s 
anecdote illustrated how a claim about the past‟s truth-value can be evaluated 
conclusively, not necessarily relatively to another. In this view, Cleland‟s notion 
of “smoking gun” and Forber‟s notion of “contrast failure” overly emphasize the 
competitive evaluation of hypotheses. It is true that the constant reshaping of 
our knowledge of the past by the finding of smoking guns can establish a 
competitive advantage of a given hypothesis over others (as Cleland and 
Forber insist), but I don‟t believe this is to be an essential component of 
hypotheses evaluation. In the next chapter I illustrate this claim with the case of 
Archezoa, a classification with evolutionary underpinnings that has also been 
shown to be wrong, not relatively incorrect. 
By centralizing her account on the discovery of a smoking gun, Cleland‟s picture 
of historical sciences primarily places emphasis on the capacity of new pieces 
of evidence to dramatically reshape the evidential picture of a given claim. This 
is confirmed in another definition she provides of the term, in which a smoking 
gun is defined as 
a trace(s) that unambiguously discriminates one hypothesis from among 
a set of currently available hypotheses as providing “the best 
explanation” of the traces thus far observed (Cleland 2002, 481, my 
emphasis). 
By emphasizing on the “unambiguous discrimination” smoking guns are capable 
of bringing, I argue that Cleland conveys a slightly distorted picture of historical 
methodology. This is for two reasons. Firstly, it creates inflated standards for 
what the effects of evidence should be. Rather than seismic changes in the 
evidential picture, I think instead that a lot of new pieces of evidence have only 
minute, uncertain effects. This reflects a criticism already formulated by 
O‟Malley in her study of molecular phylogenies:  
What is happening for the most part in phylogeny […] is not the 
„unambiguous discriminat[ion]‟ of one hypothesis as the best, but 
tentative arguments for the plausibility of certain broad historical patterns 
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and processes given phylogenetic outputs (O‟Malley 2016, 12, 
references removed). 
In other words, it is possible that some lines of evidence dramatically change 
the epistemic situation at play, but most of the time they don‟t. Instead, they 
have a much more modest, sometimes yet not precisely determined, sometimes 
changeable, but non-negligible effect.  
In part 1, I mentioned the inescapable interpretative dimension behind the 
claims and evidence mobilized in historical sciences. I think that the idea of a 
“smoking gun” confers a rather minimal role to this theoretical mediation. In a 
literal interpretation of the metaphor, it is indeed not theoretically sophisticated 
to infer from the smoke stemming from a gun that a shot has been fired from 
this gun in the near past and to identify the murderer as the person still holding 
the smoking gun. In her analysis of molecular phylogenetics, O‟Malley contests 
this minimal role ascribed to the investigator by presenting how the evidence is 
generated through 
model-driven selection and processing of some molecular data and not 
others – in a manner akin to „systematic variation‟ (O‟Malley 2016, 12). 
The idea behind this criticism is that the trick for historical scientists is not to find 
smoking guns dispersed in nature (contra Cleland 2002, 490). On the contrary, 
the generation of evidence is also a matter of questioning new and existing 
traces in an appropriate way.  
Beyond this need for theoretical mediation in the generation and interpretation 
of evidence, I also think that Cleland‟s account puts excessive weight on the 
finding of new traces as a source of epistemic movement. In her view, it seems 
that the key source of changes for the support of claims about the past is the 
finding of traces by historical scientists. It gives comparatively little importance, I 
think, to other ways to alter the support for hypotheses.  
This tendency can be illustrated by Cleland‟s response to Jeffares‟ defence of 
the importance of middle-range theories in archaeological sciences. Middle-
range theories (MRTs) are, in Jeffares words, attempts to  
109 
 
find regularities in the way that archaeological sites came about, and to 
find regularities between observable remains and the behaviours of past 
people (Jeffares 2008, 472). 
In other words, to establish these theories is to provide a theoretical basis that 
mediates the interpretation of traces of the past as evidence. Examples of 
MRTs include a framework, established experimentally, that can be used to 
demarcate, on bones found on archaeological sites, marks left by the result of 
Hominin tool use from marks left by scavenging canines (Jeffares 2008, 473). It 
is clear, in this example, that without the existence of such MRT, it would be 
impossible to determine which of the marks are evidence for Hominin tool use. 
This is why it is unclear, in my mind, how the establishment of theoretical tools 
such as MRTs can be “epistemically secondary” to the finding of traces of the 
past, as Cleland (Cleland 2011, 565-66) and O‟Malley (O‟Malley 2016, 80) have 
argued. If by this they mean to affirm the overarching importance of the 
discovery of traces to support claims about the past, I agree. But I argue that 
what theoretically mediates the interpretation of these traces, such as MRTs, is 
equally central and cannot be considered secondary. This asymmetrical 
emphasis is, I think, problematically embedded in the notion of “smoking gun” 
that suggests a form of trace-centrism.  
The last critical point I bring about Cleland‟s account ties this chapter with some 
of the points raised in the previous two chapters. As a reminder, I argued that 
hypotheses about past events take the shape of lineage explanations, which 
track the becoming of a subject through a series of steps. These lineage 
explanations are constituted of and can be used to draw fictional truths about 
the target event. Explicit fictional truths are already present in the formulation of 
lineage explanations and implicit fictional truths can be derived from the 
exploration of the fictional worlds these explanations contribute to creating. The 
evaluation of hypotheses about unique past events depends on the evaluation 
of these implicit and explicit fictional truths generated from lineage explanations.  
Cleland‟s account, in my interpretation, only explicitly acknowledges the 
influence of the evidence on hypotheses. The influence from hypotheses to 
evidence seems, however, neglected. While it is uncontroversially important 
that the finding of new evidence is crucial to support or reject hypotheses about 
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the past, I think that more should be said about how the reverse influence 
occurs. Her discussion of narrative explanations and predictions, I think, 
illustrate this relative disregard from Cleland. 
Cleland conceives narrative explanations as telling “a coherent causal story 
about how a puzzling contemporary phenomenon, a trace, was produced” 
(Cleland 2009, 53-54). In this view, narrative explanations link the past with the 
present by explaining the contemporary presence of the trace. Such narratives 
are argued by Cleland not to be of primary methodological importance. In her 
view, they both require the invention of “many of the events in the narrative 
sequence” and consequently relegate justification “to a minor role” (Cleland 
2009, 54). Because of that, Cleland considered it important to place as little 
emphasis as possible on the construction of narratives. Otherwise, this would 
divert attention from the primary task of historical sciences, namely  
explaining observable phenomena in terms of unobservable causes […] 
(Cleland 2001, 987). 
In other words, the relation of influence is here only conceived to go from the 
available evidence to the inferred common cause.  
This unidirectionality is also illustrated by her treatment of predictions in 
historical sciences. A typical instrument of the experimental sciences, the 
activity of prediction is a typical case of a movement from hypotheses to 
evidence, hypotheses producing expectations with regards to the evidence to 
be obtained. In historical sciences, Cleland argues, these predictions “are 
typically too vague for their success or failure to play central roles in the 
evaluation of the hypotheses with which they are associated” (Cleland 2011, 
553). They only serve as  
tentative guides – educated guesses, based informally upon both 
theoretical and empirical background knowledge – about where 
additional evidence (ideally, a smoking gun!) might be found for a 
hypothesis and perhaps even what form it might take (Cleland 2011, 
563). 
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In the roles ascribed to narrative explanations and predictions, I essentially 
agree with Cleland‟s observations. I disagree, however, with the interpretation 
she draws from it.  
First, I agree that the postulation of narrative explanations that thoroughly 
explaining the genesis of traces of the past with causally uninterrupted 
sequences of events is not very interesting. However, this is not the role I 
assign to lineage explanations (of which I argued, in chapter 3, narrative 
explanations were a subtype). These explanations, instead, describe a causal 
sequence between two events located in the past. It aims at explaining the 
occurrence of a past event, not to explain the evidence available in the present. 
Traces of the past, such as smoking guns, are evidence in support of such 
types of explanations40.  
Second, I also agree that predictions from hypotheses in historical science can 
be tentative guides and that they do not play as much of a central role in the 
confirmation and rejection of hypotheses as they play in “paradigmatic cases” of 
experimental sciences. However, I think that the role she attributes to 
predictions, namely shaping the search for evidence by playing the role of a 
tentative guide, is already quite important! Disregarding this importance is 
equivalent to distinguishing strongly between the so-called “context of 
discovery” and “context of justification” and giving epistemic importance only to 
what belongs to the latter. More specifically, if historical sciences are, as 
typically characterized, operating under a scarcity of evidence, then any 
element that could help to find evidence is playing a non-negligible role.  
D. SUMMARY  
An analysis of Cleland‟s account in light of the components identified in part 1 
results in a mixed assessment. She describes a methodology primarily 
dedicated to the search for remains of the past, “smoking guns”, that are 
capable of shifting the evidential picture by comparatively supporting a 
hypothesis over several others for the explanation of a phenomenon. I think that 
                                            
40 To my knowledge, Cleland doesn‟t explicit discuss the type of hypotheses 
that common-cause explanations were. It is possible, then, that they can be 
compatible with lineage explanations.  
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this account has the advantage of being forward-looking and optimistic. It 
provides a mechanism explaining the gradual improvement of existing 
hypotheses as historical scientists‟ ability to extract new lines of evidence 
improves. It also rightly highlights that the meaning and importance of new lines 
of evidence is dependent on the existing evidential network available in a given 
investigation. Smoking guns, in her view, dramatically shift the epistemic status 
of existing hypotheses in combination with the already available evidence, not 
without it.  
Further assessment of Cleland‟s account, however, reveals some limits of her 
account. Some of them are straightforward disagreements on what is part of 
this method. Others are simply disagreements on matters of emphasis and 
priorities. I disagree with her view that the evaluation of hypotheses in historical 
sciences is necessarily comparative. I provided an example of a conclusive 
assessment in part 1, and provide another one in the next chapter. Seeing 
historical sciences as merely capable of granting a relative advantage of a 
hypothesis over another is, in my opinion, underestimating how much can be 
done in this set of disciplines. I also disagree with the relative disregard her 
account displays of how hypotheses influence the search for evidence. Her 
account focuses exclusively on how new evidence influences existing 
hypotheses and, I think, lacks of an articulation of how the relation runs in the 
other direction. Her view on prediction suggests that she considers the influence 
of hypotheses to be fortuitous and not crucial to the finding of new evidence.  
I also argued that Cleland‟s account placed too much emphasis on a restricted 
set of things. By presenting the discovery of smoking guns as the main aspect 
of this method, I argued that it illegitimately backgrounds other lines of evidence 
that cause a less dramatic impact on the evidential picture. I also argued that 
this view focuses too intensely on the traces of the past by themselves and 
does not say enough about the conceptual and methodological framework that 
mediates their interpretation. In this case, the “smoking gun” metaphor is 
misleading since it does not bring attention to what enables the interpretation of 
a piece of evidence. Backgrounding the interpretative dimension similarly 
restricts the wide variety of things that can have an impact on the degree of 
support of existing hypotheses. By focusing too much on traces of the past, 
Cleland backgrounds the wide range of effects that changes in the conceptual 
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and methodological interpretative framework can have on the solidity of 
historical hypotheses. On the whole, I argued that a description of the 
methodology of historical sciences has to focus more equally on what enables 
the finding and interpretation of the traces of the past, the latter about which 
Cleland‟s brings excessive emphasis. It is not so much that I think Cleland‟s 
emphasis on smoking guns is invalid, rather than that it is incomplete and too 
narrow in its scope.  
Part 3 of this chapter focuses on Currie‟s vision of the methodology of historical 
sciences. It provides a critical analysis and a refinement of some of the 
concepts and insights that he and like-minded scholars propose. I argue that his 
concepts are filling some of the shortcomings of Cleland‟s account and are 
more in line with the insights identified in part 1.   
III. OMNIVORIES, SCAFFOLDS AND VIRTUES 
A. METHODOLOGICAL OMNIVORY AND INVESTIGATIVE SCAFFOLDS 
A central notion in Currie‟s account of the methodology of historical sciences is 
methodological omnivory. In this section, I analyse its meaning and the 
methodological components it takes into account. In particular, I argue that 
there are two distinct interpretations of Currie‟s notion, namely evidential 
omnivory and methodological autotrophy.  
In the animal world, the notion of omnivory captures the capacity of organisms 
to consume as food any type of organic matter. In the scientific study of the 
past, investigators are methodologically omnivorous in the sense that 
[r]ather than specializing in a certain kind of method, a certain array of 
tests, or a certain set of epistemic practices, historical scientists are 
opportunistic: drawing on whatever resources they can, at many levels of 
grain, to triangulate their way to plausibility (Currie 2015, 188). 
This first understanding of methodological omnivory is what I call evidential 
omnivory. Evidential omnivory designates the ability of historical scientists to 
draw on any kind of resource as long as it is capable of making a difference in 
the current evidential picture. This point echoes the emphasis on creativity 
made in part 1. It is, in some ways, an antidote to what Chapman and Wylie 
describe as a risk to assign a “foundational status to any one line of evidence” 
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(Chapman and Wylie 2016, 181). I argue that evidential omnivory avoids some 
pitfalls of the “smoking gun” view. In this view, traces of the past are resources 
among others in the search to support or discredit hypotheses of the past: no a 
priori restriction is placed on what counts as evidence41. This first interpretation 
of Currie‟s notion of methodological omnivory is thus about the nature of the 
evidence mobilized in assessing claims in historical sciences. 
The second interpretation of Currie‟s concept concerns the processes by which 
this evidence is generated. In this sense, methodological omnivory is 
understood as the capacity possessed by historical scientists to generate “new 
evidence by designing new techniques and tools” (Currie 2015, 196). This 
emphasis on the innovative capacities of investigators is what I call 
methodological autotrophy. Autotrophy is a biological term. It designates the 
capacity by organisms (autotrophs) to produce complex organic foodstuff from 
simple molecules. I privilege autotrophy over omnivory. It captures better the 
creative dimension possessed by scientists, in a context that requires them to 
achieve so much with so little (cf. Currie 2015, 198). This generative capacity is 
absent in the notion of omnivory, which merely emphasizes the diversity of 
things that can count as food for the organisms concerned. Methodological 
autotrophy, in other words, designates the construction of  
purpose-built epistemic tools tailored to generate evidence about highly 
specific targets (Currie 2015, 187). 
Methodological autotrophy describes the development of methods that extend 
our epistemic reach by bringing a new perspective to existing traces or 
generating evidential relevance to previously unexploited elements. One 
example is the application of radiocarbon dating to archaeological sites (see 
Manning 2015 for a historical overview). The application of this technique 
enabled an increase in the precision of the dating of archaeological objects. 
Another example (taken from Currie 2015) is the devising of a model, the “Bite 
                                            
41 Currie provides a detailed and systematic discussion of the varieties of “non-
trace evidence” in historical sciences (Currie 2018). Here, I am rather focused 
on the methodological richness of historical sciences, in order to complement 
Cleland‟s narrow methodological focus on the search for smoking guns.  
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Force Quotient”, from anatomical data from extant and extinct animals. This 
model was used to provide evidence for the type of hunting behaviour of an 
extinct specimen of interest, here T. carnifex. The construction of such tools can 
combine both trace evidence as well as non-trace evidence coming from 
relevantly analogous elements. As such, they are also illustrations of evidential 
omnivory in action42.  
This characterization of methodological autotrophy paves the way for another 
important conceptual element discussed in Currie‟s framework, middle-range 
theory, which has already been mentioned above. In Currie and Sterelny‟s 
words, an MRT is the interpretative theoretical package that “tells us how an 
event‟s footprint at a time is made and then transformed” (Currie and Sterelny 
2017, 19). MRTs are usually tightly adapted to the type of thing from which 
evidence is extracted and the type of contexts in which evidence is used. These 
rather specific theoretical packages, according to Currie and Sterelny, are 
attempts to capture the effects of “the processes which shape history”:  
Fossilization, political revolutions, mineralization, mass-extinctions, 
economic pressures, and so forth, [these processes having] more-or-less 
regular effects. Moreover, the signs of those effects change over time in 
reasonably recognizable and well-understood ways. Reconstruction of 
the past is possible in virtue of these processes and our understanding of 
them (Currie and Sterelny 2017, 19). 
Without MRTs, it is impossible to turn a trace of the past into lines of evidence. 
In the study of the human past, it is this need for MRTs that is at the origin of 
what is called the “auxiliary sciences of history”, reflecting the vast diversity of 
expertise (thus the evidential omnivory) needed to investigate the past. It 
includes, in this context, the capacity to  
                                            
42 Currie also mentions the capacity of simulations as “surrogate experiments” 
as another strategy to make use of non-trace based evidence in historical 
sciences (Currie 2018, 249-274). The epistemic value of simulations is still 
under debate (see Morgan 2003 ; Morrison 2015 ; Winsberg 2003 ; 
Barberousse et al. 2009). Since neither Cavalier-Smith nor Martin appear to 
employ these strategies, I choose to leave this topic aside here. 
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read critically a medieval charter, to explain correctly the etymology of 
place-names, to date unerringly the ruins of dwellings of the prehistoric, 
Celtic, or Gallo-Roman periods, and to analyse the plant life proper to a 
pasture, a field, or a moor (Bloch 1949, 68; cited in Chapman and Wylie 
2016, 135). 
One example of MRT was provided in part 2 with Jeffares‟ discussions of the 
epistemic tools produced to distinguish between bone and tool marks on bones 
in archaeological setups. Another illustration from archaeology has been 
provided by Chapman and Wylie in their discussion of the increasingly 
sophisticated methods that allowed radiocarbon techniques to provide 
increasingly reliable evidence to archaeological investigations (Chapman and 
Wylie 2016). Wylie has also discussed the various methodological strategies 
employed for the re-use of “legacy data” in archaeology (Wylie 2017), bringing 
new interpretations to previously used elements of the material record. O‟Malley 
discusses a similar requirement for adequate MRTs in the case of molecular 
phylogenies. This time, the attention is placed on how models underlying 
selection of genomic data, combined with the increased sophistication of the 
“molecular clock” model43, constitute an increasingly effective method to “extract 
signal from tremendously noisy molecules” (O‟Malley 2016, 69).  
To summarize, methodological autotrophy – the methodological creativity of 
historical scientists – highlights the ability of historical scientists to construct a 
variety of epistemic tools. This variety of tools, which include MRTs (theories 
that link traces of the past with their contexts of origin), is what underpins the 
evidential omnivory observed in historical sciences. In this picture, both aspects 
of methodological omnivory are distinct but closely tied. Together they echo 
many of the insights evoked in part 1. Methodological autotrophy emphasizes 
historical scientists‟ creativity and licenses epistemic optimism: methodological 
innovations will increase our epistemic reach into the past. MRTs are often 
dependent, in their creation, on a lot of knowledge of the contemporary (and 
thus are often built using non-trace evidence). Eventually, it provides a 
conceptually precise way to characterize how the interpretation of traces of the 
                                            
43 The molecular clock is a model of the varying mutation rates of genetic 
material.  
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past is theoretically mediated. This emphasis on the creation of MRTs is here 
rightly considered as an epistemically central aspect of historical sciences.  
MRTs present background theories that are at play in historical sciences as 
enablers. This positive vision contrasts with the main arguments mobilized by 
Turner to ground his epistemic pessimism concerning historical sciences. In a 
book-length treatment, Turner compares our knowledge of the past with our 
knowledge of microphysical particles. He argues for “historical hypo-realism”, a 
position that asserts that  
the standard arguments for realism (if they are any good at all) give less 
support to minimal epistemic realism about the past than to minimal 
epistemic realism about the tiny (Turner 2007, 61). 
This relative pessimism is grounded on the identification of two asymmetries 
between investigations of the past and investigations of the tiny. The first is the 
“asymmetry of manipulability”, which states that  
[o]ur ability to manipulate tiny things and events helps us a great deal in 
our endeavours to acquire knowledge of the microphysical structure of 
the universe. But if we seek knowledge of the past, we will have to do 
without this help (Turner 2007, 25). 
In other words, compared to the study of microparticles that benefit from our 
ability to physically access and manipulate them, the physical inaccessibility of 
objects from the past puts us in a disadvantageous epistemic posture. The 
second asymmetry is the “asymmetry of background theories”, which states that  
In historical science, background theories all too often tell us how 
historical processes destroy evidence over time, almost like a criminal 
removing potential clues from a crime scene (Turner 2007, 3). 
This asymmetry relies on an argument already discussed above, which is the 
asserted pervasiveness, in historical investigations, of information-destroying 
processes. In the comparison with the study of microphysical particles, instead, 
Turner states that  
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background theories about the microphysical world frequently do tell us 
how to create new evidence by which to test claims and theories (Turner 
2007, 25). 
An optimistic outlook on historical sciences, which focuses on the successful 
generation of MRTs that further our epistemic reach, goes in a completely 
opposite direction. It denies grounds to the asymmetry of background theories 
as it emphasizes how historical scientists continuously shift their current 
evidential limits (and the effects of information-destroying processes) by 
devising methodological innovations. In this view, new background theories do 
tell us how to create new evidence with which to test claims and theories44. 
These MRTs rely on regularities sometimes obtained via experimental 
investigations. This counteracts the asymmetry of manipulability. The ability to 
manipulate contemporary entities not only benefits knowledge about 
contemporary entities but also can directly increase knowledge of the past. A 
focus on methodological autotrophy, therefore, provides ways to undermine 
Turner‟s argument for the comparative epistemic advantage of particle physics 
over historical sciences.  
The notions of methodological autotrophy and the construction of MRTs are 
also reminiscent of Ginzburg‟s discussion of an “indicial paradigm” shared 
across a multitude of practices, scientific or not. A shared assumption of these 
practices, Ginzburg argues, is that  
[t]hough reality may seem to be opaque, there are privileged zones – 
signs, clues – which allow us to penetrate it (Ginzburg 2013, 123). 
An illustration of this paradigm is the work of art connoisseur Giovanni Morelli. 
In the 19th century, Morelli dealt with the problem of the attribution of paintings, 
such as “how to ensure the authenticity of a Botticelli?” Facing this difficult task, 
he proposed to shift our attention away from the 
                                            
44 Of course, I do not deny that, in parallel to this, our understanding of the 
information-destroying processes also gets improved. I wanted to highlight, 
however, that Turner‟s sole emphasis on these processes in historical sciences 
was unwarranted.  
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most conspicuous characteristics of a painting, which are the easiest to 
imitate: eyes raised towards the heavens in the figures of Perugino, 
Leonardo‟s smiles, and so on (Ginzburg 2013, 97). 
Instead, he hinges his paintings‟ attributions on the examination of the  
most trivial details that would have been influenced least by the 
mannerisms of the artist‟s school: earlobes, fingernails, shapes of fingers 
and of toes (Ginzburg 2013, 97). 
By doing this, Morelli made the assumption, in Wind‟s analysis, that “personality 
should be found where personal effort is weakest” (Wind 1985, 38; cited in 
Ginzburg 2013, 98). Because the least noticeable details of paintings are those 
made with the least conscious effort, Morelli presumed that they provided 
privileged loci of attributions. This assumption provides to Morelli an MRT that 
turns specific elements of paintings into important evidence.  
Similar to Currie, Ginzburg places emphasis on the creativity of investigators to 
devise methodological resources to extract evidence from a variety of sources. 
Ginzburg insists, however, that these practices are mostly tacit forms of 
knowledge, which are  
richer than any written codification; it was learned not from books but 
from the living voice, from gestures and glances; it was based on 
subtleties impossible to formalize, which often could not even be 
translated into words (Ginzburg 2013, 114–15). 
Contrary to Ginzburg, I do not have a definite opinion on how tacit the MRTs 
created by historical scientists are. A bias in my dissertation‟s analysis is that 
my resources are only textual. Therefore, I only have an access to how 
Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s methods and theories are propositionally 
articulated. Having said this, it is clear that some of their epistemic tools are, at 
least, partially explicitly articulated. It is likely, however, that tacit skills and 
assumptions are also brought in in these processes.  
B. INVESTIGATIVE SCAFFOLDS AND PRODUCTIVE SPECULATION 
I have argued earlier that Cleland‟s account does not say enough about the 
influence of the formulated hypotheses on the search for evidence. I argued that 
an account built around the notion of “smoking guns” is too unidirectional in its 
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emphasis, as it accounts solely for how new (trace) evidence impacts existing 
hypotheses. This conceptual incompleteness is, I think, compensated in 
Currie‟s framework with the notions of “investigative scaffolds” and “productive 
speculation”.  
The notion of investigative scaffolds is devised to capture some of the concrete 
consequences of the progress in historical knowledge. It designates cases in 
which   
a set of claims must already be on the table for new evidence to be 
relevant. Investigation is piecemeal and comes in stages: both the 
plausibility and richness of hypotheses is built step-by-step. As scaffolds 
are reached, new data gains evidential relevance (Currie 2015, 188).  
In other words, scaffolds are bits of consolidated knowledge which further 
empirical investigations by supporting new lines of inquiries and new searches 
for evidence.   
The notion of productive speculation stems from a discussion of the importance 
of narrative explanations in the investigation of unique past events (Currie and 
Sterelny 2017). It is very similar to investigative scaffolds. The difference being 
that, in the case of productive speculation, the elements of explanations 
postulated by scientists are speculative, they are not yet (and might never be) 
considered as consolidated bits of knowledge. Prost provides an instance of 
such speculation in the context of human history:  
The atrocities committed in Italy by French troops after the Battle of 
Monte Cassino have probably been allowed by General Juin, but no 
document signed by his own hand certifies it (Prost 2010, 855, own 
translation). 
Such speculations, Currie and Sterelny argued, are “central to successful 
historical reconstruction” (Currie and Sterelny 2017, 14). It is necessary 
because, as the case discussed by Prost highlights, the building of a narrative  
typically involves the reconstruction of causal intermediaries that have 
left no unambiguous trace in the present; positing rather than finding 
links in a causal chain (Currie and Sterelny 2017, 15). 
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While this practice has sometimes been viewed with hostility (see Cleland‟s 
discussion in part 2) and used to underline the inferior epistemic status of 
historical sciences (see, for instance, Gee 2000), Currie and Sterelny aim at 
separating the wheat from the chaff by distinguishing between productive and 
idle speculation.  
To engage in productive speculation is to fill in the gaps of a narrative in a way 
that “serves to increase the empirical constraints on historical reconstruction” 
(Currie and Sterelny 2017, 16). This type of speculation “reveals avenues for 
testing” (Currie and Sterelny 2017, 19) by enabling historical scientists to recruit 
new lines of evidence. It can make relevant previously unsuspected elements, 
which then helps the generation of new MRTs. Alternatively, some of the 
speculative elements can turn out to be confirmed and provide investigative 
scaffolds for further empirical research. An instance of productive speculation is 
discussed in the next chapter, as Martin and Müller‟s hydrogen hypothesis for 
the origin of eukaryotes (Martin and Müller 1998) brought to the forefront issues 
of anaerobic metabolism (notably through the attention brought to 
hydrogenosomes*) which drove investigations in directions that were not 
previously considered relevant. In addition to this, the hydrogen hypothesis – 
when considered valid – forms an investigative scaffold which fuels further 
research to work out the details of the initial explanation. All this is opposed to 
idle speculation, argued to be “mercifully rare in science” (Currie and Sterelny 
2017, 15). This form of speculation is incapable of keeping the evidential picture 
moving, the additional claims it brings do not carry with it signs of empirical 
tractability and therefore should be avoided.  
The building of lineage explanations, when integrating elements of productive 
speculation, can generate theoretical elements that can act, to borrow Turner‟s 
terminology, both as unifiers and tools. They are unifiers because they can “give 
a more or less unified or coherent account of the observable evidence” (Turner 
2007, 70) and tools because they are instrumental to the generation of new 
lines of evidence. On the whole, productive speculation and investigative 
scaffolds are notions that help to clarify how hypotheses about unique events 
can influence the production of evidence. It occurs by facilitating the generation 
of evidential relevance and epistemic tools, including MRTs, that underlie the 
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constitution and interpretation of new lines of evidence (or the reinterpretation of 
existing ones).  
C. COHERENCE AND CONSILIENCE 
This last section in the discussion of Currie‟s conceptual framework deals with 
aspects that are not usually much expanded upon. It is absent from part 1‟s 
methodological points but, I think, matters in the evaluation of claims about 
unique past events. This last ingredient concerns the notion of coherence. It 
stems again from Currie and Sterelny‟s defence of narrative explanations and, 
as with Currie‟s notion of methodological omnivory, can be decomposed into 
two distinct aspects.  
As Currie and Sterelny emphasize,  
[c]oherence is a much under-rated epistemic virtue. Achieving it involves 
much more than establishing mere logical consistency between what is 
said about one stage of a trajectory and what is said about the other 
stages (Currie and Sterelny 2017, 17). 
According to them, producing coherent lineage explanations45 is a “considerable 
epistemic achievement” (Currie and Sterelny 2017, 19). This comes from the 
fact that  
[a]s our information about the causal background is enriched, coherence 
becomes an increasingly important, increasingly demanding constraint. 
So, for example, a theory of the stability conditions of human cooperation 
has to fit a larger number of empirical and theoretical constraints (Currie 
and Sterelny 2017, 19). 
I argue that two distinct notions are at play in this appeal to the virtues of 
coherence. In the last quote, what Currie and Sterelny describe concerns the 
relation between hypotheses and evidence. They emphasize how difficult it is to 
successfully take the available evidence into consideration. I think, rather, that 
this dimension of coherence is better characterized as “consilience”. 
Consilience, in Whewell‟s terminology, occurs when “an Induction, obtained 
from one class of facts, coincides with an Induction, obtained from another 
                                            
45 In their article, Currie and Sterelny speak of narrative explanations. 
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different class” (Whewell 1840, 23). Understood in the present context of 
evidential omnivory, consilience is defined as the coherence of an inferred claim 
with a diversity of evidence46. This understanding of coherence as consilience 
supplements the more traditional understanding of coherence as mere logical 
consistency. This latter view concerns the relation between elements within 
hypotheses and designates the absence of inconsistencies within them. 
Because of this, I hereafter use the word consistency to point to this other 
dimension of coherence.  
Currie and Sterelny have illustrated the difficulty of keeping both virtues 
together in the context of the study of the origin of human cooperation. 
Researchers have continuously improved their understanding of the factors 
(components of the so-called “cooperation stew”) that have to be taken into 
account by hypotheses about the origin of this human trait. This increased 
pressure on the consilience side of things has so far resulted in the failure to 
create a coherent “step by step account of the transition to human ultra-
cooperation” (Currie and Sterelny 2017, 20). A similar situation, according to 
Malaterre, exists in discussions about the origin of life. These investigators have 
so far been successful at increasing the pressures on consilience through an 
increased fragmentation of the problem and hence of the number of factors that 
have to be taken into account. The resulting difficulty in creating a coherent 
explanation for the origin of life has thus pushed researchers to decrease their 
ambitions. Instead of trying to “formulate a „theory‟ about the origins of life”, they 
rather aim “to identify links susceptible to intervene in such a theory” (Malaterre 
2010, 53, own translation). 
Despite these examples, the importance of virtues of consistency and 
consilience has, as Currie and Sterelny argue, sometimes been underrated. 
                                            
46
 Currie recently discussed the importance of consilience in historical sciences. 
By defining consilience as “the exploitation of independent evidence streams” 
(Currie 2018, 138), he grounds it on the diversity of methodologies with which 
evidence are obtained. His use of consilience therefore differs from mine, which 
here focuses on the nature of the evidence. Currie‟s use is equivalent to Wylie‟s 
“horizontal independence” (see Currie 2018, 163) discussed below. 
124 
 
Cleland‟s account47 of the methodology of historical sciences is a comparative 
one. It considers as unproblematic the existence, and thus the generation, of a 
multitude of competing hypotheses that successfully account for existing 
empirical evidence (see, for instance, Cleland 2001, 988). The emphasis on 
smoking guns is precisely designed for situations where an epistemic tie 
between competing hypotheses needs to be broken. An account starting with 
the existence of multiple empirical equivalent hypotheses as the routine 
situation in historical sciences presents, I think, consilience as trivially 
maintained. Cleland similarly downplays consistency as part of her rhetoric 
against the importance of narratives which was already evoked above. As a 
reminder, retaining consistency in a narrative is criticized as necessitating the 
invention of events in the narrative sequence linking the multiple traces of the 
past with the common cause of their existence. I already argued against this 
view since I believe lineage explanations have a different explanatory target 
(they explain past events, not available evidence). Emphasizing (contra 
Cleland) the difficulty of achieving consilience provides further arguments 
against her view. As the amount and variety of evidence pile up, accounting for 
the entire evidence and retaining consistency becomes both more difficult and 
more valuable48. In this view, I am sceptical that situations of epistemic 
equivalence are as pervasive as Cleland describes. 
In addition to Currie and Sterelny, the difficulty of resisting the interlinked 
pressures from considerations of consilience and consistency has already been 
emphasized elsewhere. Kosso, for instance, argues for a “weighted coherence” 
view that simultaneously points to the importance of hypotheses to be “free of 
contradiction” (Kosso 2001, 75), but also to the fact that   
                                            
47 As will be clear in Chapter 7‟s discussion of underdetermination, Turner also 
makes similar commitments.  
48
 This discussion here is independent of whether the evidence mobilized is 
trace-based or not. To be sure, my emphasis on consilience is devised to 
counterbalance Cleland‟s unidirectional emphasis on the influence of evidence 
on hypotheses. Consilience, here, is not seen in itself as an alternative, non-
trace-based, source of evidence.  
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some claims in the network are epistemically weightier than others and 
are less likely to be challenged or abandoned (Kosso 2001, 92).  
This formulation provides a possible entry point to a sophisticated 
understanding of the relation between consilience and the evaluation of 
hypotheses. Foregrounding consilience and consistency is indeed not the same 
thing as placing all of the elements of lineage explanations on the same plane 
and considering all of them to be evidentially undifferentiated. In Kosso‟s view, it 
is more important for lineage explanations to be consistent with some well-
supported claims than others which, at a given stage, are more akin to 
productive speculation. Wylie has also previously highlighted the epistemic 
achievement constituted by keeping consilience and consistency in the context 
of archaeology:  
Most often the problem in archaeology is not to adjudicate between a 
number of equally plausible, well-supported, explanatory alternatives but 
to find one account, one reconstructive or explanatory hypothesis, that is 
consistent with all the lines of evidence that are constructed under 
diverse resources (Wylie 2002, 197). 
There is a general message lying behind all these claims about the importance 
of consilience and consistency (as well as productive speculation). They all 
convey the idea that “hypotheses matter” and belong as much at the centre of 
the attention of accounts of the methods in historical sciences as does the 
impact of evidence on hypotheses. Far from being mere postulations of a 
common cause behind accepted evidence, the concept of productive 
speculation insists on the hypothesis‟ influence on further inquiries. The 
emphasis on consilience and consistency underlines the epistemic 
achievements lying behind their successful formulations.  
D. SUMMARY 
This section presented and critically assessed a series of concepts taken from 
(but not exclusive to) Currie. I argue that they helped build a more complete set 
of conceptual resources to understand the methodology of historical sciences. I 
first argued that Currie‟s notion of methodological omnivory could be broken 
down into two distinct notions: evidential omnivory and methodological 
autotrophy. The former concerns the nature of the evidence mobilized in 
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historical sciences and leaves room for more variety (actually, it does not place 
formal restriction) for the type of things that counts as evidence in historical 
sciences. Evidential omnivory underlines historical scientist‟s opportunism by 
characterizing them as using as evidence anything that can help them constrain 
their claims49. These lines of evidence can be trace-based, but they can also 
come from what Currie calls “analogues”, defined as “naturally occurring 
surrogates of past entities” (Currie 2018, 135). The notion of methodological 
autotrophy emphasizes the ability of historical scientists to generate a multitude 
of methodological constructs, including middle-range theories, to help generate 
and interpret evidence. Both these aspects of methodological omnivory underlie 
an optimistic account of historical sciences. Contrary to Cleland, this account of 
methodology pays more attention to the virtues of the hypotheses and how they 
help drive the generation of evidence. The notions of productive speculation 
and investigative scaffolds, in particular, denotes the virtue from these 
hypotheses to help keep the investigation running by establishing evidential and 
conceptual relevance and facilitating the generation of MRTs. In addition to this, 
I identified in Currie and Sterelny‟s understanding of coherence the conjoined 
virtues of consilience and consistency – respectively the ability to account for a 
variety of evidence and the lack of internal inconsistencies. The difficulty for 
hypotheses to display both these virtues together is another reminder of the 
philosophical attention needed on the constitution and role of hypotheses.  
On the whole, Currie‟s conceptual arsenal helps build a richer picture of the 
methodology of historical sciences, which pays attention to a wider variety of 
aspects. As it is, it covers a majority of the points summarized at the end of 
Section 1. These concepts, however, do not constitute helpful resources to 
articulate an understanding of the strength of the evidence mobilized. The next 
section fills in this gap with Wylie‟s threefold articulation of the notion of 
“security”.  
IV. THE STRENGTH OF EVIDENCE: WYLIE ON SECURITY  
                                            
49 This view is particularly compatible with the relational account of evidence 
(Leonelli 2016). 
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This last section aims at completing the methodological picture for historical 
sciences by reviewing the various meanings of the concept of security as 
discussed by Wylie. This articulation, I think, describes in a precise way the 
various loci that can be strengthened or weakened in the defence of 
hypotheses. These three understandings of security concern the investigative 
scaffold mediating the interpretation of a trace of a past as evidence, the nature 
of the information extracted from this trace, and the complexity of the link 
between the evidence and the claim it supports (or rejects).  
In the first understanding, security designates the 
credibility of the source field and the degree to which the appropriated 
theory is uncontested within the contexts in which this theory was 
originally developed and applied (Wylie 2002, 175). 
In this first meaning, an interpretation is secure if the discipline from which an 
MRT is developed and the theories within these fields are considered credible. 
Credibility decreases in cases in which MRTs are built out of contested theories 
or, worse, from fields with contested credentials. The use of radiocarbon decays 
in archaeology, or of genomic sequences in molecular phylogenetics, are 
examples of MRTs that have been considered as increasingly credible over 
time as their theories and fields of origins matured.  
The second understanding of security concerns the nature of the imputed link:  
whether, or to what degree, the background knowledge in question 
establishes an exclusive and determinate connection between 
archaeological remains and the antecedent conditions or processes 
thought to have produced them (Wylie 2002, 175). 
This second notion of security is located a step further into the process of 
argumentation: granted that the MRT underlying the interpretation of a trace is 
credible, this notion deals with how determinate the connection generated 
between a set of traces and the phenomenon of interest is. It might well be 
possible that a credible MRT only generates weak interpretations. Re-using the 
previous examples, it is possible that radiocarbon analysis dates samples with a 
large margin of uncertainty, or that phylogenetic analyses on a series of gene 
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sequences generate weakly supported phylogenetic trees. A line of evidence is 
here secure if it supports the generation of determinate claims from it.  
Finally, security can also be understood as telling something about  
the number and complexity of the linkages required to connect a body of 
archaeological material to those dimensions of the cultural past that are 
of particular interpretive or explanatory interest (Wylie 2002, 175).   
This sense of security aims to capture the directness of the link between a given 
line of evidence and the claim it purportedly supports. The more complex this 
link is, the more fragile is the interpretation since this link then possesses more 
potential loci of fragility. 
To summarize, these three notions of security as credibility, determinacy and 
directness cover a broad range of aspects of the evaluation of hypotheses 
about the past. They concern the evaluation of the background knowledge 
mediating the interpretation (credibility), the strength of the interpretation from a 
line of evidence (determinacy) and the complexity of the link between evidence 
and hypothesis (directness).  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents a critical survey of the existing literature on the 
methodology of the historical sciences. The first part extracted a series of key 
components of such accounts from the analysis of quotes from cases of human 
history. These key components served as guidelines and standards to critically 
assess, in part 2, Cleland‟s account of the method of historical sciences. In part 
3 and 4 I presented a series of concepts, respectively stemming from Currie 
and Wylie‟s work, that together provide an arsenal of conceptual resources for 
the study of historical sciences. I conclude now by mapping the components 
identified in part 1 with the concepts discussed in part 2, 3 and 4.  
Epistemic optimism towards historical sciences seems to pervade most of the 
concepts discussed from Section 2 to 4. Cleland‟s account revolving around 
smoking guns, albeit argued as incomplete, is resolutely optimistic with regards 
to historical scientist‟s ability to find new evidence from the past that will shift 
our evaluation of existing hypotheses. The notion of evidential omnivory gives a 
more varied idea of what counts as evidence and, at the same time, further 
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enlarges the resources that can be exploited by historical scientists. This 
omnivory is complemented by the notion of methodological autotrophy, which 
designates the continuous creation of epistemic tools, including middle-range 
theories, that extend the historical scientists‟ epistemic reach. 
The importance of embedding the evidence within its specific context and 
existing evidential network is highlighted by Cleland‟s account, which places the 
significance of smoking guns in relation to the existing available evidence. 
However, the importance of the evidential network is made more specific 
through the notion of evidential omnivory, which leaves room also for situations 
in which a large array of evidence of varied strength still generates substantial 
support by their combined effects. The importance placed on the conjoined 
virtues of coherence and consilience also foregrounds the achievement that 
constitutes successfully accounting for the available lines of evidence.  
As much as evidence is embedded in an existing network, its interpretation is 
also thoroughly theoretically mediated. This is captured by the notions of 
middle-range theory, and the three dimensions of security discussed above. 
These concepts, in particular, highlight the necessity to bring conceptual and 
methodological resources to turn a given trace or available information into 
evidence for a claim.  
The first section also identified the pervasiveness of creativity in the work of 
historical scientists. This creativity is present in the notion of methodological 
autotrophy, productive speculation and investigative scaffolds, which particularly 
emphasize ways in which historical scientists manage to keep the evidential 
picture moving and continuously generate new lines of evidence and constraints 
to their hypotheses.  
Related to creativity is the idea that the same information or trace of the past 
can be used as evidence in a wide variety of contexts. Notions such as 
evidential omnivory and methodological autotrophy, which foreground historical 
scientists‟ opportunism and ability to squeeze as much information as they can 
from limited resources, account for this contextual flexibility.  
Knowledge of contemporary entities centrally matters to historical sciences. 
This slightly counter-intuitive-point, to which Cleland seems to give only 
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secondary importance, is accounted for with the concepts of methodological 
autotrophy and security as credibility. The generation of middle-range theories 
sometimes depends on knowledge acquired via experimental practices and is 
underlain by background theoretical knowledge of contemporary entities. The 
credibility of interpretations of evidence is also partly mediated by theoretical 
knowledge about contemporary entities: are the claims made about past entities 
plausible with regards to what is known about contemporary forms of life? 
Instead of conceiving the production of knowledge about past entities and 
present-day entities as requiring mutually exclusive methodologies, respectively 
historical sciences and experimental science, this chapter highlights how the 
former feeds from the latter.  
The varying degrees of reliability of lines of evidence have been, unsurprisingly, 
mainly discussed in the tripartite analysis of the notion of security by Wylie. The 
notions of security as credibility, determinacy and directness enabled to clarify 
how strongly supporting a line of evidence can be.  
Finally, the importance for hypotheses to be conclusively, not comparatively, 
evaluated has not been at the forefront of the conceptual discussions sketched 
above. The inherently comparative picture brought by Cleland‟s account has 
been criticized on these grounds. I think that the conjoined virtues of coherence 
and consilience, as well as the dimensions of security as determinacy and 
directness, fare well with the idea that hypotheses are evaluated on their own. 
This dimension is further explored in the next chapter.  
On the whole, this arsenal of concepts does not provide a neat and tidy account 
of the methodology of historical sciences. Instead, it provides resources to 
understand the essential components of this practice. It aims at finding ways to 
account for the nature and role of lines of evidence, the way they are generated, 
the relation between evidence and hypotheses and the virtues that matter in the 
evaluation of hypotheses. These resources can be used to build discipline-
specific frameworks or topic-specific case studies. The insights derived from 
this series of concepts are used in the next chapter, which provides a 
framework that aims to successfully account for a particular aspect of this 
methodology, the making of evidential claims. The effectiveness of this 
framework is illustrated by a case study in evolutionary biology. Hopefully, the 
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next chapter‟s discussion clearly resonates with some of the insights garnered 
in this chapter.  
  
132 
 
CHAPTER 6: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVIDENTIAL CLAIMS AND THE CASE OF 
ARCHEZOA 
INTRODUCTION 
The last chapter was devised as an attempt to do two things. First, it provided 
an identification of key components of the methodology of historical sciences. It 
then critically reviewed a series of concepts, assessing their validity in light of 
the components identified in the first part. Of these concepts, the ones that were 
positively evaluated were argued to successfully capture aspects of the 
methodology of historical sciences. They are specifically fruitful to help 
characterize the nature, role and generation of evidence, the virtues of 
hypotheses and the degree of security that lines of evidence can confer to the 
latter. Despite not providing a neat and linear account of the methodology of 
historical sciences, this previous chapter aimed at identifying useful tools that 
can be used in discipline-specific methodological accounts and case studies.  
In this chapter, I propose to restrict my attention to a specific aspect of historical 
sciences, by focusing on evidential claims. This topic is concerned with the 
ways various lines of evidence are used in order to provide support or to 
undermine a given claim. This restriction of scope is by no means an implicit 
vindication of a strong distinction between the “contexts of discovery and 
justification”. As defined by Sober: 
The context of discovery would involve questions about the psychological 
influences that lead a scientist or a creative thinker to come up with an 
idea (“how you get there”). The context of justification would involve 
questions of logic and methodology having to do with the justifiability and 
defensibility of that idea (“once you are there, how do you evaluate the 
product of this free creation of your imagination?”) (Sober, in Callebaut 
1993, 98). 
In this view, this chapter then focuses on the justification side of things. I hope 
this chapter makes clear that focusing on justification provides a great way to 
generate numerous related questions about discovery, and that a full 
understanding of concrete case studies of evidential claims cannot be obtained 
without the (mutually benefiting) conjoined investigations of both aspects.  
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The central thread of this chapter is the defence and illustration of a framework 
that formalizes evidential claims with the help of six different conceptual 
elements. I argue that this framework is particularly useful to capture the 
embedded nature of evidential argument and the successive shifts in support 
for claims. It is composed of facts, claims, warrants, qualifiers, backings and 
rebuttals. The framework is derived from the works of Toulmin (2003) and 
recently applied in the context of archaeology by Chapman and Wylie (2016). 
Part 1 draws inspiration from the last chapter to sketch a few desiderata that an 
account of evidential claims must fulfil. Part 2 is a presentation of the framework 
and explains how it fulfils the demands identified in part 1. After these rather 
abstract considerations, part 3 illustrates the effectiveness of the framework by 
applying it to a case derived from the works of Cavalier-Smith and Martin. 
Within their works, I picked the unfortunate fate of the “Archezoa” hypothesis as 
a case study. Archezoa is a taxonomic unit, a grouping of evolutionarily 
neighbouring species, which first enjoyed popularity and support before a 
subsequent accumulation of counter-evidence led to its demise in 1998. 
Because of its eventual fate and of the shifts that happened in its evidential 
support, I think it constitutes a privileged locus to study evidential claims in 
historical sciences. The chapter concludes by discussing what this framework 
allows to represent, what it keeps in the background, and the lines of 
investigation it opens but is incapable of addressing.  
I. PHILOSOPHICAL DEMANDS ON EVIDENTIAL CLAIMS 
Similar to what I did in the previous chapter, this discussion begins with the 
analysis of a quote about human history. Here, Prost insists that  
facts never appear outside of an argument. It is within this argument, and 
in virtue of it, that a historian, to support the claims made, constructs 
facts. Others will construct these facts in different ways, in virtue of a 
different argument on a different problem (Prost, in Delacroix et al. 2010, 
854, own translation). 
This quote serves as a reminder of some of the key insights discussed in the 
previous chapter. It sheds light on the necessary theoretical mediation present 
in the construction of facts. Constructing facts require the bringing of specific 
background conceptual and methodological knowledge, something like the 
middle-range theories (MRTs) discussed in the previous chapter. Prost also 
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underlines the contextual flexibility possessed by lines of evidence and their 
interpretation. The construction of facts depends on the epistemic context at 
play. In this view, lines of evidence and claims can be brought to play different 
roles in different argumentations. In addition to the necessary theoretical 
mediation behind the construction of facts, this contextual flexibility is also the 
result of the embeddedness of lines of evidence within an existing evidential 
network. It is only possible to make sense of the role of a line of evidence once 
the epistemic context in which it is mobilized and the surrounding lines of 
evidence are appropriately characterized. The notion of evidential omnivory, 
discussed in the previous chapter, is compatible with the vision developed here 
since context-dependence in principle allows for a vast variety of elements to 
count as evidence. It is therefore important, in an account of evidential claims, 
to make clear that the effects of adding new lines of evidence are individual and 
distributed: the difference they can make comes both from their own specific 
features and from how they are embedded in the existing context.  
This contextual specificity and flexibility has also been formulated by 
Collingwood, who affirmed that 
Evidence is only evidence in so far as it is used as evidence, that is to 
say, interpreted on critical principles; and principles are principles so far 
as they are put into practice in the work of interpreting evidence 
(Collingwood 1994, 203). 
The conception of evidence I endorse, and which I argue Toulmin‟s framework 
can successfully account for, is unambiguously relational. It is then unsurprising 
that this account bears a strong affinity with Leonelli‟s “relational account of 
evidence” (Leonelli 2016, 69-92). Adapting her definition of “data” to my 
definition of “evidence” what counts as evidence hinges on  
the evidential value ascribed to them at specific moments of inquiry – 
that is, the range of claims for which data can be considered as evidence 
(Leonelli 2016, 70).  
To ascribe the status of evidence to anything that, in some epistemic context, 
bears evidential value can seem hopelessly tautological. This circularity, 
however, is a consequence of the characteristics discussed above. The 
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contextual specificity, theoretical mediation and embeddedness in an existing 
evidential network, I think, make it impossible to provide a non-circular and 
essentialist notion of evidence that ascribes evidential status in a context-
independent fashion.  
Emphasizing contextual flexibility in terms of what counts as evidence and 
underlining the pervasive interpretative dimension of evidential claims also 
entails taking into account the varying degrees of strength of the components of 
an epistemic context. The last chapter‟s discussion on the threefold notions of 
security as credibility, determinacy and directness sheds light on three types of 
components. Respectively, it directs attention to the MRT mediating the 
interpretation of evidence, to the nature of the effect of individual lines of 
evidence and to the complexity of the link from evidence to claim. As the case 
study on Archezoa illustrates below, shifts in all three of these dimensions of 
security can occur in a given epistemic context. They can result from the 
addition of new lines of evidence or from various shifts in our conceptual and 
methodological understandings that can alter the security of the interpretation of 
lines of evidence in many ways.  
In the next part, I introduce “Toulmin schemas” (TS) and argue that this 
framework can successfully account for the specificity and flexibility of evidential 
claims in historical sciences.  
II. TOULMIN SCHEMAS 
TS are constituted of a set of six components: facts, warrants, claims, backings, 
rebuttals and qualifiers. Together, they enable the articulation of a formal 
representation of the evidential picture for a given epistemic context. This layout 
is represented in Fig. 9, and the meaning for each component, as well as how 
my understanding relates to Toulmin‟s original intention, are specified in this 
part.  
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Figure 9 Representation of a Toulmin layout. Qualifiers are visualized by the dotting of 
the line between “facts” and “claims”. 
A. DATA, CLAIMS AND WARRANTS AS THE BASIS OF EPISTEMIC CONTEXTS 
Epistemic contexts open when there is a jump from a set of premises to a 
conclusion, and the validity of this jump can be supported or undermined by 
bringing in a variety of lines of evidence. In the case of historical sciences, this 
inferential leap is traditionally conceived as going from a set of contemporary 
traces to a hypothesis about the past. In this framework, the traces are termed 
facts and the hypotheses about the past claims. Facts are the equivalent of 
“data” in the original formulation. Toulmin defines the latter as “the facts we 
appeal to as a foundation for the claim” (Toulmin 2003, 90). My proposed 
terminological shift is motivated by my endorsement of Leonelli‟s relational 
accounts of data. In this view, data are defined as “any product of research 
activities […] that is collected, stored, and disseminated in order to be used as 
evidence for knowledge claims” (Leonelli 2016, 77). In other words, “data” are 
(1) potential evidence built to (2) travel through several epistemic contexts. 
Here, facts are considered as (1) actual evidence which (2) grounds claims in a 
specific context. They are the comparatively more robust grounds upon which a 
more tentative claim can be formulated.  
It is now well known that facts “do not speak by themselves”. In addition to data, 
warrants are what theoretically mediate the interpretation from data to claim. 
Starting from a set of facts, warrants are “general, hypothetical statements, 
which act as bridges and authorize the sort of step to which our particular 
argument commits us” (Toulmin 2003, 91). The differences between facts and 
warrants are gradual rather than clear-cut. Following Toulmin, the first 
difference concerns the warrants‟ higher degree of generality. Secondly, facts 
are always explicitly stated in the defence of a claim, whereas most of the 
warrants are usually kept implicit (2003, 92-93). As said above, an epistemic 
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context is opened with the generation of, and the investigation into, a tripartite 
relationship between data, claims and warrants. Conversely, epistemic contexts 
close when this investigation ceases, either because the link from data to claim 
is considered sufficiently solid or indefinitely broken.  
How does the notion of warrant relate to the notion of MRT discussed in the 
previous chapter? MRTs designate the whole conceptual and methodological 
apparatus necessary to the generation and interpretation of lines of evidence. 
Warrants intervene at a moment where facts have already been constituted. 
They are the principles in virtue of which the facts, often constituted with the 
help of MRTs, are turned into key supports for a given claim. Chapman and 
Wylie characterize warrants as  
the gap-crossing assumptions, auxiliary hypotheses, background 
knowledge that constitute middle-range theory in an archaeological 
context (Chapman and Wylie 2016, 35). 
This present characterization, on the contrary, considers that most of the work 
done by MRTs is not captured by warrants and, therefore, is not visible in TS. 
This restriction helps map what part of the methodology of historical sciences is 
backgrounded by this framework. My usage of TS leaves out the constitution of 
lines of evidence to solely represent how these lines of evidence support or 
reject claims.   
B. QUALIFIERS 
Toulmin recognized that warrants are, on the basis of a set of facts, sometimes 
only providing equivocal support to given claims:  
[some] warrants entitle us in suitable cases to qualify our conclusion with 
the adverb „necessarily‟; other authorize us to make the step from data to 
conclusion either tentatively, or else subject to conditions, exceptions, or 
qualifications […]. It may not be sufficient, therefore, simply to specify our 
data, warrant and claim: we may need to add some explicit reference to 
the degree of force which our data confer on our claim in virtue of our 
warrant (Toulmin 2003, 93).  
This, for Toulmin, justifies the addition of qualifiers in his framework. Qualifiers, 
in this view, are used to specify the security of the inference to the claim.  
138 
 
Visually, the presence of qualifiers is marked by how dotted links in the 
epistemic context are. The spacing of the dots in an arrow is inversely 
proportional to the security of the link. It is possible to specify, if deemed 
relevant, the reasons behind a qualification on the representation. Spacing, 
however, is not to be interpreted in a strictly quantitative manner. It gives 
instead a rough and relative idea of the strengths of the links in an epistemic 
context. Whether or not increased quantitative precision is afforded by cases of 
historical sciences is an open question, discussed further in the conclusion. At 
face value, such an endeavour would face the difficulty of making 
commensurable the degrees of support and rejection brought by the wide 
variety of evidence at play.   
C. BACKINGS AND REBUTTALS 
According to Chapman and Wylie,  
Toulmin‟s central point is that the inferential work of warrants should be 
recognized as critical to the appraisal of substantial arguments […] 
(Chapman and Wylie 2016, 35). 
Saying this, they underline how TS successfully capture the necessary 
theoretical mediation from facts to claims. This part of the framework, however, 
does not bring very sharply the specificity and flexibility I was emphasizing as 
the main demands for this framework in part 1. This task, for Chapman and 
Wylie, is particularly fulfilled by “(t)he secondary elements – qualifiers, backing 
and rebuttals” which “signal the pragmatic, dynamic nature of arguments-in-use” 
(Chapman and Wylie 2016, 35). What are backings and rebuttals? How do they 
enable to illustrate, in addition to qualifiers, the dynamicity of evidential claims in 
historical sciences?  
Rebuttals are components that give the potential fragility identified by qualifiers 
a more specific meaning. They are used to indicate “circumstances in which the 
general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside” (Toulmin 2003, 94). 
In other words, rebuttals indicate the specific circumstances in which the claim 
made would turn out to be invalid.  
As a consequence, further facts termed backings can be brought to ensure the 
applicability of the warrants by specifying that the circumstances in which the 
warrants are applied are the right ones. Backings are therefore secondary facts 
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used in support of warrants. Backings are distinguished from facts functionally. 
The former is not necessary to the formulation and the sustained existence of a 
given claim, contrary to the latter. In Toulmin‟s view, in cases the applicability of 
warrants is “conceded without challenge” the backings remain implicit (2003, 
98).  
D. SUMMARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL UPSHOTS 
As argued above, TS are not built to capture the entirety of scientific practice. It 
explicitly focuses on evidential claims, TS effectively backgrounds what occurs 
at the level of the constitution of facts. Facts, however, can also be seen as,  
claims about surviving material traces that are identified as primary data, 
or about the context and relationships of these traces that constitute 
various kinds of secondary data (Chapman and Wylie 2016, 93). 
Similarly, what counts as warrants in a given epistemic context  
are themselves claims that depend on further substantive arguments; 
they are not purely formal inference rules, nor are they „self-
authenticating‟, as Toulmin puts it (Toulmin 2003, 91) […] (Chapman and 
Wylie 2016, 34). 
This observation indicates two things. 
First, it shows that facts and warrants mobilized in support of a claim are 
themselves fragile constructs. It has already been noted by Chapman and Wylie 
that Toulmin‟s proposal emphasizes warrants as the potential source of fragility 
to the whole argumentative construction (Chapman and Wylie 2016, 35). The 
incapacity of warrants to license foolproof inferences justifies the addition of 
qualifiers, the identification of rebuttals and the need to provide backings. I 
think, however, that more emphasis should be given to the important 
repercussions of potential changes to the factual grounds for the solidity of 
claims. This necessity to recognize the dynamic nature of factual (and 
theoretical) grounds motivates my snapshot approach to the construction of TS. 
In their application of Toulmin‟s framework, Chapman and Wylie provide 
synchronic reconstructions of evidential claims, summarizing evidential 
arguments in one static diagram (for instance, Chapman and Wylie 2016, 35: 
Figure 1.2 and 70: Figure 2.3). By contrast, I build TS at different key stages 
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(“snapshots”) of the evidential assessment of a claim. This way, I aim to extend 
their approach to capture a more dynamic picture of shifts in the security and 
relevance of claims, facts and warrants.  
The constructed nature of facts and warrants also opens the door to the 
possibility of conflicting construction and usage of these two components. 
Divergent methodological and conceptual commitments can stem in the 
constitution of diverging facts and warrants, or in interpreting similar facts in 
different ways. This epistemic pluralism underlain by the heterogeneity of 
methodological and conceptual commitments within a discipline is discussed 
further, in relation to the problem of underdetermination, in the next chapter.  
Toulmin‟s intention behind this framework was to display the field-dependence 
of strategies of argumentation. Doing this, he was denying grounds to the 
existence of shared, cross-disciplinary, forms of argumentation (Toulmin 2003, 
235). My interpretation simply allows for this heterogeneity to reach further. The 
specificity of each epistemic context does not rest on the type of components 
present in argumentations. It rather stems from the actual nature of each 
component (which actual facts and warrants, for instance, are employed) and 
how they are specifically arranged. Of course, points of convergence will be 
found within and across disciplines.  
On the whole, I think one of the appeals of TS is that, from the interplay of 
simple components, this framework can depict complex and specific evidential 
structures in historical sciences. In particular, the existence of “secondary 
elements” (backings, rebuttals, qualifiers) enables increased precision in the 
roles assigned to lines of evidence and their effects. This framework allows 
substituting sentences such as “hypothesis H has been rejected by evidence E” 
with much richer, and visual, depictions of evidential claims. 
Before turning to the case study, I also wanted to ensure that TS are not meant 
to make competition between theories irrelevant to the way hypotheses are 
assessed and evidence is generated. I insisted in the previous chapter on the 
importance of conclusively evaluating hypotheses about the past. This assertion 
is a way to contradict accounts of the methodology of historical sciences that, to 
my mind, overemphasize the idea that the strength of a particular hypothesis is 
only relative to others. This conclusiveness is encapsulated by the context-
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specificity embedded in this framework. Individual claims generate their own 
epistemic context and can be considered separately. This, however, leaves 
room for competition. The case study of the next chapter brings further 
illustration to this point, but the same lines of evidence can indeed have varying 
effects and relevance on different contexts. It is possible, also, to compare how 
strengthened or weakened competing hypotheses are and, more importantly, 
what strengthens or weakens them, in order to evaluate which one of them is to 
be favoured. The idea behind this use of TS is also to bring a more accurate 
picture of the grounds for disagreements between hypotheses, and, as stated in 
this chapter‟s conclusion, to open up investigations on the divergent 
methodological and conceptual commitments lying behind them.  
After this relatively abstract presentation and defence of the framework. I now 
provide an illustration of its relevance with a case study of an evidential claim in 
historical sciences.  
III. THE CASE OF ARCHEZOA 
A. WHAT IS ARCHEZOA? 
Archezoa, or the “Archezoa hypothesis”, associated with the work of Cavalier-
Smith, is a hypothesis in evolutionary biology with two interrelated components. 
First, it is a taxonomic hypothesis about the classification of contemporary 
eukaryotes. Archezoa, in its initial formulation, is the grouping of four phyla: 
Archamoebae, Metamonada, Microsporidia and Parabasalia (Cavalier-Smith 
1987a, 56). All these four phyla are protists (unicellular eukaryotes). The basis 
for this classification is the shared possession (or rather absence) of several 
morphological traits, the most important one being “to completely lack any trace 
of mitochondria*” (Cavalier-Smith 1987b, 17). This claim does not simply mean 
a current absence of mitochondria, but an absence of traces of mitochondria 
that could indicate a past presence of this organelle. 
This taxonomic inference has important evolutionary overtones. Protists, as 
unicellular eukaryotes, constitute privileged loci of investigation into several 
evolutionary questions. They are of interest for investigations into the origin of 
multicellularity – a trait exclusive to eukaryotes – since the first multicellular 
lineages stemmed from these organisms. More in line with this chapter‟s case, 
protists are also studied in relation to the origin of eukaryotic cells. This is 
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because it is inferred from their unicellularity that they contain the descendants 
of some of the earliest emerging eukaryotic lineages. It is among these 
organisms, in this view, that can be found the closest relatives to “primitive” 
eukaryotes.  
In investigations into the origin of eukaryotes, two traits, the possession of 
mitochondria and of a nucleus, occupy most of the scientific community‟s 
attention. These two cellular structures are indeed considered as defining traits 
of eukaryotic cells and are observed in nearly all of the representatives of 
eukaryotes. This is why archezoans, defined as eukaryotes that never 
possessed mitochondria, were considered as “living representatives of the 
earliest phases of eukaryote evolution” (Cavalier-Smith 1987b, 17). In other 
words, members of Archezoa are hypothesized to be contemporary remains 
from one of the oldest eukaryotic lineage: one that formed after the emergence 
of the nucleus, but before the acquisition via endosymbiosis of mitochondria 
(see Chapter 2 for a reminder of current hypotheses about endosymbiosis). By 
these means, Cavalier-Smith considers the existence of Archezoa as a fulfilled 
prediction of his explanation of the origin of eukaryotic cells (defended at the 
time in Cavalier-Smith 1987a; 1987b).  
The Archezoa hypothesis has largely shaped the discussions about the origin of 
eukaryotes from the late 1980s into the 1990s. It enjoyed initial support, 
especially until 1993, until a series of counter-evidence progressively weakened 
the classification (through the exclusion of specific phyla, or subparts of phyla) 
until the rejection (including from the author) of the classification in 1998 and the 
abandonment of the term in 2003. TS are here constructed to represent the 
evidential basis behind these shifts of support. Before building this framework, I 
start by a catalogue of the “omnivorous diet” of evidence used by evolutionary 
biologists. This sheds light on the creativity and variety of MRTs at play here. As 
stated above, the MRTs mediating the constitution of these lines of evidence 
are not visible in TS, since they concern the constitution of evidence, not the 
data to claim link. I also try to make clear the potential strengths and limits of 
these lines of evidence, accounting for what can affect their relevance in this 
particular context as well as the security of the links they are associated with.  
B. LINES OF EVIDENCE 
rRNA morphology 
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The study of the structure of the ribosomal RNA (rRNA) is not to be confused 
with the construction of molecular phylogenies from rRNA gene sequences, 
which I discuss later. The latter is interested in the comparison of aligned 
nucleotides of rRNA sequences in order to establish genealogical relationships 
between species. The former, instead, is about comparing rRNA morphologies 
between species, aiming at establishing phylogenetic relations based on their 
resemblances. Ribosomes* are composed of two subunits: a large and a small 
one. Prokaryotes and eukaryotes tend to differ with respect to the size of each 
of them. For eukaryotes, the overall size is usually 80S50. The 60S large subunit 
is composed (in part) of three rRNA components of size 5S, 5.8S and 28S and 
the 40S small subunit possesses an 18S rRNA component. For prokaryotes, 
the overall size is 70S, with a 50S large subunit constituted with 5S and 23S 
rRNAs, and a 30S small subunit composed of 16S rRNA. 
The study of rRNA morphologies, because they differ between eukaryotes and 
prokaryotes, is an interesting locus for generating evidence about “primitive 
eukaryotes”. The possession of a “prokaryotic” ribosome by a group of 
eukaryotes can be interpreted as a sign of having evolved earlier than most of 
their eukaryotic counterparts, before the changes in ribosome type occurred. 
The reliability of this line of evidence, however, has been increasingly 
questioned over time. The possession of smaller, prokaryote-like ribosomal 
component could also be the result of secondary simplifications. Evolution, in 
this case, would not have proceeded linearly from prokaryotic to eukaryotic 
rRNA, but would have instead added an extra step from eukaryotic rRNA to 
prokaryote-looking rRNA. In this view, then, the possession of prokaryote-like 
rRNA by eukaryotes would not be an uncontrovertibly reliable indicator of an 
early origin. 
Golgi Dictyosomes 
The Golgi apparatus is a specific feature of eukaryotes responsible, among 
other things, for protein maturation and intracellular vesicle trafficking.  
Structurally speaking, it is constituted of a functionally differentiated network of 
                                            
50 S standing for “Svedberg units”, a non-metric unit for sedimentation rate. 
Higher numbers correspond to quicker sedimentation, corresponding to bigger 
particles.  
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stacked compartments called “dictyosomes” (also called “cisternae”). The 
complexity, even the presence, of dictyosomes in eukaryotes can be taken as 
an indicator of the timing of the evolution of a given eukaryotic taxon. Eukaryote 
taxa without dictyosomes, or without a well-developed one, could be, in this 
reasoning, considered as having emerged early in eukaryote evolution. 
However, similar to rRNA morphology, inferring the primitiveness from this trait 
is risky since it could also derive from secondary simplifications.  
Spliceosomal introns 
Introns are sequences of RNA which, in the process of RNA maturation, are 
diced out and hence are not translated into proteins. Amongst the variety of 
ways with which these sequences can be recognized and removed, 
spliceosomal introns possess specific signal sequence recognized by 
spliceosomal RNA that then mediates their removal. This type of sequence is 
specific to eukaryotes and therefore possesses an interesting potential for 
generating evolutionary evidence. The absence or presence of these introns 
can, with the now usual proviso of secondary loss if they are absent, be taken 
as an indicator of the relative primitiveness of a given eukaryotic lineage.  
Hsp60 
“Heat shock proteins” (Hsp) are proteins responsible for assisting in the correct 
folding of other proteins, this function usually being described as “chaperoning”. 
Their name comes from the fact that they are usually generated in conditions of 
cellular stress, induced, for instance, by heat or wounds. Hsp60 is a 
mitochondria-specific protein responsible for protein import and macromolecular 
assembly. The presence of Hsp60 in a given eukaryote lineage is, therefore, a 
strong indicator for the contemporary or past presence of mitochondria, 
unambiguously arguing against the emergence of the possessor of such 
proteins before the appearance of mitochondria in eukaryotes.  
Hydrogenosomes  
Hydrogenosomes are cellular organelles responsible for energy production. 
Unlike mitochondria, they operate in anaerobic conditions and their functioning 
generates hydrogen, the latter giving the name to the structure. Another 
exclusive trait of eukaryotes, the evolutionary status of hydrogenosomes 
became a central point of interest for understanding the origin of this type of 
cell. The main question about them, at the time of the Archezoa hypothesis, 
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was to know whether the evolution of hydrogenosomes was in any sense 
related, or instead entirely independent, from the evolution of mitochondria. If 
hydrogenosomes and mitochondria were showed to be evolutionarily related, 
this would mean that they possess a common ancestor. In this case, any 
eukaryote in possession of hydrogenosomes cannot have emerged before the 
origin of mitochondria (or, more precisely, of mitochondria-related organelles).  
rRNA and other protein-specific phylogenies 
The nucleotide sequence of genes coding for ribosomal RNA has often been 
considered as one of the best historical documents of the living world. Firstly, 
rRNA is a ubiquitous cellular component. Secondly, rRNA is crucial to the 
maintenance of living systems in virtue of being one of the main components of 
the protein synthesis apparatus. It is argued that this function has prevented 
rRNA from having undergone changes too quickly (else it could have directly 
threatened the viability of the concerned organism) and, therefore, makes it one 
of the best-conserved gene sequences across the living world. Because of 
these two properties, ubiquity and stability, the sequence of the gene coding for 
rRNA has been used from the late 1970s in longue durée phylogenetic 
reconstructions that would cover the entirety of existing species (for instance, 
Woese and Fox 1977), from bacteria to eukaryotes, generating phylogenetic 
trees usually called “trees of life”. The trees generated with rRNA sequences 
have been used as evidence for assessing the relative position of each 
Archezoa lineage and verifying their purported primitiveness.  
In addition to rRNA sequences, other proteins, more specific and relevant to our 
understanding of the evolution of members of Archezoa, were also used to 
construct phylogenies. Taking genes coding for proteins that are less 
widespread for the construction of phylogenies enables to gain a more local 
understanding of the genealogical relationship between members of Archezoa 
and the rest of eukaryotes.  
Parasitism and secondary evolution 
Some members of Archezoa are never found in a free-living state. This means 
that their life cycle is integrally dependent on parasitic relationships they 
develop with their host, usually a multicellular eukaryote. This has two potential 
evidential consequences. The first one is that, by extrapolation, it makes it 
implausible for parasitic lineages to have evolved too early in the evolution of 
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eukaryotes, as their lifestyles depend on the existence of later-emerging 
eukaryotes for their survival. The second related point is that the development 
of parasitic life cycles, by depending on resources brought by a host, makes 
redundant (hence dispensable) the possession of certain components. 
Lineages of parasitic organisms, therefore, are more likely to display superficial 
simplicity as an outcome of secondary simplifications. 
It is noticeable that these lines of evidence are all fundamentally trace-based. 
They all have evidential value because they are seen as interpretable 
contemporary remain of past events and processes. However, what mediates 
their interpretation as remains is built from a variety of knowledge, including 
knowledge grounded on non-trace evidence from contemporary organisms. 
This description further illustrates the large scope of relevant knowledge (the 
evidential omnivory) that plays a role in the constitution and interpretation of 
evidence. I now describe how these various lines were mobilized to account for 
the shifting support of the Archezoa hypothesis as a whole. This also requires to 
provide lineage-specific analyses for each of the four members of the clade.  
C. THE SHIFTING STATUS OF ARCHEZOA 
Initial support for Archezoa 
Why were Archezoa initially singled out from the rest of eukaryotes? On one 
hand, they were argued to share with the rest of protists a number of 
“superficially similar” characteristics, as they consist of  
unicellular phagotrophic or micropinocytotic, nonphotosynthetic 
eukaryotes which lack a cell wall in the trophic phase (Cavalier-Smith 
1993, 962). 
On the other, they were singled out as possessing a 70S ribosome (instead of 
eukaryotic-specific 80S, as described above), as lacking well-developed Golgi 
dictyosomes and mitochondria51. This trio of data, in combination with the 
warrants that these characteristics are a testament of a primitive state of 
eukaryote evolution and that they are uniquely present in Archezoa, support this 
                                            
51 The components of the cilia and the absence of peroxisomes were also often 
initially mentioned (Cavalier-Smith 1987b, 17), but do not play a major role in 
later discussions. 
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initial classification. The integration of this classification into a wider evolutionary 
explanation (which is close, but not identical, to what is described for Cavalier-
Smith in Chapter 2) further backs this classification (conversely, the support of 
Archezoa also constituted a backing to the underlying evolutionary narrative it 
was embedded in. Relations of support were here mutual).  
The security of this inference, however, was not foolproof. The claim for the 
existence of the taxon is threatened by three rebuttals. Further research can 
result in the finding of traces of mitochondrial presence in purported Archezoa 
members, such as mitochondria-specific genes, proteins and structures. It 
would also be possible to interpret the facts in the light of alternative warrants 
which contradict the initial claim. While the traits shared by Archezoa members 
are considered as marks of primitivity, it is also possible that they come from 
secondary simplifications. In such cases, these traits would indicate a rather 
late origin to these organisms, stemming from lineages that have lost some of 
their more complex traits. The exclusivity of the primitive traits shared by 
Archezoa members can also be undermined by showing that later eukaryotes 
also possess such traits. The initial support to the Archezoa hypothesis is 
pictured in Fig. 10. 
 
Figure 10 Toulmin schema of the initial support of Archezoa. 
Initial support for Archamoebae 
Archamoebae is a specific taxonomic creation to accommodate “amitochondrial 
amoebae that could not be placed” in the three other initial Archezoan phyla 
(Cavalier-Smith 1991, 27). In that respect, it was an initially under-explored 
taxon that did not possess distinguishing traits apart from the ones discussed 
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above. In this respect, they were considered as rather prototypical Archezoa, 
and “present day Mastigamoebae” were considered to be the closest thing 
possible to “the most primitive eukaryote” (Cavalier-Smith 1987b, 17). In the 
early formulations of the hypothesis, therefore, the strength of the inclusion of 
Archamoebae matches the overall support for Archezoa. The only qualifier 
comes from their nature as a taxonomic gap-filler, which makes it run the risk 
that Archamoebae  
might turn out to be polyphyletic*, since they could well include both 
primitively and secondarily amitochondrial amoebae […] (Cavalier-Smith 
1991, 27). 
More work was therefore needed to further distinguish which member of 
archamoebae should belong to Archezoa.  
Initial support for Metamonada 
In addition to the initial general support to the Archezoa hypothesis, the 
presence of Metamonada in Archezoa was backed by specific rRNA 
phylogenies. In particular, a study ran by Sogin‟s group (Sogin et al. 1989) 
sequenced the rRNA of metamonad G. lamblia and the results were interpreted 
as “very strongly” supporting an early branching of this group (Cavalier-Smith 
1991, 27).  
Initial support for Microsporidia 
Similar to Metamonada, the inclusion of Microsporidia in Archezoa was also 
initially strongly supported by rRNA phylogenies. This time, the study focused 
on sequences of small subunit rRNA of microspora V. necatrix (Vossbrinck et 
al. 1987) and placed them at the time “as the deepest in the eukaryotic lineage” 
(Roger 1996, 10). In addition to rRNA-based phylogenies, the other main 
source of evidence stems from studies of the large subunit rRNA (Vossbrinck 
and Woese 1986) that showed that V. necatrix 
contains sequences corresponding to 5.8S rRNA, as in bacteria, rather 
than having separate 5.8S and 28S rRNA molecules as in metakaryotes 
[…] (Cavalier-Smith 1991, 27). 
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The only initial confounding point stemmed from the parasitic nature of 
microsporidian lineages which, as stated above, left open the possibility that 
they could  
have suffered extreme parasitic reduction, including the loss not only of 
mitochondria and peroxisomes* but also of lysosomes*, cilia*, and 
centrioles* (the latter three organelles are present in all other Archezoa 
but absence from microsporidia) […] (Cavalier-Smith 1993, 964). 
In other words, the claim that Microsporidia were archezoans was initially 
supported, but their exaggerated simplicity combined with their parasitic lifestyle 
left a lurking doubt with respects to their actual primitiveness.  
Initial support for Parabasalia 
The taxon Parabasalia was, in the beginning, the least-supported member of 
Archezoa. Contrary to other members of Archezoa, it possesses “a permanent 
dictyosome” (Cavalier-Smith 1987b, 43) and a “double-envelope […] 
hydrogenosome” (Cavalier-Smith 1987b, 23). The evolutionary status of 
hydrogenosomes was at the time unsettled, but Cavalier-Smith strongly 
qualified the inclusion of Parabasalia by assuming that hydrogenosomes  
might in principle have originated symbiotically […] or alternatively by 
reduction from mitochondria with the loss of mitochondrial DNA. If the 
later were proven, parabasalia should be transferred to the Mitozoa 
(branch Miozoa) from the Archezoa (Cavalier-Smith 1987b, 23). 
Contrary to other Archezoa members, rRNA-based phylogenies provided only 
mixed support to their deep branching: sometimes supporting it (Sogin 1989), 
sometimes supporting a secondarily derived status (Qu et al. 1988; Perasso et 
al. 1989).  
To summarize, the Archezoa hypothesis, as a classificatory hypothesis, was 
initially supported, with some members more than others. To account for the 
downfall of Archezoa, this time I proceed with each specific member in a 
chronological order of disappearance.  
The exclusion of Parabasalia and the shifts in evidential meanings 
The least initially supported of the members is unsurprisingly the first to be 
excluded from Archezoa. rRNA phylogenies were not crucial in this picture as 
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they remained incapable of unambiguously resolving the positioning of 
Parabasalia in the eukaryotic tree (Cavalier-Smith 1993, 964)52. The main 
argument for leaving out the phylum Parabasalia rather comes from the 
changes in the understanding of the evolution of hydrogenosomes. 
Understanding precisely the reasons behind this shift would deserve a separate 
study, as there is currently no comprehensive survey on the matter. Müller, one 
of the pioneering researchers on the organelle, defended a separate symbiotic 
origin for hydrogenosomes until 1992, but, at that point,  
convincing data started appearing that showed my hypothesis to be way 
off the mark (Müller 2007, 9). 
In this chapter‟s framework, the situation could be described by saying that the 
claim that hydrogenosomes were evolutionarily related to mitochondria was 
discussed in a separate epistemic context from the Archezoa hypothesis. Over 
time, support for this claim became sufficiently strong to convince the scientific 
community. This shift had repercussions in the case of Archezoa, as it added a 
warrant stating that “hydrogenosomes and mitochondria shared a common 
descent”. It does not mean that the evolutionary relation between 
hydrogenosomes and mitochondria was established without doubts (it still 
needed further research) but it was taken to be sufficiently consolidated to 
decisively license rejection of the claim that Parabasalia is a member of 
Archezoa. The rejection of this latter claim is represented in Fig. 11. 
                                            
52 This does not mean that phylogenies constructed later were not capable of 
indicating that. It just doesn‟t seem to have been a significant factor at the time 
of the exclusion of Parabasalia from Archezoa.  
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Figure 11 Toulmin schema of the rejection of Parabasalia from Archezoa. 
This rejection has interesting repercussions on the status of the Archezoa 
hypothesis as a whole. Because Parabasalia, now excluded from Archezoa, 
possesses 70S ribosome, the possession of 70S ribosome as a defining 
character of Archezoa is now unequivocally denied, impacting on the credibility 
of one of the warrants in this context. This also impacts on the support for the 
other memberships to the kingdom, especially for the initially rather weakly-
supported Microsporidia (Cavalier-Smith 1993, 965). The now decisive role 
played by hydrogenosomes also generates a new line of evidence in this 
context, as its absence is now invoked in support of the grouping. This shift is 
visible in Cavalier-Smith‟s characterization of Archezoa as possessing 
70S ribosomes, like bacteria, rather than 80S ribosomes as in most other 
eukaryotes, and in never having mitochondria, peroxisomes, 
hydrogenosomes, or well-developed Golgi dictyosomes (Cavalier-Smith 
1993, 962). 
In addition to this, the strength of the lack of dictyosomes as evidence for 
Archezoa has been relativized after the observation of secondary losses of 
dictyosomes in non-Archezoan protists (Cavalier-Smith 1993, 965).  
Archamoebae as “advanced” eukaryotes 
The credibility of the archamoebae taxon initially suffered from being mainly 
negatively defined. Doubts were raised on the status of some of its members, 
notably E. histolytica, in the face of conflicting rRNA evidence (Cavalier-Smith 
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1993, 964). This process progressively led to the eventual exclusion of the 
totality of Archamoebae from Archezoa, coming from rRNA phylogenies (Morin 
and Mignot 1995) and the isolation of genes of mitochondrial origin in E. 
histolytica (Clark and Roger 1995). In light of these lines of evidence, 
Archamoebae were in fact considered to be “relatively advanced eukaryotes 
that have almost certainly evolved by the secondary loss of mitochondria” 
(Cavalier-Smith and Chao 1996, 557). Fig. 12 summarizes the evidential claims 
leading to the exclusion of Archamoebae.  
 
Figure 12 Toulmin schema of the exclusion of Archamoebae from Archezoa. 
Microsporidia as “degenerate fungi” 
The support for the inclusion of Microsporidia, initially weak, further degraded 
after the weakening of 70S ribosome as evidence for eukaryotic primitiveness. 
The main driver of the evolution from suspicion to rejection is the discovery of 
spliceosomal RNA in microsporidia (DiMaria et al. 1996; cited in Cavalier-Smith 
1998, 227). The presence of spliceosomal RNA being evolutionary associated 
with the acquisition of mitochondria, Microsporidia could therefore not have 
emerged before its acquisition. In addition to that, protein-specific phylogenies, 
in particular from hsp70 (Germot et al. 1997) and proteins of the tubulin* family 
(Li et al. 1996; Keeling and Doolittle 1996; Roger 1996) presented Microsporidia 
members as secondarily amitochondrial and heavily degenerate fungi (Cavalier-
Smith 1998, 227). A summary of the evidential picture leading to the rejection of 
Microsporidia is given in Fig. 13.  
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Figure 13 Toulmin schema of the exclusion of Microsporidia from Archezoa. 
How about Metamonada?  
Metamonada was one of the best-supported Archezoa members. Since other 
groups have been progressively removed from Archezoa, the latter‟s existence 
was increasingly questioned. It took more time, however, for researchers to 
generate decisive evidence to reject Metamonada from Archezoa. Protein-
specific phylogenies, notably of hsp60 (Soltys and Gupta 1994), were judged 
generally unconvincing by Cavalier-Smith (Cavalier-Smith 1998, 229). What 
constituted “firmer sequence evidence for a secondarily amitochondrial 
character of the group” (Cavalier-Smith 1998, 229) is a series of phylogenies of 
the cpn60 gene, identified in G. lamblia, that “grouped solidly [the latter] with the 
mitochondrial and α-proteobacterial sequences” (Roger 1999, 152) (the latter 
which, as a reminder, is the lineage of bacteria from which mitochondria-related 
organelles stem) and of a gene involved in protein synthesis “specifically related 
to the homologue from Trichomonas vaginalis (Hashimoto et al. 1998)” (Roger 
1999, 152), T. vaginalis being a member of the rejected parasabalian lineage. 
With this combined evidence, the last of the claims for the existence of a 
primarily amitochondrial lineage is now rejected. Fig. 14 summarizes the 
evidential picture for Metamonada.  
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Figure 14 Toulmin layout of the exclusion of Metamonada from Archezoa. 
D. EPILOGUE – WHAT REMAINS OF ARCHEZOA? 
If taken as a classificatory hypothesis underpinned by an evolutionary 
motivation, Archezoa was unambiguously rejected by 1998. The name, 
however, remained as a phylum within protists that included Metamonada and 
Parabasalia and were still postulated to be the earliest (albeit post-
mitochondrial) eukaryotes (Cavalier-Smith 1998, 206). Such rooting of the 
earliest eukaryote within Archezoa stopped in 2002 (Cavalier-Smith 2002, 311, 
341), the new derived nature of the taxa leading Cavalier-Smith to drop the 
name altogether in 2003 (Cavalier-Smith 2003, 1745). If the classification is 
gone, what remains of the evolutionary underpinnings?  
Cavalier-Smith defended, at the dawn of Archezoa, the logical independence 
existing between the classificatory and the evolutionary sides of his work. The 
bigger evolutionary explanation in which the Archezoa hypothesis integrated 
itself and partially supported, the “phagotrophic hypothesis”, is argued to “apply 
to any potential host” (Cavalier-Smith 2002, 318). What was proven false, then, 
is that the Archezoa kingdom represented remnants of an intermediary stage 
between the emergence of eukaryotes and the acquisition of mitochondria, as 
well as a classificatory hypothesis grouping four distinct clades together. It 
might be perfectly legitimate for Cavalier-Smith to feel that the amalgam some 
scientists have made by regrouping distinct aspects of his work under the 
heading “Archezoa hypothesis” led to an unfair downgrading of Archezoa-
independent aspects of his work (Cavalier-Smith 2002, 318). However, what is 
also a probable, and more legitimate, cause of the decrease in popularity of the 
phagotrophic theory of the origin of eukaryotes is also the flourishing of 
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alternative hypotheses, such as the Martin and Müller‟s hydrogen hypothesis 
(Martin and Müller 1998, see Chapter 2). 
Alternative accounts, such as Martin and Müller‟s, generated different research 
programs that came to grips with and shed light on alternative sources of 
evidence. They were, in other words, stimulating researchers to exercise their 
“methodological autotrophy”. This was probably done by attempting to evaluate 
some of the fictional truths generated from the hydrogen hypothesis, this 
representing a case of productive speculation (as discussed in Chapter 5). 
Martin and Müller‟s hypothesis also came with different conceptual and 
methodological commitments. Since both Cavalier-Smith‟s and Martin‟s 
hypotheses for the origin of eukaryotes are still around, the benefits and risks of 
the existence of such divergent explanations are explored further in the next 
chapter.  
Overall, the fall of Archezoa represented a failure of a classificatory hypothesis 
and of an evolutionary hypothesis about contemporary organisms, undermining 
but not totally invalidating the general framework about the origin of eukaryotes 
in which it was inserted. To illustrate this, elements of the reasoning behind the 
phagotrophic theory for the origin of eukaryotes, a subtype of “autogenous 
theories” (O‟Malley 2010), remain present, as illustrated by the continued 
debate between “mito-early”, “mito-late” and “mito-intermediate” scenarios for 
the origin of eukaryotes (Ettema 2016).   
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 5 dealt with the methodology of historical sciences “as a whole”, and 
this allowed me to identify some of its key components and critically assess a 
series of concepts that can help to describe it. This chapter aimed to put into 
practice these insights by doing two things. Part 1 and 2 illustrated how 
conceptual demands stemming from the previous chapter can help evaluate a 
framework from a theoretical standpoint. Toulmin schemas (TS) were put to use 
in a diachronic approach in order to display the way lines of evidence are 
articulated and used in the context of historical sciences. Part 3 consists of an 
application of TS to a case study derived from my dissertation‟s focus on the 
works of Cavalier-Smith and Martin. It focused on the rise and fall of the 
Archezoa hypothesis, aiming to capture the evidential dynamics behind the 
initial support and subsequent fall of this taxonomic hypothesis.  
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As stated above, TS only enable us to visually display and reconstruct the 
modes of justification of hypotheses. I was keen, in the introduction, to remind 
that this exclusivity is by no means underpinned by a belief in the legitimacy to 
strongly distinguish between the context of discovery and the context of 
justification. On one hand, I indeed believe that the construction of TS enables a 
sharper analysis of the dynamics of justification. It provides a precise 
vocabulary and is flexible enough to build up sophisticated reconstitutions from 
the interactions of these simple elements.  
On the other hand, I argue that TS are not only useful to refine our 
understanding of evidential claims in historical sciences. While they do not 
provide explicit insights into the context of discovery and about the constitution 
of facts, I think that the construction of TS opens up several lines of 
investigation into them. Used for historical reconstructions, TS identify the 
various security shifts stemming from the introduction of new lines of evidence 
(and reinterpretation of former ones), thereby indicating the presence of implicit 
conceptual and methodological innovations behind these changes. They open 
up questions about how these various changes and shifts occurred. For 
instance, in this chapter‟s case study, how did the change in the perceived 
evolutionary status of hydrogenosomes occur? What are the factors behind the 
sufficient consensus that seems to have emerged on the subject? Delving into 
these questions requires dealing with the articulation of lines of evidence, for 
sure, but also understanding the crossing of social, historical and conceptual 
dynamics that TS alone cannot capture. The descriptions provided by the use of 
TS and these complementary investigations can help, for instance, to probe the 
epistemic soundness of some of the theory choices that have been made (akin 
to Chang‟s account of the phlogiston hypothesis in his 2012 book). To reiterate, 
I clearly do not think that the focus on justification provided by TS comes with a 
neglect of discovery.  
Among the conceptual resources devised in Chapter 5, I have so far mostly 
discussed how they explicitly account for the various degrees of security, 
illustrate evidential omnivory and implicitly display the pervasive theoretical 
mediation behind the constitution and interpretation of facts. I think, in addition 
to that, that the case study particularly highlights the benefits of productive 
speculation. The Archezoa hypotheses explicitly contained elements of 
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speculation. It required a definite “leap of faith” to assert some weakly or mildly 
supported claims. This speculation however structured the debate and oriented 
research by directing attention to particular aspects of the organisms under 
investigation. It is unlikely that so much attention would have been devoted to 
the ways to identify marks of mitochondrial secondary loss in the members of 
Archezoa if the hypothesis weren‟t formulated. This speculative hypothesis, 
despite being eventually rejected, contributed to an improved understanding of 
the evolution of early eukaryotes and, I assume, benefited from and contributed 
to parallel lines of investigation.  
I have also, in Chapter 5, highlighted the importance of the knowledge of 
contemporary entities in our understanding of the past. This argument can also 
be perceived as a contestation of accounts that would place a strong 
methodological demarcation between historical sciences and experimental 
sciences (for instance, Cleland 2002). This argument being built on an 
emphasis the primary importance, for the former, of the discovery of the 
relevant traces of the past. I believe the case of Archezoa makes it clear that 
the study of the functioning and morphology of purported members of Archezoa 
(which are contemporary organisms) and the study of their evolution were 
tightly linked. Here, historical and contemporary knowledge are better seen as 
standing in a mutually beneficial relationship. In addition to that, the various 
types of evidence mobilized confirmed the importance of several experimental 
practices, from the extraction and isolation of proteins to the sequencing of 
genomes to the culture of organisms. Contemporary and experimental 
knowledge are, evidentially speaking, far from secondary in this chapter‟s case 
study, and I believe that my case was not exceptional in these regards.    
I conclude this chapter by identifying a few of the limits and open questions 
related both to the conceptual aspects of the framework and to the way I 
designed this case study. I already evoked above the non-quantitative character 
of this framework. Due to the evidential variety displayed and also the fact that 
scientists did not evaluate the claims, in the case studied, in this quantitative 
manner, I am doubtful of the possibility of changing this particular set of TS into 
something more quantitative. It would be interesting, however, to try and apply 
TS to cases, within historical sciences, where quantifications pervade the 
evaluation of lines of evidence and whole claims. Would there be the same 
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variety of roles? How would that play out? I think that the possibility of adding 
qualifiers and of modulating the strength of the fact-to-claim link open up the 
possibility for more quantitative representations. In similar respects, TS here 
provided a visually tractable representation of the evidential structure around 
Archezoa. It might be the case that for more complex and nested arguments 
this tractable display becomes a visually cumbersome one. However, I assume 
that such complex arguments would then make any attempt at rational 
reconstructions difficult, be it summarized into words or into schemas.  
Concerning the case study in itself, I have provided a reconstruction of how 
lines of evidence were used mostly derived from the vantage point of 
Archezoa‟s father and main defender, Cavalier-Smith. This choice is partly due 
to my own time and epistemic limitations. It would be difficult, for the time being, 
to handle a variety of points of view because of the additional material to digest 
and additional intellectual sophistication it would require. The dynamics 
captured by TS in the case of Archezoa are, therefore, an incomplete and 
limited picture that would welcome further study to improve and sophisticate it. I 
think, however, that this added complexity wouldn‟t undermine the main reason 
for building TS to capture evidential claims, because it wouldn‟t contradict the 
main philosophical upshots of the schema in the first place. As discussed a few 
paragraphs above, I mostly hope for such reconstructions to open up 
complementary lines of investigations that can refute, complement, or 
supplement this particular analysis.  
After dealing with evidential claims and aiming to understand the evidential 
dynamics behind the evaluation of hypotheses considered on their own, the 
next and final chapter discusses the coexistence and competition between 
hypotheses. It does so by considering questions of underdetermination and how 
they relate to the notion of epistemic pluralism. It also proposes a different 
usage for TS.  
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CHAPTER 7: FROM UNDERDETERMINATION TO PLURALISM: BENEFITS AND RISKS 
OF THE COEXISTENCE OF RIVAL HYPOTHESES IN HISTORICAL SCIENCES 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation in general, and this chapter in particular, are motivated by two 
interrelated considerations. I wondered, first, how it was possible for two 
radically contrasting hypotheses, those of Cavalier-Smith and Martin, to have 
been coexisting for a substantial amount of time without one taking irreversible 
precedence over the other. It is a rather descriptive question, from which stems 
some normative ones. Is this coexistence a good thing? What are the benefits 
and risk associated with that? These two questions are at the basis of this last 
chapter. They provide an entry point for discussions about underdetermination 
and pluralism in historical sciences.  
The problem of underdetermination is conceived here as a problem of evidential 
security. Applied to historical sciences, it asserts that the traces left from the 
past are often incapable of providing sufficiently strong and unambiguous 
evidential constraints to allow for clear choices between competing hypotheses. 
This lack of evidential security as determinacy, as discussed in Chapter 5, if 
considered as pervasive, leads to frequent cases of what have been described 
as modest pluralism (Kellert et al. 2006). This form of pluralism accepts the 
coexistence of contradictory hypotheses when the lack of better evidential 
grounds prevents from a decision between them.  
Despite agreeing on the importance of the issue and the pervasiveness of 
underdetermination in historical sciences, I argue that the connection from 
underdetermination to epistemic pluralism needs to be revised. I do so by 
identifying a problematic assumption underlying traditional discussions around 
underdetermination. In short, philosophers engaged in this discussion have 
assumed the existence of a common pool of evidence which competing 
hypotheses must invariably take into account. This existing pool of evidence 
underlies the conceptual possibility of the empirical equivalence of hypotheses. 
Other philosophical accounts contest this vision. With them, I argue 
disagreements over what counts as evidence and what this evidence means 
are sufficiently prevalent in historical sciences to undermine the necessary 
existence of shared evidential grounds across a given scientific community. 
Underdetermination, then, does not only concern the move from evidence to 
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hypotheses: it runs deeper. It is already there at the evidential level. Revising 
this assumption about underdetermination has consequences for the form of 
pluralism that stems from it. It no longer is the unhappy consequence of 
evidential shortcomings. Instead, it is the unsurprising outcome of the 
conceptual and methodological heterogeneity in a given area of inquiry, coming 
closer to situations described in Chang‟s (2012) defence of active realism.  
The second part of the chapter proposes to illustrate and defend this form of 
epistemic pluralism. It puts to work Toulmin Schemas (TS), discussed in the 
previous chapter, to a perennial case of disagreement in evolutionary biology. 
The framework is used to deconstruct the evidential claims for and against the 
necessity of phagocytosis for the origin of mitochondria. This detailed analysis 
provides a clear illustration of the soundness of the proposed rearticulation of 
the problem of underdetermination. At the heart of the debate around the need 
for phagocytosis lies a disagreement about the relevance and solidity of some 
lines of evidence and principles, not the mere puzzlement over a variety of 
hypotheses that equally satisfy the existing evidence.  
From this case, the last part identifies some of the benefits and risks associated 
with methodological pluralism. On the plus side, contradictory coexisting 
hypotheses allow for the exploration of a broader array of relevant aspects to a 
given problem. Endorsing methodological pluralism also pushes us away from 
seeing the reconciliation of conflicting hypotheses into a unified theory as the 
sole measure of epistemic success. Reaping these benefits is not automatic 
and effortless. It comes with potential pitfalls and risks. The main one being the 
difficulty associated with the necessity for a scientific community to use a wide 
variety of knowledge to tackle the problem they are facing. Evolutionary 
explanations, for instance, are often inherently multifaceted and the relevant 
expertise cannot be equally distributed across the community. Another problem 
is one of the funding choices: if the coexistence of hypotheses is legitimate, 
then which of the research programs defending one of these hypotheses should 
be pursued?  
From these discussions, it is clear that finding ways of reaping the benefits of 
this form of pluralism and avoiding some of its pitfalls takes us outside of the 
dynamics of justification, which Toulmin schemas are only capable of 
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representing. This discussion of methodological pluralism, instead, highlights 
the necessity to attend to the conditions under which fruitful evidential 
discussions can occur. The chapter closes by considering potentially interesting 
sources to tackle this issue.  
I. FROM CONTRASTIVE UNDERDETERMINATION TO MODEST PLURALISM 
A. HOLIST AND CONTRASTIVE UNDERDETERMINATION 
The discussion starts with a characterization of the problem of 
underdetermination. More precisely, the problem is often framed as the problem 
of “underdetermination of scientific theory by evidence” (Stanford 2016). It is 
often associated with the names of Willard Quine and Pierre Duhem and chiefly 
concerns the move from evidence to theories. At the heart of the problem, 
according to Stanford, lies the “simple idea that the evidence available to us at a 
given time may be insufficient to determine what beliefs we should hold in 
response to it” (Stanford 2016). 
There are, according to Stanford, two ways of understanding the problem of 
underdetermination. The first of these is named holist underdetermination. This 
type of underdetermination emphasizes our inability to determine clear 
theoretical consequences in the face of new evidence. Let‟s imagine that we are 
faced with unexpected experimental results. They do not conform to the 
hypothesis that was under test. Underdetermination occurs when the effects of 
such unexpected result can‟t be decided with certitude. Does it refute the 
hypothesis under test? Are the results, instead, artefacts coming from the 
experimental setup? Does it refute some more or less explicitly articulated 
auxiliary assumptions? Holist underdetermination deals with cases like these. 
This is not the form of underdetermination I discuss in this chapter.  
The other form of underdetermination is qualified as contrastive. Contrastive 
underdetermination occurs when a variety of hypotheses can account for the 
existing evidence. In other words, the existing lines of evidence about an 
investigated phenomenon underdetermine the theories that can be drawn from 
them. In these cases, the equally supported theories that can be formulated are 
said to be empirically equivalent. A definition of empirical equivalence has been 
provided by Turner:  
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Two incompatible theories or hypotheses, H and H*, are empirically 
equivalent just in case they have the same empirical consequence class, 
which is to say that they have exactly the same consequences with 
respect to the observations that scientists could ever make (Turner 2007, 
46).  
This formulation contains a strong temporal dimension. It claims that the notion 
of empirical equivalence does not only concern the current state of an 
investigation but asserts equivalence as in principle irrevocable. In this view, 
cases of empirical equivalence are cases in which, in principle, no evidence 
could ever help distinguish between two hypotheses H and H*. My interpretation 
of empirical equivalence, here, is weaker. It concerns only the current state of 
an investigation and posits that two theories H and H* are equally responsive to 
the currently available evidence.  
B. UNDERDETERMINATION IN HISTORICAL SCIENCES 
Turner discussed the notion of underdetermination and empirical equivalence in 
the context of historical sciences. Together with Currie, they share the belief 
that this type of science “provides excellent source material for enquiring after 
the nature of underdetermination and how scientists respond to it” (Currie and 
Turner 2016, 43-44). Why would historical sciences provide such a locus53?  
Currie and Turner attribute the pervasiveness of underdetermination to the 
nature of the evidence. “Historical science”, they affirm, “is often marked by 
degrading signals, and thus incomplete data” (Currie and Turner 2016, 43). 
Turner, in another publication, makes the general point that “in historical 
science, the background theories tell us how nature has destroyed the 
evidence” (Turner 2007, 60, his emphasis). This is contrasted with particle 
physics, where, in his view, background theories can be used to know where to 
find new evidence. In other words, historical scientists, when lucky, can gather 
well-preserved or slightly altered traces of a past phenomenon. When unlucky, 
                                            
53 I don‟t think this is Currie and Turner‟s intention, and neither is it mine, to 
argue that historical sciences constitute the best locus to study 
underdetermination. In these sciences, however, the problem of 
underdetermination is often brought to the fore. 
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these traces are, at best, severely damaged and barely interpretable or, in most 
cases, these traces are simply gone, erased by the passage of time. Bloch 
personifies the past as a “tyrant” who has the capacity to decide which 
information can be known and which is forever out of reach (Bloch 1949, 22). If 
traces of past events are sparse, one would hope to find relief in the use of well-
established background knowledge to help to extract a maximum of knowledge 
from minimal evidence. These “lucky circumstances” can occur. Currie, for 
instance, describes how a single platypus tooth can be used to provide a “rich 
picture of O. tharalkooschild‟s morphology, ancestry and ecology” (Currie 2018, 
2). However, there are cases in which well-established background theories are 
of little help. Malaterre, discussing the research on the origin of life, emphasizes 
how principles of physics and chemistry are only weakly constraining the space 
of possibilities, making it hard to evaluate the epistemic worth of competing 
hypotheses (Malaterre 2010).  
Following this argument, the lack of evidential constraints, constituted by faint 
traces and weak background theories, results in cases of contrastive 
underdetermination. Cleland, for instance, makes the pervasiveness of 
contrastive underdetermination a cornerstone of her account of the method of 
historical sciences (see Chapter 5 for a thorough discussion of her account). 
The first stage of this method, according to her, is the “proliferation of multiple 
competing hypotheses to explain a puzzling body of traces encountered in 
fieldwork […]” (Cleland 2011, 554). Only the discovery of a “smoking gun” can 
break cases of contrastive underdetermination. Forber speaks of cases of 
“contrast failure”, similarly ascribing to evidence the role to “favour one 
hypothesis over some set of alternatives” (Forber 2009, 249). Turner has a 
more pessimistic take than Cleland and Forber. He describes local 
underdetermination problems on which there is no point to dwell because 
information-destroying processes have erased the evidence that could have 
broken these contrastive underdeterminations (Turner 2007). He uses the 
example of the colour of the dinosaurs as a typically intractable epistemic 
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task54. Similarly, Malaterre emphasizes the variety of possible and equally 
satisfying explanations that can be generated from traces of the early history of 
life. He argues that the deeper one goes in time, the more the problem of 
underdetermination tends to be salient and insurmountable (Malaterre 2010). 
On the whole, these philosophers agree on the widespread presence of 
problems of contrastive underdetermination in historical sciences.  
Associated with this pervasiveness of contrastive underdetermination is a form 
of epistemic pluralism55 in historical sciences. If the available evidence is not 
sufficient to determine the superiority of a hypothesis over others, then one has 
to leave room for a plurality of empirically equivalent hypotheses. The resulting 
pluralism56 is the necessary evil that comes when scientists face epistemically 
difficult problems. In a perfect world, signals about the past would not have 
degraded this badly and would be sufficiently clearly interpretable to generate 
evidence that helps distinguish between competing theories. Instead, in this 
view, historical sciences often find themselves in the disappointing situation 
where pluralism has to happen because of the lack of (strong) evidence. Ideally 
                                            
54 Even though it turns out that this particular pessimistic bet turned out to be 
lost, it is now possible to “draw inferences about dinosaur coloration based on 
the microstructure of fossil feathers” (Turner 2016, 60).   
55 The forms of pluralism discussed here are, of course, not representing the 
whole spectrum of “pluralist” positions in philosophy of science. Other accounts 
include Dupré 1993; Kitcher 2001; Longino 1990; Mitchell 2003; Ruphy 2016.  
56 I use Kellert, Longino and Waters‟ distinction between “plurality” and 
“pluralism”. The former being “a feature of the present state of inquiry in a 
number of areas of scientific research (…) characterized by multiple 
approaches, each revealing different facets of a phenomenon. There can be a 
plurality of representational and conceptual schemas, of explanatory strategies, 
of models and theories, and of investigative questions and the strategies 
appropriate for answering them” (Kellert et al. 2006, ix). Pluralism, on the other 
hand, is “a view about the state of affair: that plurality in science possibly 
represents an ineliminable character of scientific inquiry and knowledge (…)” 
(Kellert et al. 2006, ix-x).  
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(in optimistic outlooks), this pluralism is transient: new lines of evidence 
intervene to relieve this case of underdetermination and dissolve this plurality.  
This form of pluralism is a subset of what Fehr, drawing from Kellert, Longino 
and Waters, defines as “modest pluralism”: 
a state of affairs in which multiple explanations of a phenomenon are 
tolerated because it is expected that they will eventually resolve into 
monism (Fehr 2006, 168). 
In modest pluralism, the plurality of hypotheses is a marker of the immaturity of 
a given investigation. Cleland endorses modest pluralism when she states that 
the two-step process of the proliferation of competing underdetermined 
hypotheses and the finding of smoking guns eventually “converges upon a 
single hypothesis” (Cleland 2011, 554). Sustained states of pluralism are, on 
the contrary, the disappointing result of “the absence of the requisite 
technology” that could make potential smoking guns emerge. In these cases, 
“historical scientists have little recourse but to resign themselves to a collection 
of equally viable, rival hypotheses” (Cleland 2011, 555). In cases of local 
underdetermination, Turner would simply encourage historical scientists to 
“simply move on to more tractable research questions” (Turner 2007, 47). To 
summarize:  
(a) Underdetermination in historical sciences causes modest pluralism.  
(b) Modest pluralism is something to be defeated and needs further 
evidence to do so.  
(c) If further evidence is not found. Modest pluralism is sustained and is 
considered a disappointment.  
Kellert, Longino and Waters argue that modest pluralism and the underlying 
ideal of unification goes against the grain of a more radical pluralist stance:  
Scientific pluralism […] holds that […] the multiplicity of approaches that 
presently characterizes many areas of scientific investigation does not 
necessarily constitute a deficiency. As pluralists, we do not assume that 
the natural world cannot, in principle, be completely explained by a single 
tidy account; rather, we believe that whether it can be so explained is an 
open, empirical question (Kellert et al. 2006, x).  
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Their commitment to pluralism can be interpreted as one avoiding to perceive 
the coexistence of hypotheses as mere negative outcomes of contrastive 
underdetermination from evidential shortcomings. It does not perceive pluralism 
as an ideally temporary phenomenon that the scientific community should aim 
to eliminate. It considers, instead, that obtaining consensus is not the sole 
measure of scientific success. They are other epistemic benefits to be reaped, 
notably from situations of pluralism. While I do not deny the existence of 
empirically equivalent hypotheses in historical sciences – some set of traces do 
have equally good explanations – I, however, think that the question of 
underdetermination has been illegitimately narrowed on the move from 
evidence to theories. I now argue that underdetermination runs deeper than 
that, down to the constitution of evidence. This deeper form of 
underdetermination and the causes underlying it allow for the defence of a more 
positive form of epistemic pluralism.   
C. EXTENDING THE PROBLEM OF UNDERDETERMINATION 
The views on contrastive underdetermination presented above, whether or not 
they are applied to the case of historical sciences, all share a common 
assumption. At the heart of the reasoning is the idea that there exists a shared 
pool of available evidence that scientific hypotheses about a given phenomenon 
need to account for. The existence of this pool of evidence underpins the notion 
of empirical equivalence of hypotheses: they are empirically equivalent with 
regards to the pool of available evidence. This whole discussion, therefore, 
hinges on a continuous agreement across a scientific community concerned 
with a given phenomenon. This agreement concerns the nature of the available 
evidence – which, in line with the relational account of evidence sketched in 
Chapter 5, concerns what counts as evidence and what doesn‟t – as well as the 
interpretation of such evidence.  
While this expectation is probably fulfilled in some cases, I think that it is an 
unrealistic premise in others. Instead, I think that methodological and 
conceptual commitments are often sufficiently divergent within some scientific 
communities to prevent a continuous agreement on the nature and meaning of 
available evidence. In other words, two (or more) scientists working on the 
same phenomenon, but having different methodological and conceptual 
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commitments, will not produce theories that aim to account for the same pool of 
available evidence.  
This state of affair has already been described in several different ways. Wylie, 
for instance, uses Kuhn‟s discussion of incommensurability (Kuhn 1962) to 
argue that  
Kuhn‟s analysis of revolutionary theory change in the natural sciences 
makes it clear that the assessment of competing theories depends on 
considerations that are not just diverse but also internally complex and 
unstable: the strands that make up a cable of comparative, evaluative 
argument may conflict with one another; even when researchers share 
criteria of adequacy they may apply them differently, yielding 
incompatible judgements about the relative strength of alternative 
theories; and the criteria are themselves open to revision as research 
tradition evolve […] (Wylie 2002, 163).  
Wylie describes situations in which the internal disciplinary dynamics results in 
a heterogeneity of methods and concepts that prevents the evaluation of 
hypotheses on shared conceptual and evidential grounds. Chang similarly 
describes situations of methodological incommensurability in which “there are 
no shared, objective methodological standards of scientific theory appraisal” as 
well as “no external or neutral standards which may be employed in the 
comparative evaluation of competing theories” (Chang 2012, 59). Such 
situations prevent us from seeing the evaluation of evidential support as a 
“straightforward matter of logical or probabilistic connections between theory 
and observation” (Chang 2012, 29). An illustration of such situations is provided 
later with the case study I propose.  
These considerations push the question of underdetermination, as well as the 
resulting form of pluralism, to a deeper level. Underdetermination does not only 
occur at the interpretational level but also concern the constitution of lines of 
evidence. Because the pool of evidence to be accounted for varies across a 
given scientific community, it is therefore quite unsurprising that a plurality of 
hypotheses coexists. Here, they do not coexist because of a purported 
empirical equivalence in which they would all account for the same set of 
evidence. Instead, they coexist because they account for different sets of 
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evidence underlined by divergent methodological and conceptual 
commitments57.  
Rather than being a disappointing consequence of our lack of evidential access, 
this form of pluralism can be perceived rather positively. It results from the 
dynamism and continuous heterogeneity present within scientific communities. 
Coexisting hypotheses provide a map of the various conceptual and 
methodological commitments existing at a time, and further investigations allow 
for their exploration and refinement. This form of pluralism comes close to 
Chang‟s “active realism”, which  
recommends that we should pursue all systems of knowledge that can 
provide us an informative contact with reality; if there are mutually 
incommensurable paradigms, we should retain all of them at once 
(Chang 2012, xix).  
Applying this view to historical sciences, conceptually and methodologically 
divergent investigations should be pursued simultaneously in order to maximize 
progress. Consistent with the argument sketched in the previous section, 
cultivating this plurality of inquiries should not be expected to converge into a 
single hypothesis, and the eventual achievement of a consensus should not be 
taken to be the sole aim to be pursued. To summarize:  
(a) Methodological and conceptual divergences underdetermine the pool of 
evidence to be accounted for;  
(b) This causes what counts as evidence (and how to interpret it) to vary 
across historical scientists interested in the same phenomenon;  
(c) A plurality of hypotheses results from the plurality of pools of evidence 
scientists aim to account for;  
(d) These cases of epistemic pluralism are acceptable and might (or might 
not) be temporary.  
                                            
57 The constitution of evidence can also be underdetermined as a result of the 
processes of preparation of evidence. For instance, fossils in paleobiology are 
underdetermined since they result from choices from preparators that contain 
an ineliminable idiosyncratic dimension (Wylie 2014).  
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This argument can seem a little strong. It might look like an invitation to 
indiscriminately develop good and bad methodological and conceptual 
frameworks and to artificially maintain disagreements. As it seems with many 
defences of pluralism, a fear of relativism lurks in the background. In some 
cases, the coexistence of contrasted hypotheses can be deemed acceptable 
since each hypothesis provides a partial understanding of the phenomenon 
under study. Multiple partial perspectives can then be seen as 
incommensurable and legitimately coexisting. However, the investigations I am 
interested in are attempts to provide explanations of unique events. Because 
these events are treated as unique, is it possible to be satisfied with a sustained 
coexistence of contradictory hypotheses? Is it possible even if, as Edwards puts 
it about another historical context, “there is no heterogeneity in this 
demographic history, because the history has happened only once” (Edwards 
2009, 2)? The benefits and risks associated with this thesis are further 
discussed in part 3. Before that, the next part illustrates the proposed 
rearticulation of the problem of underdetermination with a case study from the 
works of Cavalier-Smith and Martin. It constructs a TS to characterize 
disagreement over the following claim: “phagocytosis is required for the origin of 
mitochondria”.  
II. CASE STUDY: PHAGOCYTOSIS IS REQUIRED FOR THE ORIGIN OF 
MITOCHONDRIA 
A. MOTIVATION AND PRECEDENT ANALYSES  
In the previous chapter, I provided an extended study of the rise and fall of the 
Archezoa hypothesis. As a reminder, this hypothesis, now rejected, postulated 
the primitiveness of a group of amitochondriate eukaryotes. This chapter‟s case 
is concerned with the disagreement about the requirement of phagocytosis for 
the origin of mitochondria. As stated in Chapter 2, this debate has the 
advantage of not being philosophical terra incognita and this chapter directly 
benefits from O‟Malley existing survey of the disagreement about the origin and 
early evolution of eukaryotes (O‟Malley 2010). Because I do not fundamentally 
disagree with the points made in O‟Malley‟s paper, I need to expand on the 
reasons for re-opening this case.  
In her paper, O‟Malley provides a historical survey of how the endosymbiotic 
theory for the origin of mitochondria came to be consensually accepted and a 
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presentation of contemporary competing explanations for how this 
endosymbiosis happened. Presently, she argues, there are two main types of 
hypotheses for the origin of mitochondria, demarcating them into “phagotrophic” 
and “syntrophic” models. Phagotrophic hypotheses, chiefly defended by 
Cavalier-Smith, postulate the acquisition of phagocytosis as the main event in 
the process of acquiring the ancestor of mitochondria. Syntrophic accounts, 
defended by Martin, affirm that the endosymbiotic origin of mitochondria came 
from a metabolic partnership that turned into an obligate association (both 
hypotheses are summarized in Chapter 2). The two hypotheses can be said to 
fundamentally diverge on matters of timing: phagotrophic hypotheses make the 
acquisition of mitochondria an outcome of the evolution of phagocytosis, while 
syntrophic hypotheses argue that the origin of phagocytosis depended on the 
prior acquisition of mitochondria.  
O‟Malley carefully describes the evidential and conceptual divergent 
foundations of each camp. Her analysis confirms the extension of the problem 
of underdetermination that I propose above. About the debate around the “first 
eukaryotic cell”58, she observes that both camps  
make their evolutionary case for particular candidate organisms by 
marshalling different combinations of genetic, biochemical, cell-biological, 
phylogenetic, and geochemical data (O‟Malley 2010, 213).  
Divergent views, then, are not the result of a “classical” contrastive 
underdetermination in which the same evidence equally supports competing 
hypotheses. In her analysis, which echoes my own, coexisting competing 
hypotheses are generated from a divergent set of evidence. This stems, 
according to her, from the multifacetedness of the problem and from the deeper 
conceptual and methodological disagreements underpinning the field. This 
debate is, in her view, “about justifying certain models, methodological choices, 
disciplinary commitments, epistemic strategies and ontological assumptions” 
(O‟Malley 2010, 219). Since O‟Malley did not explicitly frame her article in terms 
                                            
58 As a reminder, the origin of mitochondria and the origin of eukaryotes are 
supposed to be sufficiently interlinked causally and temporally to be considered 
as one event.  
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of questions of underdetermination, one of the interests of reopening this case 
is to extend her analysis in this direction.  
Related to this, O‟Malley also did not explicitly articulate a discussion of 
scientific pluralism from this case study. However, these questions are twice 
hinted to when motivating her analysis:  
By working our way through these evaluative strategies we may 
understand more about […] how scientific disagreements persist despite 
the conviction that increasing body of evidence will bring about 
reconciliation (O‟Malley 2010, 213).  
Other angles of inquiry involve how a field of inquiry copes with decades 
of epistemological tension between contested and unresolved 
explanations, and whether, in fact, such tension is a problem or an asset 
for explanatory puzzle-solving (O‟Malley 2010, 214).  
These two quotes provide a concise and well-formulated summary of some of 
the motivations underlying this present chapter. The first quote interrogates one 
of the expectations associated with modest pluralism, namely “bringing in more 
evidence is going to dissipate the plurality of hypotheses”. The second quote 
opens a reflection on the possible benefits and risks of sustained pluralism. 
Framing explicitly this case study as a discussion of underdetermination and 
pluralism allows me, I hope, to provide more extensive answers to some of the 
questions she raised.  
Despite the several common points there are between my chapter and 
O‟Malley‟s article, there remains a methodological difference. The case she 
studies is framed as a debate about the origin of eukaryotes. I choose to restrict 
this interest to the debate around the necessity of phagocytosis for this origin. 
The origin of eukaryotes, as it is generally understood (and described in chapter 
2), is an interlinked series of problems, comprising: 
(1) the origin and nature of the future host; 
(2) the origin and nature of the future symbiont;  
(3) the initial interaction between the future hosts and symbionts;   
(4) the integration of the symbiont within the host;  
(5) the required adjustments to turn this integration into a functional one;  
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(6) the changes from the last common ancestor to all mitochondria-related 
organelles to various forms of mitochondria-related organelles;  
(7) the origin of the various eukaryotic innovations (nucleus, cytoskeleton, 
peroxisomes…).  
Cavalier-Smith and Martin integrate all of these aspects into lineage 
explanations (see Chapter 3). This nevertheless does not mean that each of 
these aspects must be treated as epistemically indivisible. Restricting my 
attention on the necessity of phagocytosis, which concerns the integration of the 
symbiont within the host, allows me to remove some of the complexity of this 
epistemic context. For instance, lines of evidence supporting or undermining the 
various mechanisms proposed to explain the functional integration of 
mitochondria do not necessarily bear on the debates around the necessity of 
phagocytosis. 
Restricting the scope to the question of phagocytosis is also a relevant entry 
point to discussions about pluralism. Competing claims about phagocytosis are 
one of the cornerstones of the controversy on the origin of eukaryotes. Dealing 
with this specific question zooms in on some of the most fundamental sustained 
disagreements between Cavalier-Smith and Martin.  
B. ENDOSYMBIOSIS AS PHAGOCYTOSIS: PROS AND CONS 
To provide a reconstruction of the evidence defending and contesting the 
necessity of phagocytosis for the origin of mitochondria, I now use the 
framework for evidential claims presented in the previous chapter. As a 
reminder, Toulmin schemas (TS) decompose epistemic contexts into six kinds 
of components: warrants that license an inferential jump from facts to claim; 
backings and rebuttals, respectively supporting or undermining a given 
component of the context; and qualifiers which modulate the strength of the 
links between components. In the previous chapter, this framework was used to 
provide historical time-slices of the varying support for the Archezoa hypothesis. 
In this chapter, I use this framework in a comparative and static way to highlight 
the differences between two contrasting evidential claims.   
I start by outlining the various lines of evidence for the argument defending the 
necessity of phagocytosis (the “phagocytosis first” argument henceforth). An 
important and intuitive fact for this claim is the result of a consensus. The now 
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accepted endosymbiotic theory for the origin of mitochondria, which postulates 
the integration then enslavement of a free-living bacterium that became the last 
common ancestor of all mitochondria-related organelles, requires the 
engulfment of an organism by another. Combining this fact with the principle 
that the integration of foreign organisms requires phagocytic capabilities 
supports the claim that the origin of mitochondria requires phagocytosis.  
Another, more sophisticated fact, involves reasoning in terms of energetics. It is 
argued by Cavalier-Smith that the phagocytotic feeding mode allows for a 
release of the selective pressures applied to cell size. Phagocytosis thus 
enabled marked increases in cell size, these increases in cell size “imposed 
upward coevolutionary pressures on genome size” and nuclear volume 
(Cavalier-Smith 2014, 15). By allowing for larger genomes, the acquisition of 
phagocytosis then allowed eukaryotic cells to develop the various innovations 
related to eukaryotic cells. Because of that, the engulfment of a free-living cell at 
the origin of mitochondria-related organelles is considered here as a secondary 
consequence of the acquisition of phagocytosis, it accelerated but was not the 
main trigger for the origin of the main eukaryotic features.  
These two data are backed from two sources. The first one is the evolutionary 
assumption of the greater importance and priority given to autogenous evolution 
– internally-driven changes in cellular constraints and potential (O‟Malley 2010, 
212). The second backing comes from the coherent integration of the 
“phagocytosis first” claim into a bigger evolutionary explanation about the origin 
of eukaryotes and early evolution of life. A representation of the evidential claim 
in favour of “phagocytosis first” is represented in Fig. 15.  
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Figure 15 Representation of the various lines of evidence in favour of a “phagocytosis 
first” hypothesis. 
The opponents to the “phagocytosis first” claim, claiming instead that the 
acquisition of mitochondria did not require the evolution of phagocytosis (the 
“mitochondria first” argument henceforth), ground their argument on 
diametrically different facts. They affirm, on the contrary, that it is only via the 
acquisition of mitochondria that the rest of the eukaryotic innovations, including 
phagocytosis, could evolve (Lane and Martin 2010). The acquisition of 
mitochondria would have allowed these cells to be energetically sufficiently 
efficient to afford bigger genomes, while mitochondria-less prokaryotes simply 
cannot afford them. These bigger genomes, so the argument goes, are the 
prerequisites for supporting the various eukaryotic innovations. The acquisition 
of mitochondria, then, is the exogenous event that was necessary to trigger the 
origin of eukaryotes. This openly contests one of the backing of the 
“phagocytosis first” claim, which postulates that the most important evolutionary 
changes come from the inside, as well as the validity of the bioenergetic line of 
reasoning behind one of the facts.  
It is one thing to argue that only the acquisition of mitochondria, and not 
phagocytosis, could allow for the evolution of eukaryotes, it is another to affirm 
that phagocytosis is just too costly to evolve at such an early stage of eukaryote 
evolution. This second line of reasoning affirms that phagocytosis is not a trait 
that can be treated as an “early” one. It is rather affirmed that phagocytosis is a 
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“sophisticated endocytic process” (Martin et al. 2017, 15) which “demands a 
fully functional endomembrane system” (Gould et al. 2016, 7). Arguments from 
Martin and his colleagues are based on a breakdown of the needed 
components for this cellular function, and the energetic demands that are 
associated with it.  
Another type of facts mobilized in favour of the “mitochondria first” claim comes 
from the observation of extant organisms. It is argued that contemporary 
prokaryotes are capable of displaying Russian dolls-like arrangements. In these 
cases (reviewed in Martin et al. 2017, 23-26), some prokaryotes harbour other 
prokaryotes within them. The interesting thing about these host prokaryotes is 
that they are not capable of phagocytosis. While the actual mechanisms 
underlying the possibility of this integration are still debated, these cases, 
according to Martin, clearly show that the integration of foreign organisms does 
not necessitate phagocytosis, in sharp contradiction with the warrant mobilized 
in favour of the “phagocytosis first” claim. 
Backings for the “mitochondria first” claim comes from the commitment of their 
defenders to alternative accounts for the evolution of eukaryotes (for instance, 
the “hydrogen hypothesis” by Martin and Müller described in Chapter 2). These 
explanations do not postulate the necessity of phagocytosis for the 
endosymbiosis of mitochondria. At the same time, they deny the autogenous 
idea that the main evolutionary events primarily come from the inside, by 
making the acquisition of mitochondria play the central role in the origin of 
eukaryotes.  
An overall summary of the “mitochondria first” evidential claim is provided in Fig. 
16. The community of evolutionary biologists still clearly sided on this particular 
questions. A substantial number of evolutionary biologists still support the 
necessity of phagocytosis, and there are similarly many scientists defending the 
opposite.  
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Figure 16 Representation of the “mitochondria first” evidential claim. 
C. ANALYSIS 
The application of TS to this case confirms O‟Malley‟s analysis as well as the 
reconfiguration of the topic of underdetermination I proposed above. The 
requirement of phagocytosis for the origin of mitochondria is underdetermined. 
The nature of this underdetermination is not classically contrastive. The case 
study displays that the disagreement between “phagocytosis first” and 
“mitochondria first” positions does not revolve around a conflicting use of the 
same evidence. Both sides mobilize conflicting facts, warrants and backings. 
They disagree on bioenergetics arguments, for instance, as they conflict over 
the validity of a fact (“phagotrophy-based metabolism enables the increase of 
cellular volume”) and on the bioenergetic reasoning mobilized in support of it. 
This chapter only scratches the surface of this particular kind of disagreement, 
as the arguments based on energetic considerations applied to biological 
entities are worthy of an extended study. Another illustration of a factual 
disagreement is the “prokaryote Russian-doll” system used in support of 
“mitochondria first claims”. While it is a powerful backing for some, it is 
dismissed as irrelevant to the problem to defenders of “phagocytosis first” 
claims (Cavalier-Smith 2002, 307; also de Duve 2007, 400)59. Integrating these 
                                            
59 Cavalier-Smith: “I consider that such large bacteria with relatively flexible 
surfaces able to take up other bacteria could have evolved only within the 
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positions within wider explanations about the origin of eukaryotes also provide 
variable support, depending on the scientist‟s take on the subject. On the whole, 
the disagreement runs over several levels and therefore cannot, again, be 
strictly narrowed to a matter of empirical equivalence. I further argue that it is 
not a case of a conflict of the hierarchy of the available evidence. These 
scientists are not disagreeing about which of the facts matters the most, but 
rather about what counts as facts as well as on the background knowledge 
underlying their constitution.  
Secondly, this case study highlights the variety of knowledge mobilized on the 
discussions around this claim. The debate on phagocytosis is another 
illustration of historical scientists‟ evidential omnivory, discussed in previous 
chapters. Formulating evolutionary explanations necessitates taking into 
account an astounding breadth of cellular biological details, and phagocytosis is 
no exception. Phagocytosis as a cellular phenomenon has been subject to a 
careful breakdown by all the participants. Some emphasized, for instance, its 
relation to the cytoskeleton, others the acidification of food vacuoles or aspects 
of the membrane trafficking system. Understanding the evolution of each 
structure and process involved is potentially evidentially relevant. Phagocytosis 
as an energetic process has also been more and more brought to careful 
scrutiny, and it might constitute the main focus of future discussions on the 
issue. These discussions require the mobilization of notions of bioenergetics 
and thermodynamics to help estimate, for instance, the energetic cost of cellular 
innovations. Recent claims about the discovery of potentially phagocytic 
archaea (Spang et al. 2015) also spark debates around the genetic basis of 
phagocytosis.  
Will this disagreement be settled at any point in the near future? An epistemic 
bet on this question is a matter of attitude. An optimist considers that new lines 
of evidence and improved theory and methodology will help to provide stronger 
arguments that will give a decisive advantage to “mitochondria first” or 
“phagocytosis first” claims. The acceptance of the endosymbiotic theory for the 
origin of mitochondria discussed above, and the rejection of the Archezoa 
                                                                                                                                
protective cytoplasm of pre-existing eukaryotic cell and are therefore irrelevant 
to the mechanical problem of the origin of mitochondria.”  
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hypothesis, discussed in the previous chapter, showed that this is not 
impossible to achieve something near certitude in evolutionary biology. There 
are, on the contrary, two reasons that can give grounds for pessimism. The first 
is to deny the epistemic tractability of the problem: the depth and variety of 
relevant knowledge are just too big to be integrated into a coherent and definite 
answer. The second is to consider that the damage made by information-
destroying processes are too deep and that too much evidentially relevant 
information has been erased. This would prevent historical scientists from ever 
finding a “smoking gun”: a sufficiently clear set of traces that would constitute 
sufficiently strong evidence in favour of one claim over another. As made clear 
by this analysis, I don‟t feel sufficiently confident to escape agnosticism on this 
question. Keeping with a pluralist stance, the fate of this controversy is an open, 
empirical question.  
III. METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM: PAYOFFS AND RISKS 
A. BENEFITS OF METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM 
In all cases, a commitment to this pluralist stance, as outlined in the first 
section, reminds us not to perceive perennial disagreements as a failure of 
scientific research. There are many potential drawbacks associated with cases 
of forced consensus and unwarranted abandonment of competing hypotheses. 
Chang provides a particularly eloquent discussion of such a case in 18th/19th-
century chemistry (Chang 2012, 1-70). He argues that the “phlogiston theory” of 
combustion has been prematurely dismissed in favour of the “oxygenic theory”. 
This unwarranted pursuit of a single system of knowledge then resulted in 
closing off “certain theoretical and experimental avenues for future scientific 
work” which eventually “retarded scientific progress in quite tangible ways” 
(Chang 2012, 47). Actively maintaining multiple competing claims underlined by 
divergent conceptual and methodological commitments, as recommended by 
Chang‟s active realism outlined above, allows instead maximizing epistemic 
entry points on various aspects of reality.  
In this case, this form of pluralism pushes us to view the coexistence of the 
“phagocytosis first” and “mitochondria first” claims as a positive outcome of the 
existing heterogeneity of conceptual and methodological commitments in 
evolutionary biology. This plurality of approaches allows for the continuous 
redefinition and expansion of the problem. An illustration from the case study is 
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the recent rise at the centre stage of energetic considerations. Increased 
attention on the evolution of membranes (see, for instance, Lombard et al. 
2012) might also help the development of unforeseen lines of evidence. The 
development of this multiplicity of approaches would surely be hampered if the 
current plurality of opinions were not present.  
More generally, promoting methodological pluralism diverts us from considering 
the achievement of a consensus to be the sole epistemic good to be pursued. 
Currie distinguished between direct and indirect epistemic goods (Currie 2018, 
293-307). The former could be conceived as theoretical advances directly 
related to the investigation in question. In this case, direct epistemic goods 
range from theory choice to methodological and conceptual changes that bear 
directly with the investigation about the role of phagocytosis in the evolution of 
eukaryotes. Indirect epistemic goods are goods generated by this particular 
investigation that turn out to benefit other ones that are more or less related. 
The achievement of a consensus, in this view, is one direct epistemic good 
among others. Similarly, by encouraging a shift from the study of scientific 
theory to the study of scientific practice, Chang encourages us to stop solely 
being preoccupied with “propositions and their truth” (Chang 2012, 17). Here, 
while the main question does not get a definite answer, the debate around 
phagocytosis yield a variety of direct and indirect epistemic goods, including: 
 knowledge about phagocytosis and its anterior evolutionary forms;  
 knowledge about the physiology of extant and extinct microorganisms; 
 continuous improvement of methods of phylogenomic analysis, the study 
of fossils, the study in vitro and in vivo of extant organisms…  
Again, there are many ways with which one could see this sustained 
disagreement as positively impacting our knowledge (see O‟Malley 2013; 2016, 
for similar points on molecular phylogenetics). It can even be the case, as 
Chang outlined in the phlogiston/oxygen controversy, that competing 
hypotheses accidentally mutually support each other by providing knowledge 
that will eventually benefit its competitor (Chang 2012, 49). Will such benefits be 
lost if this disagreement is eventually solved and only one claim survives? I 
think that resolving the disagreement on phagocytosis is likely to open up new 
questions and, hence, new areas of disagreements. The benefits of 
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methodological pluralism, even though they are not always direct, would, 
therefore, be continuously generated in this domain of investigation.  
Embracing this form of pluralism and reaping its benefits is, however, not a risk-
free activity. There are inherent difficulties and challenges associated with the 
coexistence of competing claims.  
B. METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM’S CHALLENGES 
What are the risks associated with the coexistence of incompatible hypotheses? 
In his defence of pluralism, Chang identifies three types of challenges a sceptic 
might pose. Because my view builds upon his, these challenges are, at face-
value, similarly relevant to my argument:  
(1) “Wouldn‟t the co-existence of different systems cause confusion and 
prevent effective research?” 
(2) “Doesn‟t the maintenance of too many competing scientific systems 
dissipate valuable resources?” 
(3) “Won‟t arguments about fundamentals divert scientists‟ energy and 
attention, preventing them from launching into specialist research?” 
(Chang 2012, 48-49) 
The third worry does not affect this case study: this chapter‟s case of 
disagreement, if anything is, is part of specialist research. The first question is a 
matter of potential epistemological obstacles to scientific progress associated 
with the coexistence of competing hypotheses. The second question is a matter 
of fair repartition of available research funding.  
What confusion could be caused by a sustained disagreement about the 
necessity of phagocytosis? The key problem, here, is the variety of knowledge 
involved in the case. Because the problem is multifaceted, a wide range of 
expertise is called upon. It seems impossible to require from each person 
involved in the discussion to have the whole range of relevant expertise. This 
poses a challenge in terms of trust and contestation vis-à-vis the various types 
of expertise in the community. How to facilitate the exchange of knowledge 
between different actors? How to avoid, on one side, authoritative impositions of 
insufficiently scrutinized claims and, on the other, illegitimate dismissal of claims 
because it was made with unfamiliar but relevant bits of knowledge? The 
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heterogeneity of conceptual and methodological commitments makes these 
risks particularly salient.  
If hypotheses coexist, how to make a decision about which research program 
should be funded? Chang brushes off this legitimate concern in his specific 
case by invoking the inexpensiveness of the phlogiston research of the time 
(Chang 2012, 49). This argument cannot be invoked here. The epistemic 
pluralism adopted in this chapter emphasized a change of focus from theories 
aiming solely at generating true descriptions of the world to a wider vision of the 
direct and indirect epistemic goods that can be fruitfully generated. Therefore, 
future resources should not be allocated on the promise that the funded project 
will overrule its opponent. Assessments of the potential payoffs, instead, can be 
made by estimating potential methodological improvements, potential relevance 
and opportunities for other areas of knowledge or for some of our conceptual 
understandings. This is a definitely not a “foolproof guide to a fair distribution of 
research funds”, just some suggestion for criteria of evaluation of future 
projects.  
C. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
I have argued and illustrated in this chapter that the problem of 
underdetermination in historical sciences runs deeper than has usually been 
characterized. This is not a worrying sign. It instead provides, I think, a more 
realistic picture of underdetermination as a problem not restricted to the 
interpretation of evidence. It also can affect the choice of what counts as 
evidence and the methodological and conceptual commitments underpinning 
the creation and interpretation of this evidence. This also creates a more 
positive form of pluralism: from a necessary evil of cases of contrastive 
underdetermination, it becomes an indicator of the variety of (sometimes 
conflicting) approaches employed in the investigation of a phenomenon. This 
rearticulation of the relation between underdetermination and pluralism is 
illustrated by a study of the disagreement over the necessity of phagocytosis for 
the origin of eukaryotes.  
This chapter closes on the benefits and risks associated with methodological 
pluralism. Cultivating several competing approaches is a double-edged sword: 
on one side an expansion and enrichment of the problem, on the other a risk of 
confusion and cross-talking between non-overlapping types of expertise. The 
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problem of the unavoidably unequal distribution of expertise seems akin to the 
one faced in all cases in which various scientific actors facing a multifaceted 
problem have non-overlapping expertise. For this reason, it would be worth 
delving on the literature dedicated to “trading zones”, “inter-field theories” and 
“interdisciplinarity”. These are cases in which, as Chapman and Wylie describe, 
“it takes a community to mobilize the critical scrutiny necessary to hold 
evidential claims accountable” (Chapman and Wylie 2016, 84). Within historical 
studies of evolutionary biology, the importation of molecular techniques to the 
construction of phylogenetic trees has also been the object of extensive studies 
and could be a good place to look at to understand the forces driving the 
extension and the changing importance of types of evidence.  
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CONCLUSION 
The present dissertation proposed an exploration of several aspects of a 
particular scientific endeavour, namely, the study of unique events in the past. 
This was done on the basis of a case study, focusing on the contrasted 
hypotheses of Bill Martin and Tom Cavalier-Smith on the origin of eukaryotic 
cells. The philosophical analyses proposed in the chapters initially derived from 
a general sense of puzzlement about the case. How was it possible for these 
radically different theories about the same event to coexist? This question, 
addressed in Chapter 7, drew with it a set of additional inquiries about the 
practice of these scientists. From this, the present work aims to sketch a 
philosophical picture of these scientists‟ practice.  
Chapter 1 served as an introduction that interrogated the scope and meaning of 
the philosophy of historical sciences. I particularly interrogated the relation 
between historical sciences and human history, arguing against a strong 
methodological separation between both. This makes legitimate the use of 
analyses of the practice of human history as relevant resources for the case 
study at hand. I then drew parallels between „metaphysical‟ and „practice-
oriented‟ projects in philosophy of history and philosophy of science. „Hybrid 
works‟, looking at metaphysical and practice-oriented questions simultaneously, 
were then described as a source of inspiration to this dissertation.  
Chapter 2 summarized the (current) content of the hypotheses of Tom Cavalier-
Smith and Bill Martin about the origin of eukaryotes. This provided a scientific 
basis from which the philosophical analyses in the following chapters could 
draw and expand.  
Chapter 3 started this analysis by characterizing the type of theories that such 
hypotheses were. After reviewing the two main candidate epistemological tools 
for this task, ephemeral mechanisms and narrative explanations, I presented 
these two as subtypes of lineage explanations. This opened the possibility of 
having mixed lineage explanations that combined mechanistic and narrative 
elements within it. Are Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s hypotheses mixed lineage 
explanations? The application of this concept to my case study pointed to the 
rather narrative character of these scientist‟s theories. Moreover, this 
investigation revealed the presence, within these explanations, of non-linear 
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events, running in parallel, as well as “messy” elements, events occurring in an 
imprecise order. I left it open to further investigations what these apparently 
messy elements tell about the maturity of such explanations, as well as how 
mechanistic such explanations will turn out to become.  
Chapter 4 related these lineage explanations to the question of scientific 
representations. How are these explanations representing their target? I 
proposed an analysis focused on Toon‟s “make-believe” and Frigg and 
Nguyen‟s “DEKI” accounts. The latter argues to improve on the former‟s main 
shortcomings. I argued to the contrary by defending an interpretation of the 
make-believe account as a special case of “DEK(I)”, one in which the process of 
“imputation” (“I”) is superficially invisible because it is maximized. I then 
characterized Cavalier-Smith and Martin‟s lineage explanations as cases of 
“D(E)K(I)”, cases similar to Toon‟s but where “exemplification” (“E”) was also 
made invisible. This created a picture in which lineage explanations directly 
represent their target by containing fictional truths about it. It is possible, with 
further exploration, to uncover other, implicit, fictional truths. This set of explicit 
and implicit fictional truths constitute direct representations of the event in 
question and are the set of propositions that are to be assessed empirically.  
How are these fictional truths assessed? In Chapter 5, I proposed a critical 
survey of existing accounts of the methodology of historical sciences. From a 
set of quotes stemming from the context of human history, I first identified a 
series of components pertaining to investigations in historical sciences. This 
served as a set of guidelines with which to evaluate existing concepts put 
forward by philosophers of historical sciences. Despite its optimistic outlook and 
emphasis on mutual interactions of lines of evidence, I criticized Cleland‟s 
account as placing too much emphasis on the discovery of trace evidence, and 
as neglecting the importance of theories in directing inquiries and generating 
evidential relevance. I then presented a series of concept adapted from Currie 
and Wylie that, I think, adequately capture key aspects of the methodologies of 
these sciences. This analysis did not enable me to construct a step-by-step 
account describing how these sciences work. I think that the inherent diversity 
of practices within historical sciences prevent such thing to happen. It instead 
provided a series of concept that, I think, can be useful to analyse local 
practices within these sciences.  
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Chapter 6 narrowed down its attention on the topic of evidential claims. How is 
evidence used in the justification of hypotheses about the past? I used some of 
the insights garnered from the previous chapter to articulate some desiderata 
for such an account. I then proposed to adapt Toulmin‟s framework for 
argumentation, “Toulmin schemas”, to capture the dynamics of evidential claims 
in historical sciences. I illustrated the efficiency of this framework by using it to 
capture the shifting evidential dynamics of the Archezoa hypothesis, a 
taxonomic and evolutionary hypothesis from Cavalier-Smith that was initially 
supported then progressively rejected.  
In the final chapter, I proposed another application of Toulmin schemas to help 
to address different philosophical concerns. This time, they revolved around 
questions of theory underdetermination and pluralism. I first proposed a critique 
of the notion of “contrastive underdetermination” as stemming in a form of 
“modest”, and ideally temporary, pluralism. I argued that because of the 
heterogeneity of conceptual and methodological commitments within a given 
discipline, underdetermination was not mainly concerning the data to hypothesis 
link: it runs deeper, at the level of the constitution of evidence. Conceptual and 
methodological heterogeneity indeed undercuts disagreements on what counts 
as evidence, ultimately leading to formulations of hypotheses based on non-
overlapping sets of evidence. Pluralism, here, stems from the inherent 
heterogeneity within a discipline. Such defence of a deeper form of 
underdetermination was illustrated by the disagreement on the necessity of 
phagocytosis between Cavalier-Smith and Martin. This disagreement is based 
on what counts as valid evidence and on divergent conceptual and 
methodological commitments. I concluded this chapter by outlining the potential 
benefits (the flourishing of many perspectives) and risks (the absence of 
sufficient common grounds for a fruitful discussion) which this pluralism entails.  
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GLOSSARY 
actin: Protein composing the cytoskeleton involved in cellular movements and 
muscular contraction.  
adenosine triphosphate (ATP): An organic molecule that serves as the cellular 
currency of molecular energy.  
autocatalytic: To be said of chemical processes that are capable of increasing 
their own rate without the intervention of an external substance (a catalyst).  
autotrophy: Designates the capacity by organisms (autotrophs) to produce 
complex organic compounds from simple ones (to contrast with ”heretrophy”).  
bacteriophage: Viruses that specifically infect and replicate within a bacterium. 
centrosome: In the cytoskeleton, centrosomes are responsible for the 
organization of microtubules.  
cytoplasm: Space delineated within the plasma membrane of a cell.  
cytoskeleton: Literally meaning “cellular skeleton”. The cytoskeleton is a cellular 
network responsible for many of the cellular movements within and outside of 
the cell.  
endomembrane system: System of membranes that are found within the 
cytoplasm of a cell, typical of the eukaryotes.  
endoplasmic reticulum: An interconnected network of compartments found in 
the cytoplasm of eukaryotes. This organelle plays the main role in protein 
synthesis and key functions in the synthesis and maturation of lipids.  
glycoproteins: Proteins with chains of sugars (oligosaccharides) attached to 
them.  
heterotrophy: designates organisms (heterotrophs) which are incapable of 
producing their own complex organic compounds and instead import these 
compounds from the external environment (to contrast with “autotrophy”). 
hydrogenosomes: Organelle mainly responsible for energy production in the 
cell. Only works in anaerobic environments. Hydrogenosomes can also possess 
their own DNA, and are evolutionarily related to mitochondria and mitosomes.  
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hyperthermophiles: Designates a particular affinity of organisms for a type of 
environment. Hyperthermophiles live in extremely hot environments (from 60 
degrees Celsius).  
introns: Portion of a gene that will be spliced out after the transcription process 
(at the pre-mRNA stage). To be contrasted with “exons”, the part of a gene that 
will ultimately be translated into a protein.  
lipids: Lipids are molecules made of a hydrophilic head and of a hydrophobic 
tail. Among specific characteristics, the link between the head and tail, in 
archaeal lipids, is made of an ether bond and the long hydrophobic tail is made 
with isoprene chains. 
lysosome: Cellular structure responsible for the digestion of intracellular 
material.  
mesophiles: Designates a particular affinity of organisms for a type of 
environment. Mesophiles live in environments with mild temperature (between 
20 and 45°C).  
microtubules: Network of cellular fibres, part of the cytoskeleton, involved in the 
maintenance of cellular structure and cellular transport.  
mitochondria: Organelles mainly responsible for energy production in the cell. 
They do so mainly in aerobic environments. Mitochondria possess their own 
DNA and are evolutionarily related to hydrogenosomes and mitosomes.  
mitosomes: organelle evolutionarily related to hydrogenosomes and mitosomes 
of yet undefined function.  
mRNA: see “transcription”.  
oligosaccharides: small polymers (a few residues) composed of sugars.  
peptidoglycan: bacterial membrane component that maintains the membrane‟s 
structural integrity.   
peroxisome: Eukaryotic organelle responsible for the degradation and synthesis 
of various cellular components (lipids, amino acids, sugars)  
phagocytosis: Process of engulfment and digestion of foreign material by a cell.  
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polyphyletic: A polyphyletic group is a taxonomic group that has been grouped 
together but turns out not to share an immediate common ancestor.  
ribosome: see “translation”. 
transcription: Process that transforms a type of molecule of biological 
information into another. Transcription processes transform DNA into 
corresponding messenger RNA (mRNA) by the use of a protein named 
polymerase. 
translation: Process that transforms a type of molecule of biological information 
into another. Translation processes transform RNA into a sequence of amino 
acids usually called proteins using a multi-protein complex called “ribosome” 
and with transfer RNA (tRNA) carrying amino acids to the correspondent RNA 
triplet.  
tRNA: see “translation”. 
tubulin: constituent proteins of microtubules, fibres composing the cytoskeleton 
(see above)  
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